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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

For a long time, studies of communism were limited to the analysis of the Soviet
Union and its economic and political system. In the late 1960s first works of comparative
nature started to appear, demonstrating that there were different types of communism and
that each communist country followed its own path of development. When communism
collapsed at the end of the 1980s – beginning of the 1990s, this pattern repeated itself.
The transition process was understood in terms of transforming the general common
features of communism – changing the ownership structure, lessening state control,
liberalizing markets and prices, creating multi-party political systems, etc., and the
discussions, stressing the differences in the communist systems in all those countries on
the verge of the transition, faded away. As the reform process progressed, though,
questions arose as to why some former communist countries were having more luck with
adopting the new market institutions than others. Eventually the interest in the influence
of country-specific differences on the process of economic and political development reappeared.
This work focuses on such differences in the development of Hungary and Russia.
It demonstrates how different their paths of economic development were to break the
myth of a ‘uniform’ communist economic system established in the region. It analyzes
where these different paths brought the two countries before their communist regimes
collapsed and whether we can trace the presence of these differences in the current

Karapetyan, Zinaida, 2005, UMSL, p. 2

developments. The framework of the analysis is discussed in greater detail at the end of
this chapter.
A number of comments are in order before I proceed. I take the year 1990, when
the first multi-party parliament in Hungary was elected, as the year of the collapse of the
communist regime in that country. For Russia it is the year 1991, when Boris Yeltsin was
elected President of Russia and the Soviet Union dissolved. I refer to the governments
before 1990 in Hungary and 1991 in Russia and their respective regimes as ‘communist’
for the sake of simplicity, even though theoretically one could render it inaccurate.
Likewise, the leading party of the period in Hungary is referred to as ‘the Hungarian
communist party,’ even though its official name was the Hungarian Socialist Workers’
Party. The period after 1990 in Hungary and 1991 in Russia is referred to as the period of
restructuring or the period of transition to the market, even though one could argue that
the transition to the market in Hungary had begun long before then. The historical
analysis of Russia is presented through the historical analysis of the Soviet Union rather
than of the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic, because the Russian Republic was the
dominant power and decision-maker in the Soviet Union. The case would have been
different if the study focused on one of the other fifteen republics, because they had their
own specific features of development. Finally, the term ‘top manager’ or sometimes just
‘manager’ and ‘director’ are used interchangeably throughout the analysis to refer to the
person with the final decision-making authority at the enterprise level.
I start this chapter with a description of the traditional Soviet economic model and
a traditional Soviet enterprise to acquaint the reader with the subject of the debate on
transition. These two were at the core of the restructuring process. In subsequent chapters
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it will be demonstrated that these two traditional ‘models’ were not as traditional for
Hungary, as one was led to believe when the transition process started. I then proceed
with the discussion of the economic theories that have shaped the transition process in
Eastern Europe and a brief description of the economic transition in Hungary and Russia
after the collapse of communism. I then look at the alternative explanations for
development and present the framework of the analysis. The final section summarizes the
structure of the thesis overall.

The Traditional Soviet Economic Model1
The traditional Soviet economic model operated under a fully state regulated
centrally planned economy. The operation of the economy revolved around the
fulfillment of the five-year plan. The highest party authorities set the objectives to be
attained every five years and the national planning organ translated those objectives into
the plan. The national plan included the aggregate targets for the whole country, which
were then broken down by ministries and lower level departments and agencies into
specific targets and directions, including resource allocations, at the branch and enterprise
level for every economic activity. The enterprises were prescribed what kind of product
they were to produce and what quantity. The plan figures were likewise desegregated into
yearly and quarterly targets.

1

This is a general outline of the model that was in operation in the Soviet Union until the end of
the 1980s. The analysis in the next two sections is based on Alec Nove, The Soviet Economic System, 3rd
ed. (Boston: Allen & Unwin, Inc., 1986); Joseph S. Berliner, Soviet Industry from Stalin to Gorbachev:
Essays on Management and Innovation (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988); Paul R. Gregory and
Robert C. Stuart, Soviet Economic Structure and Performance, 3rd ed. (New York: Harper & Row,
Publishers, 1986); Richard E. Ericson, “The Classical Soviet-Type Economy: Nature of the System and
Implications for Reform,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 5, no. 4 (fall 1991): 11-27; B. D. Shtundiuk,
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A hierarchical government structure was set up to regulate, monitor, and
implement the plan. At the top of the hierarchy were the cabinet of ministers and an array
of central agencies (for example, Gosplan in the USSR or the National Planning Office in
Hungary). Ministries constituted the next level of the hierarchy that were directly
overseeing enterprises. Each ministry was divided into ‘chief administrations’ ( glavks)
each responsible for a different economic activity.
In the Soviet Union there were three types of ministries - all-union ministries that
supervised key industrial branches with enterprises throughout the Soviet Union; unionrepublic ministries that supervised enterprises that fell under the dual subordination; and
republic ministries that supervised enterprises producing for local markets. The
organizational structure of all three types was very similar.
At the bottom of the hierarchy were the enterprises themselves that were actually
responsible for fulfilling the plan’s targets. From 1973 on a new entity, an ‘industrial
association’ was gradually introduced that was to take on the functions and gradually
replace the chief administrations (glavks).
Since the whole objective of the society was to fulfill the plan, any uncertainty
that could disrupt its implementation had to be eliminated. At the national level this was
carried through by completely eradicating the market and free prices. The fulfillment of
the planned targets was believed to only be possible if the supply of materials and
resources could be guaranteed and, thus, controlled, which would be impossible to
accomplish through the market mechanism with its free flow of goods and resources.
Likewise, free prices could disrupt the supply of materials and resources because of their

Obyedineniya i Upravleniye Promishlennost’u (Associations and Industrial Management) (Moskva:
Izdatel’stvo ‘ Nauka’, 1976).
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unpredictable nature. The plan, demanding certain production figures from enterprises in
exchange had to provide the enterprises with adequate supply of materials, which was
thus accomplished through the system of state material distribution at fixed prices. The
prices, then, became just a tool for bookkeeping.
The producer prices (referred to as ‘the industrial wholesale prices’ in the USSR)
were determined on the basis of an average branch cost of production (including wages,
depreciation, insurance, and some other costs) plus a profit markup. They tended to
remain unchanged for a long time. In the case of the Soviet Union major changes had
taken place only with the price reforms of 1929, 1936, 1949, 1955, 1966-67, with some
minor adjustments in the 1970s, which meant they rarely reflected the real cost of
production.
Roughly speaking the producer price plus the turnover tax constituted the retail
price. The starting point here, though, was not the producer price, but the centrally
determined retail price calculated to ‘clear the market.’ 2 The difference between the
clearing price and the producer price then constituted the turnover tax. If the industrial
wholesale price was greater than the clearing price, no turnover tax was added and
subsidies were given to compensate for the difference. In other words, producer prices
and consumer prices were not related to each other.
The only truly market determined prices in the Soviet Union were the prices that
collective farmers could charge for their produce on collective-farm markets (either
selling produce from their private plots or the produce of the collective farm that
remained in their hands after the state requirements had been met).

2

To make sure that the product would be sold.
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The economy had to be isolated from the effects of the international markets and
their free prices as well. All foreign trade transactions were made through the All-Union
Import-Export Associations subordinated to the Ministry of Foreign Trade and organized
by product (books, autos, etc.) These organizations served the role of a middleman
between domestic and foreign enterprises, only domestic enterprises did not have any say
in the transaction. The domestic producer was simply authorized to produce a certain
item for export, which was then purchased by a respective Association at the domestic
price and sold to the foreign enterprise at the world market price. By the same token, the
Association bought authorized products on the world market at the world market price
and then sold it to the local producer at the local price. The state either expropriated the
extra profit made from such dealings or subsidized the price difference.
The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) was set up to regulate
the trade between the countries of the Soviet bloc and, consequently, make them as little
dependent on the trade with the capitalist countries as possible. Only goods not available
within the Comecon market were supposed to be bought outside.
The Soviet banking system was dominated by a single monopoly bank, the State
Bank (Gosbank); there were two other banks, the Investment Bank and the Foreign Trade
Bank, but as their names suggest, they had specific functions and their duties did not
intersect with those of the State Bank. The State Bank carried out all the functions of
central and commercial banking. All financial flows at the enterprise level were carried
out through accounts at the State Bank: short-term credits for working capital, receipts,
profits, wage fund, etc.; enterprises were not allowed to deal in cash.
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The structure of the economy was as an inverse pyramid with large enterprises
and production associations composing the largest proportion. State and collective
ownership prevailed; private ownership was limited to personal possessions.

Industrial Enterprise in the Traditional Soviet Model
A typical Soviet enterprise was headed by a director presiding over a professional
management staff: a deputy director, chief engineer, chief accountant, chief economist,
and chief technologist. The director himself (rarely herself) normally had an engineering
degree.
The work of the enterprise revolved around the annual techpromfinplan (technical
industrial financial plan) providing directives from the Central Planning Organ, the
responsible ministry, and the production association. Generally speaking, the plan
provided what inputs the enterprise was to receive and what outputs it was to produce.
More specifically, on the input side, the plan specified what material, financial, and
technical resources the enterprise would receive, how the enterprise was to utilize
available plant and equipment resources, labor and wages, and the rate of labor
productivity. On the output side it prescribed how much of the product the enterprise was
to produce (specified in quantity or rubles), what kind of product, where and when the
enterprise was to deliver the product, the enterprise’s profits, profitability rates, and
payments to the state budget.
The techpromfinplan was developed as a result of the following process:
enterprises received five-year aggregate targets from the ministry for the next five-year
plan, drew up their five year plan taking their capacity and all the other factors into
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consideration, and submitted them back to the ministry for revisions and final approval.
The process was no different if the enterprise was a part of an association, with the
exception that the enterprise submitted its plan to the association and then the association
would provide an aggregate plan for all the enterprises to the ministry.
Since there were penalties for under-fulfillment of the plan targets enterprises
tried to underestimate their capacity in the process of plan development to receive targets
that they could actually fulfill. What evolved was a system of extensive bargaining, “as
the central authorities strive for maximal performance with threats of punishment while
subordinates seek ‘easier’ tasks by pleading incapacity.” 3 Since the branch ministries and
other local regulatory authorities were responsible to their superiors for the fulfillment of
the plan targets at the enterprise level, it was in their interest as well that the enterprises
received more or less realistic assignments. There was little or rather almost no incentive
for enterprises to over-fulfill the plan.
This planning model, unfortunately, only worked well on paper. In actuality, the
final plans were often based on distorted information and were unrealistic to fulfill:
Due to the size and complexity of the planning problem, the limited information
and computational capability of the central authorities, the fact that existing
information is distorted by subordinates seeking easier assignments, the extreme
time pressure under which they are operating, and the continually changing
economic situation, detailed operational plans are rarely consistent and central plans
are only so at the most aggregate level. (Ericson 1991, 17)
This inconsistency was further exacerbated by the unfeasibility of its targets due to the
policy of ‘taut’ planning pursued by the government – “assigning ambitious targets and
limiting the resources provided.”4 These conditions made the fulfillment of the plan at the

3

Ericson, “The Classical Soviet-Type Economy,” 15.
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enterprise level almost impossible. As a result enterprises or rather their directors had to
develop certain strategic behaviors to attain or sometimes pretend to have attained their
final goal of plan fulfillment.5
Since the targets assigned to enterprises normally could not be simultaneously
achieved, the director had to make a decision about which plan indicators to fulfill to
satisfy the central authorities. Gregory and Stuart point that managers used “plan
directives, the bonus system, informal and formal communications from the party, and
simple intuition” 6 to figure out the preferences of the planning authorities. Despite the
inclusion of and reinforced focus on profit and profitability from the 1960s, the main
focus throughout the Soviet times remained on output:
Historically, the priority system has consistently signaled the priority of
output performance over other plan targets. Thus, the priority system directs them
to emphasize output performance over other plan targets, with the resulting
neglect of costs, innovations, quality, and so on. Second, the priority system
signals to managers the relative importance of the various enterprises with whom
they conduct business. If managers find themselves unable to meet delivery
obligations to both enterprises X and Y, they must rely on their priority awareness
to make their choice. (Gregory and Stuart 1986, 220)
Clearly, then, what resulted was not only neglect for quality, technology, and other
indicators, but also an inefficient system of output allocation with regular delays and even
failures to deliver products to the customer, whose production process was then
obstructed as well.
4
5

Ibid., 17.

Failure to fulfill the plan could result either in the loss of bonuses or the loss of the job for the
director, which would entail a loss of much more than just employment and the salary. The position of a
director held quite a large number of perks for its holder. For example, besides the monetary rewards,
which constituted a substantial portion of the director’s income and were much higher for the position of a
director than anyone else at the enterprise, there was a myriad of non-monetary rewards that in a nutshell
provided the director access to otherwise limited and non-available resources such as good living quarters,
an automobile, etc.
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Thus, the ‘priority system’ was not sufficient in itself to control for the problems
of the plan mechanism, in particular, for the irregularities in availability of the inputs.
The managers then resorted to other strategies. One of these was to hoard resources
(including labor) - the manager would try to stockpile extra materials and employ more
people than would normally be necessary, to be ready for any unexpected changes or
irregularities in the plan. Storming – the production of a large portion of plan output at
the last minute, had become the usual production style as well.
Another strategy to control for irregularities with inputs was to use services of a
middleman called a tolkach (an expeditor, but the literal translation is a ‘pusher’). The
tolkach was someone, not necessarily employed by the enterprise, who had the ability to
procure necessary materials for the production using connections and all other means
possible.
All this naturally demonstrates that the Soviet manager was resistant to innovation
in the production process, because it would only add more uncertainty to the fulfillment
of the plan.
According to Gregory and Stuart the management style of the Soviet enterprises
was characterized by three main features: centralism, verticalism, and one-man
management (edinonachalie).7 Centralism referred to the idea of democratic centralism,
according to which democratic discussion was encouraged during the stage of
deliberation on a particular issue, but the final decision was made at the center.
Verticalism referred to the vertical organization of the economy and the top-down flow of
directives from Ministries to enterprise management. The one-man management placed
6

Gregory and Stuart, Soviet Economic Structure, 220.
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the responsibility of the enterprise functioning on the enterprise manager;
“’edinonachalie’ means that the manager has the authority to direct the labor and capital
resources of the enterprise (within the constraints imposed by the plan). The manager’s
staff is obliged to obey the manager’s directives, according to Soviet law.” 8
Finally, because employment was a Constitutional right, according to which every
person was guaranteed a job, the common Western perception of the Soviet industrial
worker was ‘lousy and lazy’ - he/she did not care about the quality of his/her work and
did not work hard.
.
Two Approaches to Transition
The Soviet type economic model as described above had numerous shortcomings
- the persistence of the economy of shortage, low technological innovations, poor quality
of the products, just to name a few, that proved the mechanism to be inefficient to
generate consistent economic development and growth. To correct for all the problems
that the Soviet type economy endured, the transition to a full-fledged market economy
was advised to the ailing economies of the former Soviet bloc in the 1990s. With help
from Western specialists the governments in the region developed plans for replacing the
old institutional framework of command economy with market institutions. The two main
economic schools that dominated the discourse on the strategies of transition in Eastern
Europe were the classical/neoclassical school and institutionalists.

7

Gregory and Stuart, Soviet Economic Structure, 216.

8

Ibid.
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Principles of classical/neoclassical9 economics are based on the ideas developed
by Adam Smith who understood economic growth as dependent on capital accumulation
and culture that promoted natural liberties.10 According to Smith free trade was an
essential part of that system, because it is in human nature “to truck, barter, and exchange
one thing for another.” 11 On the basis of these principles neoclassical economists
promoted less economic control or government intervention and maximum liberalization
of finance and trade.12
A standard package of suggestions from the classical/neoclassical economists
included: liberalization of markets, abolition of barriers to foreign direct investments,
abolition of government regulations restricting competition, privatization of state
enterprises, reduction of government budget deficit, market determination of interest
rates, replacement of the quantitative restrictions on import with tariffs, establishment of
the legal system that secures property rights.13 In other words, their policy was
“withdrawing government intervention in favor of the rationalization of an economy

9

I use the terms ‘classical economics’ and ‘neoclassical economics’ interchangeably, because I am
not interested in the differences between the two approaches, but rather in the core ideas that they both
share.
10

Richard Peet, Theories of Development (New York/London: The Guilford Press, 1999), 25.

11

Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, ed. Edwin
Cannan (New York: The Modern Library, 1937), 13.
12
13

Peet, Theories of Development, 49.

Marie Lavigne, “What is Still Missing?” in When is Transition Over, ed. Annette N. Brown
(Kalamazoo, Michigan: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 1999), 19-22; Peet, Theories of
Development, 52; Merton J. Peck and Thomas J. Richardson, eds., What Is To Be Done? Proposals for the
Soviet Transition to the Market (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1991); The World Bank,
The Economy of the USSR: Summary and Recommendations (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1990).
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through disciplining by the market and by self-interested individuals efficiently choosing
between alternatives in the allocation of resources.” 14
Institutional economics partly shares classical/neoclassical assumptions, but
diverges from them in its stress on the importance of other institutions besides the
market. “Many institutional economists share the dominant notion of economics as the
study of the efficient allocation of resources, but diverge on whether the market is the
economy’s guiding mechanism. The real allocating mechanism, they say, is the structure
of the society, which organizes markets as well as other institutions.” 15 The new
institutional economists view institutional structures, understood as the web of formal and
informal rules, as the main determinant of development. To explain the state of
development at any given time they introduced a concept of ‘path dependency,’ which
maintained that institutions are created on the basis of institutional structures, and,
therefore, the values and traditions, of the past.16 Hence, it is difficult to radically alter
any existing economic arrangement, because it hinges not only upon a web of laws and
formal rules, but also upon informal codes of behavior and cultures, which are not
amenable to change. The process of institutional change, therefore, becomes highly
dependent upon the successful transformation of those informal rules and codes of
behavior as well.
In Eastern Europe the differences in the two schools manifested themselves in two
different approaches – which, for the sake of simplicity, will be referred to as gradualism
and ‘big bang’. The first approach was advocated by institutionalists and urged that
14

Peet, Theories of Development, 52.

15

Ibid., 58.
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transformation proceeded gradually with careful planning of the sequence and timing of
reforms. The second approach, backed by the classcial/neoclassical school, advocated a
fast installation of the new market institutions without concern for the sequence or timing
of changes. Hungary adopted the first approach and Russia the second.
The basic differences between the two approaches were well summarized by
János Kornai as follows:
Supporters of strategy A [gradualism] envisioned the private sector’s share
of output growing as new private firms appeared and the state sector shrank with
the sale or liquidation of state-owned companies. They emphasized the creation of
favorable conditions for bottom-up development of the private sector:
encouraging the launch of new firms by eliminating the barriers to entry,
guaranteeing the security of private ownership, enforcing private contracts, and
applying affirmative action – cautiously – for example, tough tax and credit
policies.
Strategy A called for the privatization of state-owned companies through
the sale (at fair prices) of state assets, preferably to outsiders able to invest in the
companies. State property would not be given away – insiders would also have to
pay a fair price. After sale, ownership would be concentrated in the hands of a
dominant owner.
Strategy A also stressed the importance of hard budget constraints17 and
consistent enforcement of bankruptcy and accounting laws. Hard budget
constraints introduce a process of natural selection: profitable companies are
bought by investors while chronic loss makers are forced into bankruptcy and
liquidation.
In contrast, strategy B’s emphasis was on the rapid elimination of state
ownership. It called for privatization primarily through some form of giveaway –
for example, voucher schemes. The goals were dispersed ownership – the equal
distribution to all citizens of state assets – and the development of ‘people’s
capitalism.’ (Kornai 2000, 12)

16

Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge
University Press, 1999), 92-104.
17

As opposed to ‘soft budget constraints’ that were the practice during the communist regime. The
term ‘soft budget constraint’ was introduced by János Kornai himself and refers to the situation when
enterprises’ expenditures are not bound by their income, because the state readily covers the excess
expenditures (See János Kornai, Vision and Reality, Market and State: Contradictions and Dilemmas
Revisited (New York: Routledge, 1990), 20).
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Transformation of the Russian Economy in the 1990s
The first Russian economic reform program came into effect on January 2 of
1992. It was a big bang strategy calling for immediate price and trade liberalization along
with a decrease in state spending and an increase in control of the monetary supply. Mass
privatization was to follow as soon as liberalization and stabilization were achieved. The
government believed that price liberalization would not cause high inflation, because
certain measures for price monitoring would be put in place; that the market mechanism
would take over and the currency would quickly stabilize; and that “within a year Russia
would have a budget without deficit and a system of maximum social protection for its
population.” 18 Contrary to these expectations the country started sliding into a deep crisis
as soon as prices were liberalized in the beginning of 1992: the first quarter of 1992 saw
an 800-900 percent increase in prices for most goods and services, and they continued to
rise on and off afterwards; production started to fall; by March 1992 there was a shortage
of money, which meant that people were not paid their wages, salaries, and pensions on
time; many enterprises had to switch to in-kind payments of wages to their employees;
people’s savings held in the state bank lost their value; by the summer and fall of 1992
the government was forced to cut financing of health, education, and other social
programs.19
The first privatization program introduced in the summer of 1992 turned into a
big disaster as well. In line with the general purpose of privatization the Russian
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government hoped to transfer state enterprises onto the shoulders of private entrepreneurs
that would be financially interested in making them efficient and profitable. A number of
privatization strategies were designed, the most notorious of which was voucher
privatization. During the design stage of this privatization program at the end of 1991 the
plan was to transfer state property to all citizens of the country by creating personal
accounts for each citizen and depositing equal amounts of money that could only be used
for the purpose of privatization. The amount to be given away was calculated by dividing
the value of Russian productive capacity by the number of people. In the end, no
accounts were created and the money was distributed to people in the form of vouchers;
“these were nondescript pieces of paper, not backed by any government guarantee.”

20

They were anonymous too, which meant there was no way of telling whether the voucher
reached its designator, and, if not, where it went. Vouchers could be used to buy shares of
enterprises that were listed by the government for privatization.
There were many problems with this privatization scheme: the value of the
voucher was set before the inflation process started, but as the inflation devalued the
voucher no revaluation of the value of the voucher took place; the base values of the state
enterprises were set often at ‘one thousandth’ of their real value, which meant the
country’s assets were literally given away instead of being sold off ; people that bought
up vouchers cheaply and used them to buy state enterprises at ridiculously low values,
did not have the millions of dollars necessary to revitalize the enterprises, which, in the
end, meant that no changes at the production level occurred; the regular Russian citizen
had no idea what the purpose of the voucher was and what privatization meant, and
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considering the critical economic situation many either simply sold their vouchers for
cash for much less than their real value or did not do anything with them at all.21 Out of
148 million vouchers that the government thought would have been used by 1993,
completing the voucher privatization stage, only 36 million were used.22 “The
management of an enterprise did not obtain any real capital as the result of
privatization...The government...gained no economic benefit.” 23
Another form of privatization was the sale of state property of the service
industry. In some cases it did result in improvement of the services, but mostly with their
re-orientation to serve the narrow well-to-do strata of the society.
Before large and medium size enterprises could be privatized they had to be
transformed into joint-stock companies. The workers of the companies had a number of
options for transforming enterprises. The first option gave the employees (the worker
collective) 25% of the shares free of charge and another 10% at reduced cost, but they did
not obtain control over the new enterprise. The second variant gave the worker collective
51% of the shares and a real control over the management of the enterprise. Finally, the
third variant provided for a free sale of the enterprise at a market price. The second
variant was the most popular, because it provided the worker collectives with real
powers. At the same time it was an option that was the least likely to bring the necessary
innovation and changes in the life of the enterprise:
It was obvious that workers would not be interested in allocating profits to
pay dividends to incidental shareholders instead of increasing their own wages.
On the other hand, this variant of privatization made it difficult to carry out
21

Ibid., 90-93.

22

Ibid., 94.

23

Ibid.

Karapetyan, Zinaida, 2005, UMSL, p. 18

reorganization and modernization, especially if laying off workers was involved.
In other words, productivity of labor would be raised very slowly. Few people
were interested in buying shares in such enterprises. Not surprisingly the
formation of such joint stock companies did not result in greater efficiency of
production and in many cases made the operation of plants and factories more
difficult. (Medvedev 2000, 92)
Only two percent of enterprises were privatized according to the first variant. The
companies that were to be sold at free prices for the most part had to be sold at their low
base value, because there was no capital in private or institutional hands to bid for higher
prices. Most of them were bought with vouchers acquired from all over the country.
The next wave of privatization was initiated in 1994 when thousands of
enterprises were put up for sale through auctions for real money, and not vouchers, and
then in 1995 when large blocks of shares of enterprises were auctioned off (instead of the
whole enterprise or its individual shares). Much has been written about the abuses of the
process during which even profit-making enterprises were sold off for a fraction of their
cost or former top-secret technologically advanced government enterprises were acquired
by foreigners through questionable deals.24 The main result of the process was the
enrichment of private individuals and not the state coffers that remained as empty as they
were in the beginning.
According to Philip Hanson the Russian transition was also failing in
macroeconomic stabilization and the building of market institutions.25 The macrostabilization was compromised by persistent budget deficit and large government
spending not matching its revenues. The establishment of the market mechanism was
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undermined by high barriers to both market entry and exit: “licensing and regulation by
local and regional authorities have been comparatively oppressive and corrupt....Barriers
to market exit have loomed at least as large as those to market entry. Perhaps the biggest
single failure in Russian implementation of market reforms has been the maintenance of
soft budget constraints on large state and ex-state enterprises.” 26
At the end, Yeltsin’s attempts to establish a market economy resulted in the
creation of what Michael Elman called a mutant economic system.27 In place of an
efficient state apparatus, which was the hope of democratic transformation, a corrupt and
parasitic one developed with officials treating their positions as a chance to enrich their
private foreign bank accounts rather than perform their duty. The economy became more
primitive and the importance of the division of labor in the society decreased, which,
among other things, could be seen in a dramatic increase in the importance of the
subsistence sector in agriculture (private plots, gardens, allotments, dachas,28 etc). The
importance of barter transactions in industry and agriculture increased as well, by March
of 1998 accounting for 50% of industrial sales and almost entirely replacing monetary
transactions in agriculture.29 Wages, pensions, and other payments were rarely paid on
time often reaching a delay of a few months (and not only in the state sector). The
economy became completely saturated with crime ranging from racketeering to
assassination of ‘competition’; the criminal, political, and business worlds became highly

26

Ibid., 1142-1143.

27

Michael Ellman, “The Russian Economy under El’tsin,” Europe-Asia Studies 52, no. 8
(December 2000): 1417-1419.
28

A dacha is a place in the country that people normally use to grow fruit and vegetables for
personal consumption or sale.

Karapetyan, Zinaida, 2005, UMSL, p. 20

inter-wound with even the national legislature housing large-scale criminals and
‘protecting’ them under legislative immunity. Reciprocity, a pre-capitalist form of
economic relations, remained very important. Ellman, nevertheless, points out that it was
a mutant, but market economy, with a relative abundance of goods and services and
absence of queues. It was an economy that responded to the ruble crisis in 199830 the way
that a market regulated economy is expected to respond - with the decrease in imports
and increase in exports and in import-substitution forms of production.31
This was the country that the current Russian President Vladimir Putin inherited
from Boris Yeltsin. Remarkably enough, just within a few years of his ‘reign’ President
Putin managed to move the country’s economy in the positive direction: the rate of
inflation was slowed down, the economy started to grow, the state budget was becoming
balanced, “private ownership of land has been reintroduced, financial markets revamped,
rules covering customs simplified to cut down on corruption and a start made on the
banking sector, natural monopolies and judicial reform.” 32 A plan for a comprehensive
reform of almost every aspect of life has been introduced. The President has made it clear
that the ‘stealing’ of state property would be put to an end and that enterprise tax
discipline would be better enforced. Various measures have been introduced to remove
the market entry obstacles to new enterprises: “the economic development ministry has
pushed through laws to reduce taxes on small firms, speed up and simplify business
registration procedures, cut burdensome state inspections, and trim the number of
29
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licenses and permits companies require to function.” 33 The problems are still numerous,
but the overall prognosis is much more optimistic than it was under Yeltsin. The main
outcome, though, is that the country is still largely in the process of transition 15 years
after it began.

Transformation of the Hungarian Economy in the 1990s
The transition in Hungary presents an absolutely different case. Not only did the
strategy differ, but the outcome was much more successful and the country had managed
to turn its economic orientation 180 degrees by becoming a member of the European
Union in May of 2004. This provides a drastic contrast with Russia’s on-going attempts
to create a friendly environment for private businesses and reorient its economy to the
market.
The first liberalization measures in Hungary were actually introduced under the
old Communist government and included liberalization of foreign trade, prices, wages,
transactions in foreign currency, and wholesale markets in factors of production.34
The privatization process began in 1990 with selling off small shops with less
than 10 employees and restaurants, hotels, and service outlets with less than 16
employees, which was normally referred to as pre-privatization, in which only
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Hungarians could participate.35 The process was not much of a success, because (1) it did
not include the transfer of rights to tangible assets - buildings and land, but only to the
furniture, inventory, and rental rights, which created an image that the government was
‘selling the air’; (2) banks were not eager to provide credit for such purchases; and (3) the
conditions for starting a business from scratch were often more attractive than acquiring
one through the process of pre-privatization.36 As a result, only 2,120 small businesses
out of 10,000 eligible were privatized in the process of pre-privatization.37
The first privatization program of 20 large enterprises based on the centrally
directed privatization process, in which the state assumed full control, was likewise a
failure. By the spring of 1991 not a single one of the 20 enterprises had been bought.38
The State Privatization Agency admitted that the failure of the program lied in its neglect
of company managers, who actively resisted the changes imposed from above. “By
manipulating inventory and production figures, dragging their feet, and scaring off
potential investors who were not to their liking, managers won the cat-and-mouse game
against the agency.” 39
In the summer of 1991, having learnt the lesson, the government introduced a new
privatization program - self-privatization, according to which enterprises could start the
privatization process with the assistance of small private agencies licensed by the State
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Property Agency. Enterprise managers were given complete control in finding outside
investors and the sale of enterprises was conducted entirely by the private agencies
without interference from the state. This program was a great success.
In 1992, an employee-share ownership privatization program was introduced, and
from 1993 forward enterprises could be leased with an option to buy after six to eight
years.40 Government loans were made more available for privatization needs as the
process progressed. Along with the privatization program the government introduced
measures to decrease its subsidies and investments.
The policies of the first post-communist government, headed by the Hungarian
Democratic Forum, nevertheless brought recession: the current account and the budget
deficits were mounting. The new government under the leadership of the Hungarian
Socialist Party was elected in 1994, introducing a new radical program in 1995 known as
the Bokros package (named after the current finance minister) to bring the deficit down,
restore the balance of trade, and eventually improve the growth rate. The main principles
of the program were reduction in government spending, increase in taxes, devaluation of
the currency, and instituting a crawling-peg exchange rate.41 The new government also
revitalized the privatization process that slowed down in 1994 this time selling off a
significant portion of the state assets to foreign investors.42 The new economic program
largely achieved its goals: “Hungary’s growth rate accelerated, inflation moderated, the
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trade balance improved (through the much faster expansion of exports than imports), the
current account also improved, and foreign debt reduced.” 43
By 1998 leading economic researchers announced that “the foundation of
capitalism had been laid in Hungary.” 44 János Kornai concluded that the transition to
capitalism in Hungary was achieved according to the following three criteria – the
monopoly power of the Communist Party had been abolished; private ownership became
dominant in general and in its contribution to GDP in particular; and the market
coordination of economic activities supplemented by other mechanisms replaced the
central coordination mechanism.45
The end of the transition process was manifested by the beginning of negotiations
for membership in the European Union in 1998, which marked a new stage in Hungarian
development – the stage of convergence of the Hungarian economic and political system
with laws and regulations of the European Union. The culmination of that stage was the
Hungarian people’s approval of joining the Union in May of 2004.

Cultural Approach to Development
“The Western European economies share a common core of capitalist institutions.
It is that common core that should be the aim of the Eastern European reforms. The finer
points of choosing between different sub-models…can be put off until later, once the core
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institutions are firmly in place.” 46 This was the main premise behind all the reform
proposals drafted by Western ‘experts’, which was supported by the idea that once this
core of capitalist institutions was established, people would ‘naturally’ take advantage of
the opportunities provided by the new institutions. In the beginning, there was little
discussion of a possibility that these proposals failed to account for something that could
create obstacles to their realization. Eventually, as the transition process unfolded itself it
became obvious that its success greatly varied across the region with some countries
being more successful than others. It also became obvious that the original proposals did
lack something that was apparently creating obstacles.
The reform designers mostly blamed the failures on the flaws in the
implementation process, not the strategies themselves. Others have been trying to
understand what could have been missing from the beginning that made those strategies
at times obsolete. One explanation is offered by the cultural paradigm – there was a
disagreement between cultural values and the strategies and goals of transition.
The idea of the importance of culture in development is not new. Max Weber was
the first to bring attention to it by asserting that values and ideas could influence the
process of economic change.47 He challenged the assumption of social action as based on
predictable self-interest that derives its social knowledge from empirically verifiable
information – the premise that modern economics is based on.48 He believed that there
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was no pre-determined pattern for social change and that the path of social development
was a matter of probability and chance. 49 Each society according to Weber is at a unique
stage of development at any given time that cannot be predictably foreseen.50
Almond and Verba drew attention to the importance of political culture for
understanding development. They defined political culture as a system of “specifically
political orientations – attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, and
attitudes toward the role of the self in the system...It is a set of orientations toward a
special set of social objects and processes.” 51 Political culture generates political structure
and behavior and, also, is a product of political structure and behavior.52 “Beliefs,
feelings, and values significantly influence political behavior...and ...are the product of
socialization experiences.” 53
There are numerous definitions of culture. Adler identified a number of points
that seem to be most commonly agreed upon: culture is something that is shared by most
members of the group, that is being passed from generation to generation, and that
influences behavior.54 Values are what is shared by the group within the same culture.
“Individuals express culture and its normative qualities through the values that they hold
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about life and the world around them. These values in turn affect their attitudes about the
form of behavior considered most appropriate and effective in any given situation.” 55
Values can be defined as either consciously or unconsciously held general assumptions
about what is right and wrong, and what is preferable;56 they are “a broad tendency to
prefer certain states of affairs over others.” 57 Attitudes express values and predispose
people to act in a certain manner.58
Numerous studies have been conducted to demonstrate the persistence of culture
through time. In the 1970s an analysis of the political culture of the communist states
revealed that the results of political change after communist takeover were consistent
with the countries’ previous political experience and political culture:
The Hungarians seem to have settled, faute de mieux, for a system in which
parliament, the courts and the press have much the same ambiguous but not
ineffective role as they had before the Second World War. The Poles have used
their traditional alternation of adaptation and insurrection to limit the right and
responsibilities of government to a level not dissimilar to that which Polish
governments enjoyed between 1919 and 1939. The Yugoslav system seems to
satisfy very well the political expectations of a society in conditions in which one
nationality, the Serbs, suffers discredit from this association. The caudillo element
in Cuban socialism is obvious, and in this respect Cuban government is probably
very much what the Cubans expect good government to be. In China there has as
yet been no settlement of a modus vivendi between the old and the new, but the
issues involved could well be expressed, as far as values are concerned, entirely in
the language of the traditional political culture – and frequently are, even by the
great iconoclast Mao Tse-tung himself. In the Soviet Union, the relative lack of
change since the death of Stalin expresses the consonance of Russian tradition and
Soviet practice; such change as there has been might be described as the
relinquishment of Stalinist excesses in order to return to the normal Tsarist level
of authoritarianism. (Gray 1979, 267)
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Kathryn A. Szent-Györgyi, likewise, finds that the pre-communist behavioral patterns
and attitudes in villages in Hungary carried on and influenced the behavior and attitudes
of peasants in those villages well into the 1980s.59
Similarly, there have been studies of cross-country differences in culture. From an
analysis of worker surveys from 40 countries Hofstede concluded that the different
combinations of four dimensions of national culture - Power Distance, Uncertainty
Avoidance, Individualism, and Masculinity explained the differences in organizational
structures and work-related values across the countries.60 Every feature of the
organization – from motivation to leadership, was contingent upon those four
dimensions.61 Dorfman and Howell building upon Hofstede’s work found that two of the
leadership processes that they studied – directive leadership behaviors and contingent
punishment leadership behaviors, were moderated by cultural beliefs, and that the other
two - contingent reward behaviors and supportive leadership behaviors, were not.62 They
nevertheless mention that in respect to the latter two the evidence does exist in the
literature that cultures differ in how they perceive their importance.63 Adler provides a
number of examples of how cultural values of different societies shape their
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organizational behaviors and how confusing it can be when one tries to apply managerial
principles from one cultural setting to another.64

The Current Study
The main contention between the economic approaches to transition presented
earlier and the culture driven approaches to development discussed in the previous
section lies in their understanding of the importance of culture specific characteristics for
the process of development. Economists place their trust in creating the ‘right’ market
institutions that can work within a setting of any country. Cultural theories suggest that
institutions operate within a framework of a certain culture that shapes institutional
development as well; the process of economic development, then, has its own logic in
every country and cannot be easily duplicated within a different cultural setting.
Not all economists disregard culture as unimportant. Institutional economists,
through their idea of path dependency, for example, accept informal rules and behaviors
as building blocs of institutional structures as well. Their attention to culture, though, is
normally limited to obstacles that it creates to the establishment of new market-based
institutions. The question of whether the new institutions can fit a particular cultural
setting and whether they are needed at all is not discussed, because the establishment of
these new institutions is understood as the main goal of transition and a major precondition for attaining successful development.
In this work I do not argue whether one approach is right or the other. I have
introduced the economic theories to acquaint the reader with the logic behind the process
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of transition in Eastern Europe. I have introduced the cultural theories to demonstrate that
certain characteristics of societies not only stubbornly persist through time and change,
but also often determine the process of change itself. Taking these macro-level processes
as a starting point by presenting a history of Hungarian and Russian economic
developments during communism with the emphasis on heir cultural and institutional
differences, I then analyze their manifestation at the micro-level – the enterprise.
Enterprise is a driving force of economic development. Economists set up market
economic structures so that enterprises had the right environment to become efficient and
productive and had the ability to generate economic growth. At the same time, in line
with the cultural paradigm, enterprise is a product of the society and culture and it
expresses social and cultural values in its behavior. In relation to macro-level processes
enterprise demonstrates how the society translates these processes to the micro-level
filtering them through cultural values and social preferences.
Without having an understanding of this interrelation one can attain only a partial
understanding of political and economic developments in a given country. Despite the
presence of all the ‘right’ market institutions, for example, market can be very limited in
its ability to set rules of the business game, and this can often only be revealed through an
analysis of enterprise behavior.
One comment is in order before I proceed. The focus on economic development
in this work does not mean that it excludes the importance of political processes. On the
contrary, the study analyzes government decisions (that is, political decisions) that
pertain to generating economic change. Economic development, then, is understood in
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the content of political economy with culture- and country-specific features at the
foundation.

Framework of the Analysis
The analysis is structured as follows. First, a historical development of the
planned economic system in Russia and Hungary is presented with emphasis on two
issues – how the system came about and what kind of reforms had been introduced prior
to its collapse. There are a number of reasons why this historical overview is important. It
has become a common trend to view the communist period in East Central Europe and
the former Soviet Union as something alien, which interrupted their normal path of
development for so many years. In the case of East Central Europe it was believed to
have existed and lasted as long as it did only because the Soviet Union forced the
countries to adopt the system with the threat of military intervention. In the case of
Russia it was the communist party headed by Lenin and then Stalin that took over the
country and kept it its prisoner until it collapsed in 1991. Little attention has been paid to
the economic and political circumstances of the time when the systems in the two
countries were coming into being. As a result it was perceived as a structure that had
been imposed on the two countries and not developed. Consequently, little merit has been
given to the idea that the systems had developed according to the countries’ specific
circumstances and cultures and that they were different on the verge of the transition
process. The analysis here demonstrates that whereas the Russian economy indeed
operated according to the above-presented model, the Hungarian economy did not,
already being saturated with elements of the market.
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The study then continues to show that as a result of these differences not only the
state Hungarian industrial enterprise was different from the Soviet industrial enterprise,
but that Hungary had laid a foundation for the legal private sector and private initiative
long before the transition to the market started, while the Soviet Union never allowed that
in its own country.
I then present the results of a survey of managers of industrial enterprises in the
two countries conducted in 2004. The analysis of the survey results focuses on three
issues – (1) the degree of the enterprises’ market orientation, (2) outside factors that
impede or help enterprises in their work, (3) the political and economic events that have
had an effect on their business environment, the job and skills of the manager, and the
relationship between businesses and government.
Two general hypotheses are proposed. (1) Hungarian enterprises will
systematically display more market oriented behavior than Russian enterprises; (2)
regardless of the political and economic developments in the two countries in the last two
decades, the businesspeople in both countries will perceive no or little change in their
business environment and their work as a result of those events.
The first hypothesis was born from the idea that since Hungarian culture was
much more market oriented than Russian culture before the transition process started,
Hungarian businesspeople are more likely to be market oriented than Russian
businesspeople today. Since it would be a major mistake of logic and common sense to
argue a direct link between the communist time and present omitting the one and a half
decades of successful transformation in one country and its failure in the other, I do not
intend to do so. The market orientation analysis is presented to demonstrate to what
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degree industrial enterprises in the two countries have adapted to the new system and
whether the qualitative analysis of the results can point at any connections with the
communist times.
The second hypothesis is based on the premise that if the two countries had
developed according to their own specific paths of development and cultures before the
transformation process started, the economic and political events of the post-communist
transformation would be a continuation of that process and none of the political and
economic events of the transition process would be perceived as having had an effect on
the business environment and enterprises.
The survey results support the first hypothesis that Hungarian businesspeople are
more market oriented than Russian businesspeople and partially support the second
hypothesis showing that economic and political events of the last decades have had little
or no influence on the life of Russian enterprises but have had a significant influence on
Hungarian enterprises.
The final discussion of the analysis provides a link between the main findings of
the survey and the historical analysis. Among other things it demonstrates that business
practices in the two countries do indeed display features whose origin can be traced back
to the communist period, and that the influence, or the lack of thereof, of political and
economic events on enterprises in the two countries can be understood through a prism of
the countries’ distinct legal traditions.
The main objection that one may have to the approach presented in this work is its
seemingly light treatment of the reform process of the 1990s as an influential factor in
explaining current developments. Two counter objections can be brought against such
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arguments. First, there have already been many studies that demonstrated the effects of
the reform choices on various aspects of countries’ development, the limitations of such
approaches for explaining development, and the influence of culture on the process of
development.65 Second, what this study seeks to do is to discover the continuity in the
country’s development through finding similarities between its communist past and
immediate present; and, in this respect, any effect that the most recent reform processes
have had are beyond the scope of the study.
Russia was chosen for the analysis because it was the country where the Soviet
economic model was born and operated until its collapse. Hungary was chosen for
comparison with the differences described above.

Structure of the Thesis
The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows. Chapters 2 and 3 provide the
historical analysis of the economic changes in the Soviet Union and Hungary since the
advent of communism until its collapse. Chapter 4 compares the state and private sector
in the two countries before the transition to the market began and the implication of their
differences for the transition process. The next three chapters present the results of the
survey: Chapter 5 focuses on the survey methodology and respondents’ description,
Chapter 6 analyzes the enterprise behavior and their market orientation, and Chapter 7
discusses external constraints and events that have influenced enterprises’ business
65
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environment. Chapter 8 brings the results of the historical analysis and the survey
together to show the continuity in each country’s development, and concludes with the
lessons that can be learned from the research.
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CHAPTER 2
SOVIET ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
-What is worse than an atomic bomb?
- Battleship Aurora: one shot brought seventy years of destruction.1

At the current stage of economic development of Russia, when the emphasis is on
the country’s transition to the market, only basic institutional principles of the soviet
economic model are remembered, because those are the principles that the market reform
has been introduced to change. Since the model is normally perceived to have been
created on the basis of ideological principles of communism and since the communist
ideology is no longer in the leading position, the political and economic circumstances
that prompted its development are often overlooked as irrelevant for understanding the
current stage of economic development of the country. The objective of this chapter is to
demonstrate that the model did not develop simply out of some ideology that the
communist party imposed on the country, as many wish to see it. The model was as much
of a product of political and economic circumstances at the time of its establishment as of
some ideology that Russian communists often stretched to fit the circumstances.
This chapter first outlines the historical events that led to the development of the
traditional Soviet economic model as described in chapter 1 and then traces economic
reforms that aimed at ‘improving’ the model from the 1960s until 1991.
Often an analysis of a country’s economic development is limited to certain
criteria. The dominant approach to explaining the development of the Soviet Union has
been to focus on the ideology and its role in shaping the development. Ideology has been
1

On the day of the Revolution in 1917 the Battleship Aurora fired a blank shot that was a signal
for the revolutionaries to start the storm of the Winter Palace - the building where the provisional
government met.
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used to explain the domination of state ownership and eradication of private initiative, the
collectivization of agriculture and the establishment of the centrally planned economy.
Historically determined political and economic circumstances in this approach receive
very minimal attention.
An alternative approach, which this study takes as a starting point, stresses the
importance of understanding historical circumstances on par with ideology in order to
explain why the country preferred a certain path of development at any particular point of
time.
My goal in this chapter is to demonstrate that communism did not happen in
Russia ‘out of the blue;’ that it was not some alien phenomenon that kidnapped the
country and its people for the next seventy plus years, but rather was a continuation in the
country’s development; and that its development ideologically, economically, and
politically had Russian roots and one only has to look at the historical facts to see it.
Given all of the above, its mere dissolution in 1991 could not quickly change the basic
foundations of the economic system and bring a miracle of economic recovery and fast
development of the market economy, as many believed would happen as soon as the
Russian people were freed from the ‘chains’ of the system.

The Birth of the Socialist State and Command Economy
The transformation of the Russian Empire, which subsequently came to be known
as the Soviet Union,2 began with the Great October Socialist Revolution of 19173 as a

2

The Soviet Union was established in 1922.
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result of which the Russian Bolshevik party4 seized power. Even though the one-party
system with the dictatorship of the proletariat and nationalization of the means of
production along with other major changes in line with Marxist ideology took place in the
first years after the revolution, the Soviet economic model, as we know it, did not fully
come into being until the end of the 1920s – beginning of the 1930s, under Stalin’s
leadership. In fact, the economic arrangement that preceded it was anything but the
highly centralized administrative-command economy that came to be identified with the
Soviet Union. The years of 1921 to 1928, known as the NEP– the New Economic
Policy,5 saw an establishment of a rather mixed economy with legalized private
agriculture, private trade, and some small scale private manufacturing. Why, then, had
the final system evolved into something absolutely different with the abolition of private
initiative, complete removal of the market, and a highly centralized and administratively
managed economy? Or one may rather ponder why did the NEP even happen if the
ideology, presumably, called for a centralized planned economy to be established in the
first place?
On one hand, ideology in itself cannot answer these questions, because these two
quite opposite systems happened to develop under the leadership of the same Communist
3

The revolution took place on October 25, 1917 according to the old Russian Julian calendar and
on November 7, 1917 according to the Gregorian calendar, which the country finally adopted in 1940.
Since the discrepancies between the two calendars are a matter of days and the precision to the day is not
important for the narrative that follows, no special attention will be given as to which calendar is used when
a date of an event is given.
4

The party that later became known as the Communist Party of the Soviet Union went under the
name the Bolsheviks before 1917. The party came into being as a faction that sprang from the Russian
Social-Democratic Labor Party established in 1899.
5

Although there is some debate as to when the NEP actually ended, 1928 is most commonly
considered to be the year when the shift away from the policies of the NEP began. The confusion stems
from the fact that even in 1931 official references to the NEP could be heard and the first five-year plan
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party. On the other hand, if one considers the achievements of the NEP – the recovery of
the economy to its pre-war level, rapid growth, stabilized currency, balanced budget even
generating a surplus in the 1924-25 fiscal year, one cannot help but consider its removal
as a result of its ideological incompatibility, rather than some circumstances that rendered
it unusable. It appears that ideology and circumstances played equal roles in the country’s
development of the time.
The Communist Party of the Soviet Union claimed Marxism, and later MarxismLeninism, as the guiding force of its ‘construction’ work. 6 The problem was, though,
that besides the main postulates, such as the dictatorship of the proletariat and the
nationalization of the means of production, they could borrow little step-by-step guidance
from actual writings of Marx, because of the discrepancies between the situation in
Russia and the situation of transition to communism that Marx had written about.
The transformation that Marx had predicted was to happen in a society that was
already passing through a mature stage of capitalism; Russia at the time of the Revolution
was only on the brink of establishing a capitalist society.7 As a result, any guidance that
may have been drawn from Marx’s writings as to how the transformation was to proceed
adopted in 1929 called for an increase in the national income generated by the private sector. (Alec Nove,
An Economic History of the USSR: 1917-1991, 3rd ed. (London: Penguin Book, 1992), 133.)
6
7

The word ‘construction’ here refers to ‘building’ socialism and, subsequently, communism.

Russia was still a quite backward society at the time. Here is how Gregory and Stuart describe it:
“Russia’s per capita income ranking placed her among the poorest countries of Europe. The sheer size of
the Russian Empire and the magnitude of Russian agricultural output masked the per capita weakness of
industrial outputs. The peasants, not the industrial workers, was still the dominant figure in the Russian
economy. A minority of the population – and therefore the labor force – was literate, indicating poorly
developed human capital; illiteracy was nearly complete among the vast, underemployed peasant
population. Russia’s demographic pattern was still roughly comparable to that of the developed countries
during their pre-modern periods. Birthrates, death rates, and, especially, rates of infant mortality remained
stubbornly high. Industrialization remained dependent upon foreign capital. It was not clear whether the
most highly organized institution, the tsarist bureaucracy, was a help or hindrance to economic
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could not be applied to the situation in Russia.8 The Russian Communist party had to
develop their own strategy of ‘revolutionary change’ relying on their own judgment and
interpretation of the Marxist ideas and on the circumstances at hand.
The Bolsheviks thus rejected the pattern that Marx seemed to have
envisaged for the west – of the bourgeois revolution giving rise to an initially
stable bourgeois-dominated regime, under which the economic and other
conditions necessary for socialism would be put in place. During 1917 and after
it, the Bolsheviks acted on the assumption that in Russia things would have to be
done the other way around. The socialist revolution, that is, the seizure of power
by socialists, would have to come before the socio-economic and cultural
transformation which, according to theory, should have preceded it. In Russia the
socialist regime would itself create the conditions necessary for socialism rather
than be created by them. Between the revolution and the achievement of
socialism, there would, therefore, have to be a transition period of unpredictable
length, during which the regime’s first task would be to bring the country to the
point of readiness for socialism which ‘should’ have been achieved under a
bourgeois government. (Gooding 2002, 8)
Lenin believed that the lack of mature proletariat in Russia, which was expected to be the
driving force behind the socialist revolution, would be compensated by the strong
leadership of the party of ‘dedicated professional revolutionaries’ that would rely on
waking up the socialist potential in the Russian peasantry.9 Hence, the establishment of a
strong centralized state under the guidance of the party in the first years after the
revolution.
The Russian peasant commune deserves special attention as it was at the core of
the belief that Russia could arrive at socialism its own way. Russian peasant life was
development” (Paul R. Gregory and Robert C. Stuart, Soviet Economic Structure and Performance, 3rd ed.
(New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1986), 44).
8

There is some evidence that at the end of his life Marx came to believe that a different Russian
way to socialism was possible utilizing the potentials of the Russian peasant communes (see, for example,
Haruki Wada, “Marx and Revolutionary Russia,” in Late Marx and the Russian Road: Marx and ‘the
Peripheries of Capitalism,’ ed. Teodor Shanin, 40-75 (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1983)). This
shift in Marx’s attitude did not make the task for the Russian communists any easier, though, because it
never developed into a comprehensive theory or even some systematic explanation.
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organized around their village communities, called mirs. The communes were to a great
extent self-governed. The day-to-day business of the commune was carried out by an
elected headman. The commune made its decisions through a village assembly in which a
head of every household had a vote and which every adult could attend. There were
certain principles that the communal life abided by:
The basic rules of the Russian village were mutual support, mutual responsibility,
and fair shares for everybody. Each should have enough to get by – but nobody
should have too much. Each should act socially responsibly and nobody should
imperil the general welfare, and stern action would be taken against anyone who
did flout the unwritten code. (Gooding 2002, 2.)
Even the land allocation between different households, which was the responsibility of
the commune, was carried out in accordance with these principles – instead of cultivating
one chunk of land, each household received narrow strips of land in different places so
that the bad and the good land was divided out evenly between them. The distribution
was done in accordance with the households’ work capacity or its size, and it was
revisited every so often to adjust to any changes in these regards. Even when peasants left
their villages to seek work in the cities, they would organize a sort of workers’
communes, called artels, sharing “work, wages, and hardships.” 10 The fact that former
peasants laboring in the city kept close ties with their village communes proved to be an
obstacle to the formation of a solid class of proletariat, because they often returned to the
villages when times got difficult in the city.

9

John Gooding, Socialism in Russia: Lenin and his Legacy, 1890-1991 (New York: Palgrave,
2002), 7-8.
10

Gooding, Socialism in Russia, 2.
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These main features of the Russian peasant commune - “more or less universally
accepted principles of equality and social solidarity,” 11 were praised by many Russian
intellectuals and thinkers and made the commune, unknowingly, the centerpiece of
strategies of socialists of all kinds.
In 1917 the matters for Communists were further complicated by the fact that
Marx distinguished between two types or stages of communism, one of which, the crude
communism, was eventually to lead to the final stage of communism. The Bolsheviks
themselves termed the first type ‘socialism’ and the second type actual ‘communism.’
The first phase of development after the revolution, therefore, constituted a transition
period towards the first type of communism – socialism, which was a transition period in
itself. Since in Marx’s view the first stage was to come naturally as a result of the
capitalist society’s development and its inner contradictions and was to be fairly short, it
did not receive much attention, let alone explanation, in his writings. In Russia, on the
other hand, it was an important stage. Not only did the Bolsheviks have to devise
strategies to bring the society to socialism, they had to determine when it was to begin
and, eventually, to end.12 Thus, there was little guidance from Marx for the Russian
communists regarding how to proceed with the transition to socialism.
This ideological confusion manifested itself in an apparent lack of strategy after
the take-over in October of 1917. Lenin himself wrote “there was not and could not be a

11
12

Ibid.

Gooding points out that in the beginning a distinction was made between a ‘socialist society’
and a ‘society living under socialism,’ with the former being in the transition to the latter. The distinction
was finally abandoned when Stalin in the 1930s declared that socialism had been achieved. The author
further points out that the party eventually was not eager to declare communism too soon, because it would
mean the end of its power; “the optimal target date for communism was some imprecise midway point
between the utterly remote and the fairly near future” (Gooding, Socialism in Russia, 11-12).
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definite plan for the organization of economic life.” 13 Most of the first policies that one
would have expected to happen for ideological reasons – the transition of power to the
Soviets of Workers’, Soldiers’ and Peasants’ Deputies, nationalization, and appropriation
of land, were, in reality, spontaneous processes legitimized by the communist
government ex-post-facto. Below is a brief description of these main developments.
Right after the Revolution the Bolsheviks transferred government power to the
Soviets of Workers’, Solders’ and Peasants’ Deputies, which became the foundation of
the Soviet political system. The institution of the Soviets, though, was not created by the
Communist party, and their power did not come from a revolutionary decree:
While central power was breaking down in Petrograd [in 1917, before the
revolution], moreover, it had virtually collapsed in the rest of Russia. And in the
non-Russian regions, local self-government was already a reality...An alternative
government existed in the soviets in practically every region, province, city and
town of Russia. Soviets were not omnipotent organizations. But they were
stronger than any of their institutional rivals; they had formal hierarchies
stretching from Petrograd to the localities; they had personnel who wanted a clean
break with the old regime of Nicholas II and the new regime of Lvov and
Kerenski.14 (Service 1998, 60).
What the Bolsheviks did was they changed the de facto power of the Soviets into de jure
with little additional instructions as to how the Soviets were to organize their further
work. Yakov Sverdlov, Secretary of the Central Committee of the party, wrote to a local

13

V. I. Lenin, Collected Works volume 26 (September 1917 – February 1918), translated from the
Russian 4th edition by Yuri Sdobnikov and George Hanna, ed. George Hanna (Moscow: Progress
Publishers, 1964), 365.
14

Prince Georgi Lvov and Alexander Keresnki were ministers in the Second Provisional
Government. Between the time when the Monarchy abdicated, March 2 of 1917, and the Revolution, there
were two Provisional Governments.
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party activist: “You understand, comrade, that it is difficult to give you instructions any
more concrete than ‘All Power to the Soviets.’” 15
The decree nationalizing medium and large enterprises came in June of 1918.
There is still debate whether the Bolsheviks had planned an all-around nationalization of
enterprises from the very beginning or they were opting to keep a mixed economy for a
while, but were forced to take a step in that direction by the circumstances. “It would
certainly be wrong to assume that local Soviets, even communist-controlled, acted
because the center told them to. The large majority (over two-thirds) of nationalizations
were local, until June 1918, and may have been due to genuinely local decisions.” 16 The
acts of initial nationalization had taken place at the end of 1917 – beginning of 1918
without any official policy calling for it. The government had to issue a decree on
January of 1918 proclaiming nationalization without central orders illegal, and then
follow up with another decree in April of 1918 of the same nature but with establishing
harsher punishments, because the first one had not been observed. This clearly indicates
that the process was not under the Communists’ control.
The same fate was bestowed on small enterprises. In the beginning it was
conceived impractical by the communist leaders to nationalize small-scale industry.17 The
process, though, had started spontaneously and the government had to issue a decree in
April of 1919 prohibiting such actions. The decree did not have any effect and by

15

Robert Service, A History of Twentieth-Century Russia (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard
University Press, 1998), 85.
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November of 1920, when nationalization of small-scale industry was finally made an
official policy, “most of it had already been either nationalized or paralyzed.”

18

The strong local workers self-management, which was the driving force behind
the ‘illegal’ nationalizations, did not originate with the Communist proclamation of the
dictatorship of the proletariat in 1917 either. The factory-workshop committees that were
the leading force of self-management had already existed during the provisional
government. The decree on workers’ control of 1917 that gave them more power just
“appeared to put the seal of legality on growing syndicalist, not to say anarchic,
tendencies which had been increasingly manifesting themselves for months before the
Bolshevik seizure of power.” 19
In the villages, likewise, peasants had started taking actions before the
Communist party came to power in October of 1917 and announced its agrarian reform
based on expropriation of estates in its Decree of Land. In addition to illegal uses of land
to grow crops and graze livestock, theft of crops and equipment, and illegal cutting of
timber, outright seizures of land had been recorded as early as March of 1917 with its
occurrences reaching 237 cases in June of the same year.20 Even after the land decree
came into force, Nove notes that
neither the Bolsheviks... nor any political force, could tell the peasants what to do.
Each village made its own arrangements, which varied widely between and within
regions... it was not in fact a reform undertaken by the authorities, it was a more
or less elemental act by peasants, with government organs accepting and by
implication legitimizing what was happening. (Nove 1992, 41)
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The Bolsheviks themselves in 1917 rode to power on the waves of socialism that
they had not created. In the summer of 1917, just a few months before the revolution, the
Bolshevik party was in the background of the political process. It was socialist ideas,
which were often quite different from the Bolsheviks’, which were guiding the country
with the Mensheviks and the Party of the Socialist-Revolutionaries in the lead.21 The
Monarchy abdicated in March of 1917 and the two Provisional governments that
followed were under strong influence of these two parties. Even the Constituent
Assembly, which was elected after the revolution in the first more or less free elections in
the country (and the last until the 1990s) but was dissolved by the Bolsheviks right after
the election, gave the Bolsheviks only 25% of the votes, while the SocialistRevolutionaries, for example, received 37%.22 “The Constituent Assembly polls had
given eighty-five percent of the vote to socialists of one kind or another. But the
Bolsheviks were a single socialist party whereas the working class wanted a coalition
government of all socialist parties.” 23
In other words, the Bolsheviks rose to power in the country that had welcomed a
socialist ideology long before the revolution and whose people themselves had initiated
all the processes that are now identified solely with the ideological work of the Soviet
Communist Party.

21

The Mensheviks were another faction that sprang from the Russian Social-Democratic Labor
Party and was, to some extent, similar to the Bolsheviks. The party of the Socialist-Revolutionaries differed
from the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks in its reliance on the peasantry, and not the proletariat, as the main
revolutionary force.
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War Communism
The first initial confusion as to what to do with the country that so suddenly fell
into the hands of the communist party was gradually phased away and starting in the
middle of 1918 the communist government began to introduce more or less consistent
policies. The country had gone through two distinct periods of economic and political
changes before finally settling for the system that was described in chapter 1. The first
period, that lasted from the middle of 1918 until 1921 is known as war communism. The
second period, which is described in the next section, was the era of the New Economic
Policy.
The basic features that came to be identified with war communism, besides
nationalization and expropriation of land, were forced requisition of agricultural
surpluses (prodrazverstka) and their distribution according to class and social
background; a ban on private trade, which nevertheless prospered through the black
market; elimination of money from economic life – the naturalization of relationships
between the state on one hand and its citizens and enterprises on the other; and the
militarization of labor.24
As the name suggests, war communism was a policy of a war period. After the
Revolution the Bolsheviks had a task of not only consolidating and preserving their
power, but also taking control of the country’s broken economy to face the consequences
of World War I and to combat the Civil War that was just beginning. In times of war any
government, even the most democratic one, opts for increased government intervention in
the economy to generate resources necessary to combat the war. In Russia, this necessity
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was magnified by the concurrent internal political developments. The spontaneity and
unruliness of most economic and political processes completely undermined the new
government’s ability to control the economy by indirect means, if such would have even
been considered. The communist party with its revolutionary agenda and little plan for
implementing it had very limited experience in country governance; and the only
historical example from which it could tap the necessary knowledge was the authoritarian
style of government of the Tsar. As a result, war communism was born with its emphasis
on strong government control of and intervention in the economy.
War Communism was not exactly a planned development, though. It was rather a
product of circumstances, one leading to the other, and the government’s choice as to
how to react to those circumstances.
The collapse of the ruble and the dire situation of industry prompted the
government to ‘bail out’ enterprises in need, which, unintentionally, led to the
elimination of money from and naturalization of the transactions with nationalized
enterprises.
It began with cash advances by VSNKh [the Supreme Council of National
Economy] to meet wages payments and other expenses for those enterprises
which happened to have run out of liquid resources. This practice spread. At first,
many of the advances were supposed to be credits and not grants. However, in the
general conditions of chaos and collapse, the practice of meeting the running
expenses of the economy out of the budget became almost universal and cash
payments gradually lost their significance. (Nove 1992, 57)
As this happened, workers and employees could not be paid their salaries with money
either and, thus, could not be charged for food, consumer goods, and such services as
transportation, housing, or mail. This eventually spread to other strata of the society.
24

For a full analysis of the policies of war communism see Silvana Malle, The Economic
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Private trade was declared illegal as soon as money was no longer functional. The
collapse of the monetary system, however, was not the sole reason for the abolition of
private trade. As the shortages of food continued, private ‘distribution’ of foodstuffs
posed an additional obstacle to the government’s attempt to secure food supplies to cities
strategically important for their war time industries. First came the restriction on private
trade in the main agricultural categories. Then, the system of barter between industrial
enterprises and peasants replaced the trade in agricultural products altogether, which had
actually been put into practice by enterprises and peasants before the government made it
official. Finally, the forced requisition of food surplus was imposed on the peasants.
The policy of forced food requisitions was not new to Russia either. The Tsarist
government had introduced the policy once before in response to the same problems that
the Bolsheviks were facing – the shortage of food supply to industrial centers so vital for
the war economy. 25 What was unique about the policies of the communist government
was their ideological justification as a struggle against bourgeois elements in the village.
A party decree of May of 1918 read:
While the consuming provinces are starving, great stocks of cereals,
including the 1916 harvest and the 1917 harvest which has not yet been threshed,
lie, as habitually, in the producing provinces. These stocks are in the hands of the
rural kulaks and wealthy people, in the hands of the rural bourgeoisie. Replete and
satisfied, having accumulated an enormous mass of money earned in the years of
war, this rural bourgeoisie remains deaf and unresponsive in the face of the
moanings of starving workers and poor peasants; it refuses to dispatch cereals to
the state station points with the aim of forcing the state to increase again and
again the price of cereals, while at the same time it sells for its own benefit cereals
in the provinces at fabulous prices to speculators and bagmen.26
Organization of War Communism, 1918-1921 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
25
26

Malle, War Communism, 323.

The word bagman comes from the Russian word meshochnik and refers to people that moved
the foodstuffs for illegal trading on the black market.
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The reply to the violence of grain holders upon the rural poor must be
violence upon the bourgeoisie. (Malle 1985, 359-360.)
Malle points out that the Bolsheviks were aware of other policy alternatives undertaken
in the countries like France and Britain, which could have been used in place of forced
food requisitions. Apparently, the party chose the policy because it provided the most
attractive alternative at the time. “The policy undertaken….was based on a rough
evaluation of the relative costs of alternatives, as well as on political assessments.” 27
Ideology in this case was exploited to justify the policy and give it a character of
legitimacy, rather than to guide the party in the policy-making process.
It is all too easy to attribute economic and political developments to some official
ideology, because the latter always comes through clearly in official documents.
Economic and political facts, which are often the actual driving force behind different
developments, can be scattered throughout history and do not present themselves easily
to the observer. In Russia this phenomenon often manifested itself in the revision of the
dominant ideology to justify actions that had been taken in response to circumstances.
For example, when the money lost its value, the naturalization of the economic
relationships came to be perceived by many as the sign that the society was clearly
moving towards socialism, even though this ‘feature’ of socialism had never been
mentioned before. Likewise, one of the prominent communist leaders of the time,
Bukharin, rationalized the destruction of industry as being the necessary step on the way
to building a socialist society from anew.28
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By the same token, it is difficult to understand just what war communism was.
Lenin, for example, justifying the party’s switch to the NEP in 1921 declared that “War
Communism was thrust upon us by war and ruin. It was not, nor could it be, a policy that
corresponded to the economic tasks of the proletarian;” it was “a mistake” that was “in
complete contradiction to all we wrote concerning the transition from capitalism to
socialism.” 29 At the same time, Roberts points out that Lenin originally considered war
communism as the move in the right direction to establish socialism and not just some
measures necessitated by war.30
The NEP was, likewise, justified ideologically as a necessary evil, ‘a step
backward’ from socialism that had to be taken in order for the country to take ‘two steps
forward’ in the future. In reality, however, the new policy was the government’s response
to civil unrest all throughout the country that was threatening the government’s already
shaky powers.
The next section briefly looks at that ‘step backward’ that was taken during the
NEP years just to demonstrate the stark contrast between its policies and the policies of
war communism. I do not focus on the reasons that brought the NEP, because it is not
important for the analysis. My goal is to simply demonstrate, by presenting the major
features of the NEP, that the same Marxist ideology that was used in defense of war
communism was now twisted around to justify the necessity of the NEP.

28
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The New Economic Policy (NEP)
The end of the era of war communism and, subsequently the beginning of the
NEP, came when the obligatory requisitions of agricultural surplus were replaced by the
proportional agricultural tax in March of 1921. Peasants were given the right to use the
excess product, which remained in their hands after the tax, as they wanted, including
selling it on the local market. According to Nove private trade had to be legalized if the
government wanted peasants to make the excess product available to the areas suffering
from the lack of food.31 Since it would have been difficult for peasants to travel
thousands of miles to remote areas to sell their own product (especially considering that
the majority of transporting in the country at the time was done on horse-ridden
carriages) private trade became the only alternative.
Likewise, small-scale private manufacturing had to be allowed if the problem of
shortages was to be overcome at all.32 In 1921 the earlier decree nationalizing all smallscale industry was revoked. Enterprises that escaped nationalization were allowed to reopen. The same year a decree was issued allowing private individuals to organize smallscale production. State enterprises could be leased out; even some de-nationalization
occurred with the return of enterprises to their former owners (although this was very
minimal).
The restructuring of state industry progressed along the same lines. The no-money
relations were abandoned. The practice of running industry as one giant enterprise with
the VSNKh at the top was given up. Nationalized enterprises were divided into two
categories. The first category that included fuel, metallurgy, war industries,
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transportation, banking, and foreign trade, remained dependent on the state budget and
central allocation of supplies.33 The second group was shifted to a new commercial based
system (khozraschet), in which “profit-making and the avoidance of losses were to be the
operational criteria.” 34 The latter enterprises were allowed to form trusts that were given
legal authority to enter into independent contracts.35 By 1922 trusts were operating on the
market with no priority given to the state; “if ‘privateers’ offered better prices, they
handled the goods. If private contractors or intermediaries gave better service than the
trading organizations which were slowly replacing the material-allocation bureaucracy of
the war communism period, then here too the Nepmen got the business.” 36
The currency was stabilized, the no-money relations with the population were
abandoned as well, and the country was re-opened to trade with the outside world again,
although still on a limited basis. The results of the NEP were impressive.
Economically, it appeared that the NEP had succeeded beyond everyone’s
expectations. Agricultural output in 1922 has risen enough for the Politburo to
resume the export of grain. As trade between town and countryside increased,
output recovered. By 1923, cereal production had increased by twenty-three
percent over the total recorded for 1920. Domestic industrial recovery also
gathered pace: in the same three years output from factories rose by 184 percent.
(Service 1998, 155)
Considering that by 1922-23 seventy five percent of all retail trade was in private
hands,37 the NEP became a very big ‘step backward’ by any measures, but it did attain a
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stable rate of growth and stabilize the economy. Was its abandonment, then, an act of
bringing the party and the country back in line with the Marxist ideology or were there
any other reasons?

The Establishment of the Traditional Soviet Economic Model
Apparently, the achievements of the NEP gave birth to the controversy that
eventually led to its disintegration. Bringing the country’s economy to its pre-war level
naturally raised the question of what had to be done next.
An extraordinary debate on how to initiate economic development took
place in the Soviet Union between 1924 and 1928 that anticipated Western
discussion on the same topic by some 25 years. Its participants ranged from
leading party theoreticians to nonparty economists, and its audience included
almost everyone of political and intellectual importance in the Soviet Union. The
most remarkable feature of this debate was that it raised a multitude of questions
concerning development strategy – issues of balanced growth versus unbalanced
growth, agricultural savings, the proper scope of planning, taxation, and inflation
to promote development – that are still widely debated among Western students of
economic development. The debate focused upon the alternative development
strategies open to the Soviet economy in the late 1920s. (Gregory and Stuart
1986, 76)
Here I focus on the issue that eventually divided the party and determined the fate of the
Soviet economy – the issue of industrialization.
The necessity of further industrialization of the country’s economy was
acknowledged by everyone; the controversy rose when the discussion turned to the
question of its pace and scope. A group of party leaders, that came to be identified as the
left opposition, opposed the balanced development tendencies of the NEP and called for a
rapid industrialization at the expense of the peasantry.
Encouraging the growth of the peasant and private sectors of the economy, argued
the leftists, would quickly drain capital away from the state. This was a dangerous
tendency, so the argument went, because it would create an investment crisis in
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the state’s industrial sectors. At the same time, economic policies that favored
private agriculture and trade would make the government vulnerable to the
economic power of hostile social classes – the peasants and urban trading strata...
The government should regulate prices and taxes ... to force peasant producers
and consumers to bear the burden of capital accumulation for the state’s
industrialization drive. (Shearer 1996, 82).
The party’s majority leaders, including Stalin, opposed to such a radical plan and opted
for the continuation of the NEP’s line of balanced development of the economy. “Stalin
emphasized the achievements of NEP and ridiculed the left’s super-industrialization
proposals and the left’s demand that ‘tribute’ (primitive socialist accumulation) be paid
by the peasants.... he made it clear that any movement in the direction of collective
farming would be gradual and voluntary.” 38 The left opposition was eventually silenced
and removed.
The paradox lies in the fact that after the party was rid of the leftists, Stalin turned
against his former allies, removed them, and adopted the approach propagated by the
leftists. This radical turn in his thinking first surfaced in his response to the grain
procurement crises in the second half of the 1920s.39 Despite the voices advocating
solving the problem with indirect means, such as increasing agricultural prices, Stalin
undertook an offensive against the peasants of certain areas, precisely the Urals and West
Siberia,40 along the lines of the policies of war communism:
There went Stalin with a task force of officials and police. Free markets were
closed, private traders thrown out, peasants ordered to deliver grain and punished
as criminals if they failed to do so. (Nove 1992, 150).
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Even though right afterwards he officially denounced his methods and promised that
“nothing similar would be repeated,”

41

this was a sign that Stalin’s position was shifting

away from the principles of the NEP.
Nove points out that among the reasons that prompted the shift in Stalin’s opinion
were the following:
(1) The desire by many party members, and notably Stalin himself, to
eliminate an individual peasantry which, as Lenin had said and Stalin repeated,
‘produces capitalists from its midst and cannot help producing them, constantly
and continuously...’
(2) The problem of industrial development, with priority of heavy
industry, and the linked issues of capital accumulation and farm surpluses.
(3) The price policies, in industry and agriculture, which developed in
1926 and were obstinately continued, and which could of themselves have
destroyed NEP, even if no other complications had ensued.
(4) The political atmosphere, the prejudices against the market and
Nepmen generally, the rise of monolithism and of Stalin, the ‘leap forward’
psychology. Fears of internal class enemies and also of the hostile environment,
affected both the social policies of the regime and the degree of priority accorded
to heavy industry, as the basis of military capacity. (Nove, 157-158, see also
Sigelbaum, Chapter 5).
Under these circumstances, at the end of the 1920s Stalin moved to establish the highly
centralized command economy, began intensive industrialization of the country with the
emphasis on heavy industry, and undertook the notorious policies of forced
collectivization.

Reforms of the Soviet Model.
After the system was established in the 1930s economic debate was eradicated,
criticism was not allowed, attempts to bring attention of the high officials to the idea of
the reform ended in the execution of the initiators.
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Criticism of the system became dangerous, and economic failures were attributed
to individual mistakes and willful sabotage, not to the system itself. The ‘law of
value’ – supply and demand – was declared by Stalin not to operate in a socialist
economy.
By the 1930s it had become dangerous to argue for either the positive role
of market forces or the existence of economic laws in a planned socialist
economy. Increasingly, planners shied away from concepts such as ‘equilibrium’
and ‘balanced growth’ as unnecessary constraints on their freedom of action, and
most economic theorizing ground to a halt. (Gregory and Stuart 1986, 391)
The first attempts to experiment with the system were made only under
Khruschev in the late 1950s- beginning of the 1960s, albeit very limited. They were
confined to the reorganization of the ministerial system – to be more precise, its
decentralization, replacing branch ministries with regional economic councils, but were
eventually reversed by Khruschev’s successor. The main achievements of Khruschev’s
era were probably the liberalization (even though partial) of the political environment,
opening it up to economic debate, and some shift of priorities from heavy industry to the
production of consumer goods. Other changes that he introduced were piecemeal
attempts at improving the system:
drastically improved incentives for agriculture; the extension of cultivated land by
ploughing up the ‘Virgin Lands’ of northern Kazakhstan and southern Siberia;
campaigns to change cropping patterns; ...the initiation of large scale imports of
machinery and know-how (specifically to upgrade an extremely backward
chemical industry, though this practice was later extended to more branches of the
economy); the development of foreign trade more generally; the first large-scale
importation of food; a wage reform with the introduction of a minimum wage and
a shortening of the working week; the start of a major program of housing
construction; the publication of official economic statistics. (Hanson 2003, 52).
The first more or less comprehensive reform was introduced by Premier Kosygin
in 1965 (under Leonid Brzhnev as the First Secretary of the Communist Party). The
reform itself was quite conservative, but it was preceded, from about 1962 to 1965, by an
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open discussion of various reform alternatives.42 The debate, sometimes referred to as the
“ Liberman discussion”, is worth attention, because the 1965 reform was drawn on the
basis of the ideas voiced during the debate, and especially the ideas of Evsei Liberman.

The Liberman Discussion
The beginning of the debate is normally attributed to the publication of the article
“The Plan, Profits, and Bonuses” by Evsei Liberman in the official party newspaper
Pravda.43 The ideas expressed in the article highly influenced the final reform. The
article was written in a very plain and clear language and it is worth quoting the author’s
words extensively:
It is necessary to find a sufficiently simple and, at the same time,
substantiated solution for one of the major tasks set by the CPSU [the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union] Program, which is to develop a system of planning and
assessing the work of enterprises so that they will be vitally interested in the
highest possible plan targets, in introducing new machinery and improving the
quality of output, in a word, in the highest efficiency of production.
This can be achieved, in our opinion, if the enterprises are presented with
plans only with respect to the volume of output and the assortment and dates of
deliveries. Moreover, this should be done in such a way that the direct contacts
between suppliers and consumers are taken into account as much as possible.
All other indices should be communicated only to the economic councils;
there is no need to distribute them among the enterprises.
On the basis of the targets for volume and assortment of output, the
enterprises themselves should work out a complete plan that covers, among other
things, labor productivity, quantity of work force, wages, costs of production,
accumulations, capital investments, and new machinery.
How can the enterprises be entrusted with the job of working out plans
when at present all their draft targets are usually much lower than their actual
capacities?
42
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This can be done if the enterprises have a maximum interest, both moral
and material, in making full use of their reserves not only in the process of the
fulfillment of plans, but also during the drafting stage. For this purpose it is
necessary to work out and approve long-term plan norms of profitability for every
branch of production. It would be most expedient to approve these norms
centrally, in the form of scales determining the size of bonuses to enterprise staffs
in dependence on attained level of profitability (in the form of profit in percent of
production assets). (Liberman, “Plans, Profits, Bonuses,” 79. Emphasis by the
author)
According to the author this proposal would resolve a great number of problems that the
Soviet industry was facing. It would solve the problem of poor utilization of existing
enterprise capacities and equipment and would provide disincentives to enterprises to
keep high stocks of unsold goods, because profit would be calculated in relation to
production assets.44 Subsequently, “the enterprises will no longer ‘fight’ to get
unjustifiably low plans, for such plans would not give the enterprises sufficiently high
profitability.” 45 Similarly, enterprises would strive to increase their labor productivity,
because “asking for, and hiring, superfluous manpower” would reduce their profitability
as well.46 For the same reason - increasing profitability, enterprises would strive for the
reduction in the cost of production.47 At the end, profitability would be important,
because it would become the only determinant of managers’ and workers’ bonuses. A
system of additional bonuses would be developed to reward enterprises for producing
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new goods; similarly, reductions in bonuses would be implemented to punish enterprises
for producing the same goods for a long time.48
Giving enterprises more ‘authority’ was not meant to replace central planning.
“All the main levers of centralized planning – prices, finances, the budget, accounting,
large capital investments – and, finally, the value, labor and major physical indices of
rates and proportions in the sphere of production, distribution and consumption will be
determined centrally.” 49 The goal of the measures was to improve the efficiency of
central planning. Likewise, profitability would only apply as long as the enterprise met
the plan targets for the volume of output, assortment and quality of goods and terms of
delivery.50
Liberman did not suggest any specific measures regarding how to improve the
price system, but he did mention that prices, remaining stable, nevertheless, should
become flexible. “Prices must combine stability and flexibility. Prices for industrial
goods must be revised as the correlation changes between the average cost of production
of a given branch and the operative prices, with due consideration for the new goods’
novelty, quality, and effectiveness in operation or consumption.” 51
The author made sure to emphasize that there was no danger of abandoning the
socialist ‘way’ in relying too much on profit, because profit in a socialist society was
different from capitalist profit. “Our profit has nothing in common with capitalist profit.
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The essence of such categories as profit, price, and money is quite different with us, and
they successfully serve the cause of the building of communism.” 52
It appears that the other contributions to the debate simply provided a ‘variation
on the same theme’ disagreeing mainly on the details.

The Reform of 1965
The goals or the problems that the actual reform of 1965 was intended to solve
were well summarized by Prime-Minister Kosygin in his statement of September 28,
1965 published in the news-paper Izvestia. It is necessary to understand these, because
they make it clear why the reform was adopted in the first place. To begin with, the
factors that necessitated the reform were seen in the increased complexity of economic
relations; expansion of the scale of production and capital investments; the necessity
dictated by scientific and technological progress to be able to introduce new technology
and scientific achievements into production quickly; the requirements of “technical
standards, quality, durability of goods, and their effective use” of the “present-day
scientific-engineering revolution;” guaranteeing increase in the “material well-being of
the people” along with securing high capital accumulation; and, therefore, “raising the
efficiency of social production as much as possible, saving live and materialized labor,
and considerably and steadily increasing returns from capital investments and fixed
assets.” 53 The Prime-minister also noted that the volume of the national income,
51
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industrial output, and the rate of growth of labor productivity in industry had declined in
recent years and these trends needed to be reversed.54
The problems that the reform was to solve, therefore, were to correct for the
unbalanced economic development that gave the priority to the production of the means
of production at the expense of consumer goods and agriculture; to eliminate the large
number of unfinished or delayed construction projects (new plants, etc.), which would
eventually increase the cost of putting those into operation and often made the equipment
originally installed obsolete; to speed the introduction of new technological and scientific
achievements in the production, which had prior been very slow; expand the production
of modern machinery and equipment and better utilize the achievements of foreign
technological development; and to better utilize manpower resources in the country.55 All
these problems could only be solved if centralized planning was complemented by the
economic initiative of enterprises:
The economic initiative and rights of enterprises are too narrow and their
area of responsibility is insufficient. The cost-accounting system is in many ways
a formality. The existing system of material encouragement to industrial
personnel does little to interest them in improving the overall results of the work
of their enterprises and often operates in contradiction to the interests of the
national economy as a whole. (Kosygin 1966, 13)
As a result, the reform of 1965 decreased the number of plan targets given to
enterprises from the center to the following eight: “the volume of goods to be sold; the
main assortment of goods; the wage fund; the sum of profits and the profitability;
payments into the budget and allocations from the budget;...the volume of centralized
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capital investments and commissioning of production capacities and fixed assets; the
main targets for introducing new technology; the indices for supplying materials and
equipment.” 56 With time, after certain conditions were to be achieved, the assignment of
the wage fund was to be abolished as well.57
To improve the quality of the product a system of state certification was to be
introduced.58 To make it easier for enterprises to fulfill their plan targets the planning
methods were to be based on “scientifically substantiated norms and technical-economic
calculations” 59 and the five year plan targets to be presented yearly as well so that
enterprises could plan their production better.60
A number of measures were proposed to improve the cost-accounting system.
Enterprises were to set up a production development fund that would be financed from
their profits and that they would use to finance technical improvements in production.61
Financial resources for capital construction would no longer be distributed to enterprises
for free, but would be given in the form of credits; credits would, likewise, replace the
free give-away of additional circulating assets.62 A charge for the production assets
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allocated to enterprises would be deducted from their profits.63 “In the future, payments
for assets will become the most important part of the state’s income, and the importance
of other payments, including the turnover tax, will be correspondingly reduced.” 64
Finally, the material responsibility for failing to fulfill contractual obligations with other
enterprises was to be increased.65
Two other funds were to be established – a fund for material incentives for the
personnel and a fund for financing social and cultural undertakings and housing
construction, both financed from the enterprise profits to give enterprises incentives to be
more profitable.
To reform the price system, which was still envisioned along the lines of the
centrally determined prices, a State Committee for Prices was set up. One remark
deserves attention – talking about improving the prices Kosygin points out that “there can
be no question but that retail prices can be revised only along the lines of reducing
them.” 66 In other words, no consideration was given to the notion of bringing producer
and consumer prices closer together.
As was mentioned above, Khruschev, in an attempt to decentralize central
economic management, replaced branch ministries with regional economic councils. The
1965 reform reversed the decision and brought branch ministries back to life at the all
union, union-republic, and republic levels.
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The ministries will plan and control production and deal with issues of
technical policy, material and technical supply, financing, labor, and wages. The
branch research institutions will be subordinated to them. This will facilitate the
enterprises’ production and economic activity, since all the basic issues
concerning their production and economic activities will now be settled by a
single agency – the ministry. (Kosygin 1966, 33).
It was envisioned that the ministerial staff would be reduced, because a number of
functions were to be transferred to the level of enterprise amalgamations.67 The idea was
to let central planning agencies set targets only for the amalgamation overall without
giving detailed instructions to individual enterprises, factories, and workshops belonging
to amalgamations themselves. The latter were to receive their targets and instructions
from the amalgamation management instead. This would reduce the bureaucratic
apparatus of the government and would make the planning process more efficient,
because the details of the production process would be worked out by the bodies directly
involved in it. In some cases amalgamations would also combine research and production
units under one roof hoping to improve the speed of introduction of new technology and
scientific achievements into the production process.
Finally, in the sphere of material and equipment supply, trade between
manufacturing and consuming enterprises, conducted through territorial supply-and-sales
centers, was envisioned for the future. In the meantime only some re-organizational
changes to the government bodies responsible for the function were proposed.
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Achievements of the Reform of 1965
The reform, though conservative by the standard of the other East European
countries, was quite far-reaching for the conditions of the Soviet Union, considering the
country’s recent history of the Stalinist regime and the rigid economic model that it had
created. Its implementation, though, was rather modest and fell short of achieving most of
its goals.
The achievements of the reform were probably the most far-reaching at the
enterprise level. By 1970, 41,000 industrial enterprises (which accounted for 93 percent
of factory production) were switched to the new system.68 Katz points out that five years
after the reform was introduced “none of the aspects of the reform dealing with the
relationship of the individual enterprise to over-all economic planning have been
developed significantly.” 69 The shortcomings of the reform can be well summarized in
the results of a poll of over 200 plant directors cited by Katz:
The largest number of directors (48 percent) cited the material-technical-supply
system as the primary problem in their daily operations. Almost 80 percent of the
directors responded that there had been no change in this aspect of operations
since the reform, while most of the rest reported only slight improvement. The
second factor cited was the inadequate size and ineffectiveness of incentive funds,
including the fund for development of production. The third most important factor
was lack of operating independence and interference from above. Of the more
than 200 directors, 56 percent said the increase in their independence since the
reform was insignificant, for the most part due to interference from the glavk and
ministry. The spheres in which enterprise directors wanted more authority were:
labor and wages, 18 percent; capital investment, 44 percent; financing, 35 percent;
and pricing, 16 percent. All in all, the similarities of their reactions to the
sentiments of directors in the pre-reform period, indeed to those of directors in the
Stalinist period, are startling testimony to how little has changed, due to the
68
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conservative manner in which the reform had been carried out. (Katz 1972, 179180).
Katz further points out that the reform was slowed down not just by the resistance
of the bureaucrats and the system, but also by the general re-orientation towards
conservatism in the country.70 He suggests that the tendency could be clearly seen by the
domination of conservative ideas in economic conferences, official publications, and
even leadership’s speeches. 71
Gregory and Stuart, likewise, point out that as soon as the managers started
displaying more independence, “planners and bureaucrats” began to press for
amendments of the reform to restrain the “’undesirable’ spontaneous enterprise
actions.” 72 The changes that resulted gave more regulatory power back to the central
organs in a number of aspects: the flexibility in determining the size of the incentive fund
was replaced by more rigid regulations; the distribution of the incentive funds was to
become strictly controlled; the production development fund was taken from the control
of managers and put under the regulation of the ministries; finally, the number of plan
targets given to enterprises was again increased.73
The amalgamation of enterprises did not advance and in 1973 a new decree on
amalgamations had to be introduced. The traditional system of material supply continued
to function. The role of credit did not expand as much as was proposed, and a large
number of investment projects continued to be financed from the budget; the 6% interest
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charge on capital proved to be so low that it did not bring any real changes to the
efficiency of their utilization.
Overall, Gregory and Stuart point out that one cannot assert that things did not
change after the reform was introduced, but the changes did not necessarily proceed in
accordance with the reform intentions.
The thrust of the 1970s seems to have been toward the improvement of
planning methods, for example, the greater emphasis on long-term plans, better
norming, increased use of automated methods and computerization, and the like.
Decentralization does not seem to be an appropriate characterization, yet the issue
of changing the levers or mechanisms through which the economy is manipulated
is relevant. Did the economic content of the levers change? One Western critic of
the reform could write in 1973 that ‘after seven years of the reform, economic
methods, or ‘levers,’ have been effectively converted into administrative ‘levers’
... as a consequence, centralized planning and administration are even more
entrenched...’” (Gregory and Stuart 1996, 408.)

Economic Changes in the 1970s
Before Mikhail Gorbachev introduced an all-around reform of the system at the
end of the 1980s a few more attempts to ‘improve’ the system were undertaken.
In 1973 a formal decision was finally made to base industry on associations
(obyedineniya). According to Nove there were different kinds of associations. There were
all-union and republic associations, production and science-and-production associations;
there were associations, whose enterprises retained independence (i.e. they operated on
khozraschet74, had a legal personality, and a bank account) and associations, whose
enterprises lost their independence and became merely branch factories or workshops;
some, which in other sources are sometimes referred to as industrial associations,

73

Ibid., 406-407.

74

Khozraschet – profit and loss accounting .

Karapetyan, Zinaida, 2005, UMSL, p. 69

replaced ministerial departments.75 According to a statistical bulletin of the Soviet Union
in 1985 there were 4,378 production and scientific associations that included 18,800
independent enterprises and production units and whose share of industry overall was
50.3%.76
In 1979 a new decree was introduced titled “On Improving Planning and
Strengthening the Economic Mechanism’s Influence on Raising the Effectiveness of
Production and Quality of Work.” Individual measures that were to be taken under this
decree are not as important for the present analysis as the main course of change
proposed, because it demonstrates no real retreat from the previous approach. As Morris
Bornstein summarizes it:
The aims of PIEM77 are to increase output; to reduce its cost, and
particularly the use of materials and fuels; to improve quality, including through
the introduction of new products; to secure the timely delivery of output
according to the contracted product-mix; and to cut construction time and costs.
PIEM pursues these goals through a variety of measures affecting planning,
performance indicators, incentives, and finance. PIEM does not entail
decentralization in any of the three senses … ‘administrative’, ‘economic’, or
‘internal enterprise management’. Instead, PIEM is an effort to strengthen the
effective control by central planning agencies and ministries over the operations
and results of the Soviet economy. (Bornstein 1985, 23.)
At the end, all these measures fell short of improving the situation so much so that
the Soviet economy was normally perceived to be in a state of crisis in the beginning of
the 1980s.78
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After the seventies, the Soviet economy demonstrated increasing characteristics of
crisis. Plan targets were seldom fulfilled, growth continued to diminish,
consumers found their level of living stagnating, and producers found both labor
and capital more scarce. One can certainly speak of a crisis in the years from 1979
to 1982 as poor weather conditions yielded near disaster at harvest time, the costs
of economic development in the east soared, and investment policies and
programs failed to keep the aging capital stock from continuing deterioration. The
labor force during that period drifted toward demoralization and disengagement;
effort and creativity gravitated toward the second economy. (Bryson 1995, 35).
These were the conditions in which Mikhael Gorbachev assumed power in 1985.

The Performance of the Soviet Economic Model from 1928 to 1985
As much as the collapse of the Soviet system seems to have been unavoidable to a
modern observer, its impressive performance in the first decades gave reasons to its
contemporaries to believe, with as much rigor, in its superiority over other systems.
“From about one-quarter the size of the U.S. economy in 1928, the Soviet economy
climbed to about 40 percent in 1955, 50 percent in 1965, and about 60 percent in 1977.” 79
The achievements of the system were so impressive that from the 1950s until probably
the 1970s the main question of concern for Soviet and Western observers alike was:
When would the Soviet Union catch up and overtake the United States? The growth of
Soviet Gross National Product (GNP) attained an impressive rate of 5.8 percent between
1928 and 1940, 5.7 percent between 1950 and1960, and 5.2 percent between 1960 and
1970 (Table 1).80 At the end, though, the system could not sustain the high rate of growth
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and it slowly started to deteriorate. By 1985 when Mikhail Gorbachev assumed power the
rate of growth slowed down to 2 percent between 1980 and 1985 (Table 1).

Table 1. Gross National Product of the USSR, 1928-1983
(annual rates of growth)
1928-1940

1940-1950

1950-1960

1960-1970

1970-1975

1975-1980

1980-1985

5.8

2.2

5.7

5.2

3.7

2.6

2.0

2.9
GNP per 3.6
capita
Source: Ofer 1987, 1778.

3.9

3.9

2.7

1.8

1.1

GNP

Reforms under Mikhail Gorbachev
Mikhail Gorbachev’s term in office proceeded through two phases. The goal of
the first phase, which lasted from1985 to 1989, was to improve the old planning
mechanism. The second phase, from 1989 to 1991, was an attempt to change the
mechanism by introducing a mixed economy, which, nevertheless, came too late and was
eventually overpowered by the political processes of the country’s final disintegration.
According to Mau, the premise behind Gorbachev’s first policies was not new –
they were devised in order to further increase “the welfare of the people” and improve
“the conditions of their spiritual and material life,”

81

which, in turn, could not have been

achieved without achieving a high rate of economic growth and improving the economic
mechanism. What was novel in Gorbachev’s approach was an additional focus on the
‘human factor’ that had never been incorporated into the reform process before.
“Gorbachev and his allies began to realize that the country’s economic malaise was
intrinsically linked to a deeper moral, social and cultural crisis. To decrease the alienation
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between government and society, a prerequisite of economic reform, Soviet reformers
understood that they must first overcome public apathy and inertia.” 82 Hence, the
policies that are commonly known under the name of ‘perestroika’ were put forward with
the following key principles:
(1) Acceleration (uskorenie) – the need to include dynamism in the development
of productive forces by concentrating investment resources on the machinebuilding sectors;
(2) Perestroika – the transformation of production relations, changing the social
and economic organization of the late Soviet system;
(3) The human factor – the need to humanize the system of social relations, to
overcome the one-sided technocratic approach to solving economic and
production tasks. It was this thesis that led somewhat later to the ideas of
glasnost’ and democratization;
(4) ‘Integral socialism’ – the attempt at a theoretical explanation of the character
of the transformation begun, on the understanding that the existing system of
social relations could and must be transformed sufficiently deeply to ensure
the passage of socialism to a new stage of ‘development’, but without
changing the very essence of the socialist system of economic management
(which was already ‘mature’). (Mau 1995, 389-390)
The approach to reforming the system during these first years, thus, was still
predominantly confined to the ideas of improving the existing mechanism, which, at the
end, did not play a big role in changing the economic mechanism or for that matter in its
collapse. Hanson points out that even the main legislation such as the decree of January
1987 allowing joint-ventures in the Soviet Union, the law on the state enterprise of June
1987, and the law on cooperatives of June 1988, in reality were one way or another
unworkable:
Central planning of output, centralized supply allocation and central control of
prices remained in place. Within those arrangements, any foreign joint ventures
81
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faced enormous difficulty in functioning; the autonomy of state enterprises was
largely fictitious, and unplanned activities of cooperatives was likely to produce
transactions not designed to meet the wishes of consumers but harnessed to plan
evasion by state enterprises. (Hanson 2003, 196)
Other changes during that time proceeded in the same vein. For example, the
banking legislation of 1988 simply broke up the monolith banking system into six banks
– the State Bank, the savings bank, the industrial construction bank, the agricultural bank,
the housing and social infrastructure bank, and the bank for foreign economic relations,
but did not change their functions.
The biggest innovations of the time that probably opened the Pandora’s box of the
Soviet Union’s destruction were the policy of glasnost and the political perestroika. As a
result of these policies at the end of the 1980s the Berlin Wall came down, the countries
of Central East Europe were electing non-communist or coalition governments, people in
the Soviet Union were rallying for political democracy, leaders of the Union republics
were demonstrating independence from the Union. By 1989 the Soviet economy had
turned into “a centrally planned economy with the center knocked-out.”

83

From 1989 to 1991 there were a number of attempts to restore the Soviet
economy. A myriad of quite far-reaching legislation was adopted – legislation on leasing
of assets, on land, on property, on anti-monopoly policy, on currency, etc., and a number
of reform programs were proposed.84 It was during this time that the first price reform
was enacted setting prices for some categories of goods free. The only problem was that
all these measure were coming too late: the Soviet Union was dissolving and the
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republics were no longer cooperating. One by one they were introducing their own
policies. Russia in June of 1990 declared its sovereignty and in October passed a law that
put all the assets on its territory under Russian, and not Soviet, control.85 In the summer
of 1991, before the Union was officially disintegrated, Russia elected Boris Yeltsin as its
first president. In other words, the Soviet Union found itself in a ‘systemic vacuum’ in
the last two years of its existence.
There is no need for a detailed analysis of the ‘last day’ economic reforms of the
Soviet Union, because they no longer played an influential role for the development of
the Russian economy. Economic reforms introduced by the Russian government took
precedence as soon as the Union collapsed.

Conclusion
The goal of the historical overview in this chapter was to acquaint the reader with
the origins of what later came to be known as the Soviet Economic Model and attempts to
reform the model, for four reasons. First, I wanted to demonstrate that the Communist
takeover in 1917 and the subsequent developments had been born out of the historical
situation in the country and not just as an attempt of some ideologically driven group to
instill communism. Second, I wanted to point out that the Soviet model, likewise, did not
just come about from an ideological blue-print, but was created for a combination of
political and economic reasons. Third, it was necessary to demonstrate that in reality
there was no unified Marxist ideology that stood behind all the economic changes in the
Soviet Union and that the ideology was often made to fit political and economic
84
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circumstances. This proved to be a useful tool for introducing changes not only in the
Soviet Union, but also in other countries of the Soviet bloc, by the means of constantly
reanalyzing Marxist doctrine and showing that each newly introduced political or
economic element fit right in. It, so to speak, gave the rigid system a feature of
‘flexibility.’ Fourth, the analysis of the reforms of the model needed to be presented to
show the stark contrast with the economic reform process in Hungary, which is the
subject of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 3
HUNGARIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The general perception of Hungarian development, or any other Soviet satellite
nation for that matter, after World War II is that every policy decision since the Soviet
troops ‘liberated’1 the countries was dictated by the Soviet Union with no room left for
dissent or disagreement. In the Hungarian case, the policies of collectivization and
nationalization carried out in the 1940s are cited as an example of the strong Soviet
influence, with the invasion of the country by the Soviet troops in 1956 to halt the
counter-revolution signifying the peak of the Soviet domination. A closer look at the
historical developments of the time, though, paints a more complex picture. It appears
that (1) the aftermath of World War II played a major role not only in the Soviet Union’s
ability to keep the region (and the country) under control at that time, but also in
Hungary’s susceptibility to it; (2) reform and counter-reform decisions in the forty years
of communist rule in Hungary were influenced by a myriad of factors and Soviet
influence or rather an international situation was often just one of them; (3) the common
perception that the Hungarian politicians and economists could introduce market
elements into their system only when the Soviets allowed it overlooks the fact that the
debate between the pro-reformists and their opposition in Hungary was a continuous,
ever-present process that tilted one way or the other depending on domestic and
international circumstances; (4) the economic development of the country did not

1

During Communist times, the advancement of Soviet troops onto the territory of Central East
Europe making the German army retreat during World War II was presented as the liberation of those
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abruptly stop and take a different turn in 1989, but has been a continuous process
beginning with changes introduced before 1989 and gradually leading to the events of the
1990s.

Setting the Stage: Hungary after World War II
Policies of radical nationalization, collectivization, and, subsequently,
Sovietization marked the first decade of Hungary’s reconstruction after World War II.
These developments are normally understood as the steps that Hungary had to take under
the pressure of the occupying Soviet power.2 The initial reform initiatives, however, were
not a simple manifestation of Soviet control. “The radical reform of the economy tied in
closely with the war damage the country had suffered and the heavy burdens of
reconstruction and reparation payments.3 Experts of the Hungarian General Credit Bank
(Magyar Általános Hitelbank) were already calling for ‘stronger government
intervention’ in the summer of 1945, arguing that ‘direction of production and
consumption and compulsory economic measures of economic control’ would be needed

territories by the Soviet Union. After Communism collapsed and many of its aspects started to be revisited,
here, too, opinions became critical of just how much freedom the Soviet Union brought to those countries.
2

In the first years after the war every formerly ‘hostile’ country had to stay under the control of an
Allied Control Commission, which was headed in each case by one of the allied powers. In Hungary, the
Commission, responsible for denazification and democratization of the country, was headed by the Soviet
Union. Originally, the Soviet troops were to stay in the country only until the peace agreement was signed,
but the later political developments, which will be discussed further in the thesis, kept them there longer.
3

When the war came to an end, Hungary found itself in a devastating situation with the total war
damage of twice the amount of its national income in 1938 and $300 million in reparation payments
delivered in goods to the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. “The war destroyed about 40
percent of the nation’s wealth. Homes were ruined, one-third of the bridges were blown up (including all of
the bridges over the Danube in Budapest), and 70 percent of the railroad rolling stock was taken out of the
country. Ninety percent of Hungary’s industrial companies suffered substantial losses, and most of the
country’s livestock was taken away.” ( Gábor Révész, Perestroika in Eastern Europe: Hungary’s Economic
Transformation, 1945-1988 (Boulder, San Francisco, & London: Westview Press, 1990), 23)
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for several years.”4 In other words, the circumstances of the post-war devastation within
the country called for and eventually led to acceptance of some radical measures. In fact,
even most of the West European countries took radical steps at that time, like keeping the
high level of state control over production and distribution, while some (Great Britain and
France) even carried out extensive policies of nationalization.5
Many features of popular revolutionary radicalism became incorporated into the
democratic transformation of the country [Hungary]. The communists and other
left-wing forces were able to insist on these, since Soviet support and political
pressure kept them in power despite their electoral defeat.6 However, there is no
denying that the Soviet pressure coincided with a wave of radicalism in post-war
Europe, which allowed communist parties to join the coalition governments of
several leading European countries. (Berend and Csató 2001, 262)
Likewise, the first radical land reform carried out in March of 1945 as a result of
which 75,000 estates and 3.2 million hectares (35% of the country’s territory) were
confiscated or expropriated was prompted by social needs and demands, rather than the
Soviet pressure, after “many villages, seething with discontent, did not wait for
government measures and began parceling out the great estates on their own initiative.”7
“The land reform was a genuine revolution: first because it rearranged the structure of
Hungarian society, and second because it was carried out by the people who worked the
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land. Despite hesitation in some places, the peasants generally accepted the land as their
due.” 8
The first waves of nationalization began in similar circumstances. From the end of
the war the state was the only entity capable of financing the reconstruction program and
reparation shipments. “The factories and the banks had empty coffers. According to the
balance sheets of the big banks on December 31, 1945, their revenues could cover only 5
per cent of their expenditures, while 91 per cent of their inward cash flows consisted of
loans from the National Bank. In practice, financing of the economy had become a state
function, performed through the National Bank.” 9 As a result, the first nationalization
steps that began with the nationalization of coal-mines and auxiliary plants in December
of 1945, right after Great Britain nationalized its coal-mines, were demanded by
economic necessity. “The people had no objection to the nationalization of the major
industries and banks. Such measures were deemed necessary, and they were supported by
the workers and the progressive left wing and more or less by the democratic parties as
well.” 10
One cannot deny that the Soviet Union manipulated the situation in the country to
promote its own interests, but it would be an overstatement to assume that it unilaterally
directed the course of the events during those years.

8
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used to set up state or cooperative enterprises (23).
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When Hungary was ‘liberated’ the Hungarian communist party consisted of only
a ‘handful’ of members. 11 Even though its membership grew quite rapidly from 30,000
members in February of 1945 to a half of a million by the end of 1945, it won only 17%
of the votes in the first free national elections that were held in November of 1945.12 It
probably would not have risen to power as quickly as it did by 1948 without the support
of the Soviet Union, but it appears that its destiny was still dependent on more than the
Soviet will to dominate. “The party’s prospects depended on such factors as Soviet
presence, the course of inter-Allied relations and, inside Hungary, on its own political
skill and on the reaction of the people.” 13 The Soviet presence aided the party in a
number of ways. First, the Soviets provided financial and other assistance to the party –
“they gave it material assistance (food for distribution, transport, a press and
newsprint)....The Communist Party...was provided with offices, lodging, food and even
clothing by the Russians. In all fairness, however, the Soviets also rendered aid to the
Communists’ political partners and the population at large.” 14 Second, the Soviet
authorities helped the party to gradually eliminate its opposition through pressure,
intimidation, and charges of conspiracy.15

11

Since the communist party had been outlawed by the previous regime, a large number of
communists had fled to Moscow to avoid repression, and those who stayed had to go underground. It is not
clear just how many underground members the Hungarian communist party had (3,000 people seems to be
the highest estimate), but the number was not large (see Miklós Molnár, From Béla Kun to János Kádár:
Seventy Years of Hungarian Communism, trans. Arnold J. Pomerans (New York: Berg, 1990), 100.) When
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Hungary.
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Domestically, the party attracted people for its novelty representing a new
“alternative that many Hungarians of the younger generation were willing to try” and its
image of an all-Hungarian front fighting for a new democratic Hungary representing all
the people – “a party of the working class and yet of the whole nation, revolutionary yet
moderate.”

16

During those years, they presented themselves not as a Marxist-Leninist

proletarian party, but as a national movement even casting aside the famous slogan of the
‘dictatorship of the proletariat.’ 17
There is debate regarding just how much influence the international events that
happened next had on the country’s future. Some historians believe that the decisive point
in the country’s political and economic development that led its destiny Eastward into the
Soviet empire was the change in the great power relations:
Although Soviet pressure and communist policy in 1945-47 smoothed the
way for the later development of a socialist state, there was no sudden change
until 1947-8. Stalin, still intent on maintaining the wartime system of alliances,
was not yet concerned with open Sovietization of Central and Eastern Europe
during those years. It was still unclear whether Stalin wanted to add the countries
in the region freed by Soviet troops to its empire, as a buffer zone, or whether he
would be content with ‘Finlandization’ – demanding full loyalty in foreign policy
while leaving the internal social system undisturbed. As so often before, the fate
of the region and Hungary depended on great-power relations. The advancing
Cold War brought a chain of mutual suspicions and dissention, with consequent
security-maximizing efforts leading to aggressive steps that bred further
insecurity and antagonism and undermined security. The outcome was an open
collapse of the alliance system in 1947 - 48 and a new, Soviet-American
confrontation. As a French historian of the Cold War pointed out, hitherto there
had been an alternative to Soviet rule in Eastern Europe. (Berend and Csató 2001,
271.)

15

Ibid., 110-114. This approach of gradual, step-by-step elimination of the opposition became
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As the Cold War broke out and the Truman Doctrine of containing Soviet influence came
out, a peace treaty was signed and ratified that originally was to give Hungary full
sovereignty and dismiss the Allied Control Commission, but at the end allowed the
Soviet troops to stay in the country to keep contact with the Soviet zone of occupation in
Austria. “Extending the occupation as the Cold War deepened effectively decided the
country’s political future.” 18
Yet others argue that the outbreak of the Cold War did not radically alter the
course of events, but rather created the ‘right’ circumstances for the communist
‘takeover’:
The ‘theory of circumstances’ put forward by some American revisionist
historians, who argue that the Kremlin’s ‘ satellization’ of Eastern Europe was
nothing but a response to American acts of hostility, has the ring of being as false
as the theory of premeditation. Stalin and his advisers ‘premeditated’ and
‘planned’ just one thing: not an inch of conquered territory in Europe must be
allowed to escape their net. This is a factor, incidentally, which also explains the
Finnish exception. For the rest, the precise moment and the form of the seizure of
power hinged very largely on a combination of external and internal
circumstances. Instead of imagining a universal scenario written by an omniscient
and machiavellian Stalin, we would do better to consider that the Soviets
envisaged and elaborated several scenarios with a view to securing an optimal
hold on each of the countries concerned.
...the Cold War as a global confrontation made no more than a marginal
impact on Hungary. While it is true that the country did not fall definitively into
the Soviet camp until the famous ‘turning-point’ of 1948 – that is until the period
of the great clashes around the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan and the Berlin
crisis – it is equally true that by that stage the signposts were already in position.
These signposts, though clearly perceive by British and American
diplomats, elicited no energetic reactions from London or Washington. The
British had abandoned Hungary to its fate well before Yalta; the Americans had
never seen Hungary as a political counter. By all accounts, the policy of
containment and the Marshall Plan did nothing to change this situation. No one
lifted a little finger to try to save Hungary’s pluralist democracy. ( Molnár 1990,
135-136.)
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By the same token, Molnár argues that the image of an all-inclusive pluralist communist
party was just a “wait-and-see” policy that the Hungarian communists had adopted
waiting for the ‘right’ time to establish the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’.

19

Regardless of which approach one adopts, the fact remains that the international
situation one way or another – either by opening the window of opportunity or by
demanding urgent actions – facilitated the change in the domestic political strategy of the
party. From then on the Hungarian communist party abandoned the pluralist approach,
started consolidating its power more aggressively, became the sole political force within
a year and moved to ‘establish’ the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat.’
With that the rapid Sovietization of the country began. In 1948 the banking
system was restructured to mirror the Soviet banking system. A massive collectivization
campaign was introduced. As a result, the proportion of peasants belonging to
cooperatives increased from two in 1949 to twenty-five in 1953.20 The nationalization of
all Hungarian firms with more than a hundred employees was carried out in March of
1948; in December of 1949 all firms employing more than 10 people were nationalized. 21
The one-party system was established in 1949. By the beginning of the 1950s the private
sector practically ceased to exist.22 The Communist party came under direct control of the
Soviet Union with Stalin and the Politburo of the Bolschevik Party appointing the leading
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posts, which led to the replacement of the majority of the opposition party leaders.23 The
country’s economic program was dictated by the Soviet Union; the five-year plan system
was initiated.24 Even the country’s police became directly subordinated to the NKVD
(later the KGB).25 “The Sovietization of the country extended to formalities such as the
national coat of arms (altered along Soviet lines), arts policy, the education structure and
syllabus, the press, even national holidays and state honors and decorations. Hungary had
lost its independence.” 26 In 1949 the borders were literally closed and the flow of
information was halted; any attempts to build a different version of socialism in the
region was severely prosecuted.27
Berend argues, however, that even in those circumstances viewing the changes of
the time only as a result of Soviet coercion is still insufficient. According to the author,
the main goals of the Hungarian development at the time were to industrialize the country
and speed up the process of capital accumulation.28 The Soviet economic experiment to
that date was the only example of the successful accomplishment of these two goals in a
short period of time, which also withstood the test of a war.
All these factors certainly contributed to the Hungarian government’s
decision to adapt the Soviet model rather than seek new paths. This statement
sounds like a euphemism, because one might well ask whether the move by the
Hungarian government was a decision at all, since it was taken under very strong
Stalinist pressure under the conditions pertaining in the international communist
23
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movement at that time. That fact is well known, but nevertheless it would be a
gross oversimplification in the opposite direction to regard this move as
compulsory emulation. One indication of the appeal that the Soviet model had is
its adoption during those years by the Yugoslav and Chinese revolutions, even
though they were following a decidedly independent course. (Berend 1990, 7)
The conviction that the Third World War was to break out in a few years, upheld by the
Soviet leadership, provided further ‘justification’ for adopting the Soviet economic
mechanism with its emphasis on building a self-sufficient state regulated economy that
could withstand the demands of war.
Overlooking the fact that the international situation and political and economic
circumstances in Hungary after the war contributed to country’s susceptibility to adopt
the Soviet type economic model confines the understanding of the country’s development
to the framework of a simple weak-strong state dichotomy and the realm of politics. As a
result, as long as the framework remains – that is as long as the Soviet domination is a
variable, the importance of any other economic developments is diminished, because they
are believed to be secondary. Such an approach deprives the countries of Central East
Europe of any kind of uniqueness in their historical development. In the long run, it leads
to an oversimplified understanding of their economic development and its consequences.
Hungarian development after the end of the 1940s is always viewed in light of the
political developments described above. The institutional structures introduced by the
Soviet Union at the time are taken to have lasted until the Iron Curtain fell in 1989. The
attempts at reforming the command economic system in Hungary after the 1940s’
changes are not taken seriously, because they did not attempt to alter the system’s basic
principles. As a result, the understanding that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe
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were at the same starting point when the transition to a full market economy began is
taken as given. As I argue in Chapter 4 this was not the case.

Hungary after Stalin
After Stalin died in 1953 the new Soviet leadership relaxed their political line and
announced their commitment to the so-called New Course. “This New Course meant
softening the dictatorship, emphasizing ‘socialist legality,’ reviewing earlier fabricated
trials, halting the forcible collectivization of agriculture, allowing withdrawals from
existing cooperative farms, and a policy of improving goods supplies to the
population.” 29 For Hungary the new course allegedly started when in 1953 the leaders of
the communist party were summoned “in disgrace” to Moscow only to be criticized for
“imposing Stalinism on Hungary” and ordered to “’correct their errors’ right down the
line.” 30 The visit ended with the demotion of Mátiás Rákosi – the forefather of Stalinism
in Hungary, and with his replacement by reform oriented Imre Nagy. Already six months
into Nagy’s leadership changes could be seen in all aspects of life: “the peasantry had had
its burdens reduced, 8,000 tradesmen had been given permission to reopen their
workshops, internment camps had been abolished, persons forcibly moved to various
parts of the country had been authorized to return and a number, many of them elderly,
were already back in their homes in Budapest. Nagy also announced a rise in the standard
of living and the resumption of economic relations with capitalist countries.” 31
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This came at the time when the Hungarian economy was slipping into a deep
crisis induced by the defects of the newly imposed system. The first five-year plan with
its emphasis on fast accumulation and industrialization to quickly create a self-sufficient
war economy was becoming impossible to fulfill.32 There was a chronic shortage of
consumer goods.33 Enterprises were producing a large amount of spoiled, unusable
goods, because they only had to meet production quotas in numbers and not in quality.34
A large amount of resources were frozen in unfinished investment projects.35 It was also
becoming obvious that the system was detrimental to long term technological
development, quality improvement, and productivity level, because it did not provide any
incentives for enterprises to be more efficient. The system’s shortcomings were
compensated by a myriad of directives and orders; these only resulted in the increase in
the country’s bureaucratic apparatus, but not in the efficiency of the economy.

36
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economic crisis was exacerbated by the political unrest that was a result of constant
purges, prosecutions, forced collectivization, and the confiscation of land in the villages.
It is important to note here that the economic policy pursued in the 1940s had
some positive consequences as well. Hungary’s “national income and the volume of
products turned out for consumption in 1948-1949 were equal to or somewhat greater
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than in 1938;”

37

manufacturing output exceeded its pre-war level by 1949, which in some

cases was more successful than in some West European countries.38 Much of the
economic disequilibrium of the 1950s really resulted not just from the shortcomings of
the system, but from the unrealistic targets of the first five year plan (1950 - 1954) and
the strategies adopted to fulfil it.
The original target for national income was a 63 percent increase over the plan
period, or 10 percent growth yearly. The revision [in 1951] called for 130 percent
growth, or 18 percent yearly... The share of national income to be budgeted for
accumulation was to rise from the 18-20 percent of 1949 – a figure that was
already artificially high – to 35 percent, of which industry was to receive half.
(Even at times of rapid growth, net accumulation is generally no higher than 2025 percent, and industry’s share during periods of industrialization is normally no
more than 20-30 percent.) (Révész 1990, 33)
Such high level of accumulation could only be achieved at the expense of the population
and personal consumption. Compulsory produce deliveries at a very low price were
imposed on peasants; prices were increased at a higher rate than wages to curb personal
consumption.39 Structurally, the goal of the plan was rapid industrial development with
the emphasis on heavy industry to prepare the country’s economy for the Third World
War. This resulted in neglect of all the other sectors. Hence, the disequilibrium and the
problems mentioned above.
It is hard to assess what the future of the country would have been if Stalin’s
death did not take place in 1953 and the new Soviet line was not introduced.
Nevertheless, the discontent with the system was felt all throughout the region and the
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“thaw” in the Soviet policy probably provided the fertile ground for opinions to be more
or less openly voiced.
In Hungary the first systematic theoretical criticisms of the system appeared at the
end of 1954. A monthly magazine Közgazdasági Szemle [Economics Review] that had
been previously shut down was re-launched and became a forum for the reform debate.
The first issue published a work criticizing the drive for creating a self-sufficient
economy based on import-substitution and attacking the price policy.40 Similar debates
and articles appeared in different venues as well.41 The first comprehensive reform
proposal was published in the Közgazdasági Szemle in December of 1954 by Péter
György.
‘The main methodological mistake in our leadership,’ according to György Péter,
‘is excessive centralization, bureaucracy....We try to carry out economic tasks...
mainly through the mass issue of central directives.’ Control by means of
authority, he argued, should give way to ‘goods [and market] relations between
enterprises.... and between enterprises and consumers.’ The incentive for
enterprises should be determined by profit and firms should ‘pay interest’ on
investment funds instead of being presented with them by budget. (Berend and
Csató 2001, 299)
The author maintained that the proposed principles of “gain, profit, supply, and demand”
corresponded to the same principles in the capitalist economy, but in the case of Hungary
would be used “for laying the socialist foundations” of the economy.
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János Kornai in his dissertation in 1956 stipulated that socialist economy based on state
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ownership could operate under “various economic mechanisms” which should be
subjected to the “compulsion of the economy” instead of the directives.

43

Politically, the pro-reform attitudes manifested themselves in ‘many-faceted
socialism.’ Imre Nagy wrote
The principle has been established historically that, in addition to the
unity accepted in the chief and basic questions of insuring the victory of
socialism, various forms and methods may be applied for solving concrete
problems in the building of socialism....
To apply Marxism-Leninism to other countries by upholding its principles
without modification can cause only the distortion or stagnation of Marxism. It is
therefore an improper, unscientific, and anti-Marxist method to copy or
mechanically ape the application of scientific socialism. By enriching MarxismLeninism with new tenets and applying them practically on the basis of
experiences gained in the various countries, after careful and intensive
examination, these principles can be utilized bravely in conformity with the
characteristic local situations.
In this sense, ‘Hungarian socialism,’ which was meant to be a disparaging
label for the independent application of scientific socialism, is in effect nothing
else but a type of Hungarian socialism, in other words, the application of
Marxism-Leninism to specific Hungarian situations. (Nagy 1957, 12-14.)
From the outset of Nagy’s nomination, Mátiás Rákosi, representing the
‘conservative’ side of the party took actions to undermine Nagy’s position. Believing that
Nagy owed his nomination to Beria’s policies in the Soviet Union, Rákosi went into an
open full-blown attack of Nagy after Beria was dismissed.44 Soon after, the turmoil
within the Soviet leadership opened a window of opportunity for Rákosi to completely
dismiss Nagy and quiet the new ideas.
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The debate was silenced for the time being; in Spring of 1955 the Közgazdasági
Szemle even published an editorial self-critique accusing themselves of publishing
incorrect, non-Marxist views.45 The first changes introduced to the system by the
government were rather modest and insignificant. They aimed at somewhat shrinking the
bureaucratic apparatus and reducing the number of compulsory plan indicators.46
This pro- and anti-reform debate within the party and outside would become the
characteristic feature of the Hungarian development from then on, which was absent in
the Soviet Union. One side, which I label ‘conservative’ from now on, believed that the
shortcomings of the system did not lie in the economic mechanism, but rather in its
implementation. The other, the pro-reform side, connected the economic problems to the
mechanism itself, as was previously shown through the ideas of Péter György and János
Kornai, and advocated bringing market forces into the game.
Finally, the important overall lesson is that the major debate did not occur
between the Soviet Union and Hungary as one would be led to assume if one understood
the history of Central East Europe after World War II as the product of Soviet
domination. The debate occurred between the conservative and pro-reform sides within
the country, both of which at different times exploited the international situation to
further their agenda.
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‘Counter-Revolution’ of 195647
The events of 1956, when a peaceful student demonstration to show solidarity
with the Polish uprising turned into a revolution, had a dual effect on the country’s
further development. On one hand it did confirm that the Soviet Union was still reluctant
to let the country out of its control and was prepared to defend its ‘territory’ with military
intervention. On the other hand, it demonstrated a strong need for a change.
It is a historical paradox that the very shortcomings of the timid, partial reforms
beginning in 1953 led to the outbreak of open revolution. The armed suppression
of that revolution, on the other hand, made radical reforms essential. The Kádár
regime could not simply continue where Rákosi and Gerõ had left off. After a
period of stabilization by brutal, merciless means, the system underwent a
succession of pragmatic reforms. These came in successive waves, broken by
halts and setbacks, but leading ultimately to a transformation of the Hungarian
system of state socialism. (Berend and Csató 2001, 297).
The international situation again provided a window of opportunity for the Hungarian
leadership: the de-Stalinization course taken by the Soviet Union in 1956 and the reforms
introduced in the country meant that there was no return to the full dictatorship; a number
of other communist countries started following the Yugoslav example of an ‘alternative’
road to communism; and an open confrontation between China and the Soviet Union
further undermined the image of an all monolithic Soviet bloc.48
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Economic Reforms Between 1956 and 1968.
Even though the full-scale economic reforms in Hungary were not to be
introduced for another ten years, the years after the revolution prepared the ground for
future radical changes. Right after the new leadership was installed in 1956 the party
issued a resolution promising to introduce a new economic policy “adequate to the new
situation” and harshly criticizing the previous leadership for “copying the Soviet example
mechanically,” “relegating national interest,” and seriously offending “the national and
patriotic feelings of the Hungarian people.” 49 The dual pledge of the new government to
both the continuity of the socialist course and to bringing changes raised serious debates
between the pro-reformist and the conservative sides of the party. The first emphasized
the need for change and, thus, radical reforms; the second - continuity and, thus,
piecemeal modifications of the existing system. The latter won the debate at the end of
the 1950s, but the former prepared the theoretical foundation for the comprehensive
reforms that were to be implemented in the 1960s. More importantly, the heated public
debate that sprung out of this confrontation and eventually spread from economic
journals to daily newspapers demonstrated that an open discussion was possible.50
“Although the partial and gradual transformation of the planning system at the turn of
1956 and 1957 did mean that the Hungarian economy had embarked upon a path of
change, far more important than the actual results of this was its effect on attitudes and
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the experiences it provided. It proved that the economic mechanism was no longer a
taboo subject and that it could be corrected.” 51
Let us look at the reform proposals and the reasons they were shuffled aside for
the next ten years. Days after the new government announced its dedication to
restructuring the system, a network of committees was set up (total of about 200 people)
to devise a reform proposal headed by György Péter (recall that he was among the first to
raise questions regarding the working of the economic mechanism in 1954) and Professor
István Varga.52 The final draft of the reform proposal submitted to the government in
June of 1957, while reiterating its commitment to the centrally controlled socialist
economy, proposed changes to the planning mechanism, prices, and investment structure.
It preserved the yearly plans based on long-range national economic objectives, but it
rejected the notion of breaking down the yearly plan into company level plans.53
Enterprises were to become independent, and the government was to supervise the
fulfillment of the plan through indirect means.54 Direct control of ministries and other
agencies was to be abolished; supra-company trusts and associations were to be set up to
serve as liaisons between enterprises and the government.55 Ministries that controlled
enterprises were to be combined in a single Ministry for Industry, “which was to act as an
industrial policy-making and supervisory body.” 56 The mechanism of profit-sharing
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through which enterprises were to keep a share of the profit from the sale of their product
would provide an incentive for enterprises to be efficient while in the meantime
contributing to national economic production. The price system was to be reformed so
that the producer prices actually reflected the costs involved in the production process.
Although fixed prices and price ceilings were to remain in some areas, a larger proportion
of goods was to be sold at free market prices.57 Moreover, the export and import prices
were to reflect the world-prices through the use of real exchange rates.58 The government
would no longer provide investment resources to companies for free; enterprises were to
pay a fee for utilizing fixed assets and were to pay interest for financial assets.59
The initial suggestions presented at the committees’ deliberations dealt away with
compulsory plan directives all together, went much further in establishing free market
prices and in the use of various mechanisms of economic policy such as credit for the
central direction of enterprises.60 A compromise that was actualized in the final proposal
had to be made if the idea of a reform in general was to be sold at all.
Here it should be remembered that the reform proposals were being devised under
extremely difficult historical circumstances, so that they were influenced not only
by the level (and the weaknesses) of theoretical understanding but by tactical
concessions to make them more acceptable. Those devising the proposal thought
the dysfunctions of the economy could easily be cured by a partial granting of
autonomy to companies and even more partial introduction of market prices.
Moreover (and in this they were perfectly right in practice), the committee
considered that reforms could only gain acceptance gradually. (Berend 1990, 37)
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The opposition to any major reforms at the time equated socialism with the Soviet
type economic model and insisted that the approach in place was overall correct and that
all that had to be done was “to trim its ‘excesses’ and ‘distortions’.”

61

As soon as the

reform committees went to work, the opposition started its attack on the reform ideas
labeling them revisionist and non-Marxist and “a stand-in for counter revolution.”

62

They advocated that the problems arose from the wrong economic policy and not the
mechanism itself: “’In our view the errors derived not from the economic foundation, the
production relations, but from the economic policy. The economic policy was
oversized.’” 63 The declaration made at the Meeting of Communist and Workers’ Parties
in Moscow in the fall of 1957 that revisionism presented the main danger for the
development of socialism, strengthened the opposition’s standing.
Overall the diversion from the reform path at the end of the 1950s appears to have
come as a result of a combination of factors: the people at the leading positions that made
decisions regarding economic policy debated against the comprehensive reform; the
economy was recovering and the political situation was stabilizing quickly – “in April
1957 and again on May Day there were enormous rallies backing the government. Just as
the shock of the serious collapse had strengthened the inclination to comprehensive
reforms, so the swift economic and political consolidation did the opposite;” finally, the
resolution of the Meeting in Moscow gave extra support to the anti-reform movement.64
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The corrective measures that were introduced at the time included the reduction in
the number of plan indicators and elimination of direct central directives for a range of
products in different industries, especially light industry.65 Enterprises became more
involved in drafting their plans, although still through the same process of plan
bargaining, just better institutionalized.66
Small changes to the price system were introduced as well. The most important
change was the abolition of state subsidies for basic materials (e.g. coal, bauxite, lead,
iron ore, wool, timber) produced at home, which resulted, in some cases, in doubling and
tripling of prices.67 The prices on imported goods were recalculated to equal an average
of world-prices.68 The goal was to encourage more modernized and less resource
intensive production. 69 The book value of buildings and equipment was reassessed as
well, to increase the depreciation rate.70 Moreover, the centrally determined fixed prices
were to be revisited more often to better reflect changing production costs. 71 In 1964 a 5
per cent fee to enterprises on their gross fixed assets to encourage their more efficient
utilization was introduced.72 No changes were initiated to link consumer prices with
producer prices.
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These piecemeal reforms were for the most part derived from the ideas presented
by the pro-reformist side in the debates of 1957. The only difference is whereas the latter
called for an all-around comprehensive systemic change of the economic mechanism, the
conservative ‘reformists’ only applied the elements that did not undermine the basic
principles of the system. Following this same route, therefore, they pronounced that the
economic mechanism could be improved if production forces were further concentrated.
Thus, in 1962, mergers of state-owned industrial enterprises were underway. As a result,
their number decreased from 1,427 in 1950 to 839 in 1965 and the average number of
employees in each rose from 336 to 1,183 respectively.73
In agriculture, the significant shift first came with the proposal that membership
in agricultural cooperatives should be voluntary and that peasants should be persuaded,
rather than forced, to join them with the prospects of increasing their living standard.74
Even though due to the pressure from the Soviet Union the proposal had to be set aside
and the process of forced collectivization had to continue, the government demonstrated
its willingness to replace force and command with economic incentives. First and
foremost, the system of compulsory deliveries at very low prices that had existed before
the revolution of 1956 and that was eliminated by the revolutionary government did not
return. A new system was introduced with much higher prices.75 What was more
important, the government adopted a policy of tolerance of household farming – in other
words, tolerance for private agriculture. Practically, the move was necessitated because
the collectivized agriculture was not coping with the economic tasks alone. Ideologically,
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the move was justified as a transitional measure that would be eliminated as soon as
collectivized agriculture was strong enough to provide an adequate supply of goods:
Household farming is an integral complementary part of cooperative farming....It
will be needed so long as the economic activity of the cooperatives, namely the
production of goods by them, has not reached a high enough level for collective
production to take over the supply...of the peasant family needs of cooperative
members, and their proportion of production....Then, and only then and on that
basis will household farming become superfluous and meaningless. Until them,
there is a need for it, and this issue must be taken very seriously...In many places
the transitional measures are being branded in a sectarian manner as ‘capitalist
tendencies’ or regarded as some sort of ‘sin and act against socialism...’These
damaging, narrow-minded ideas must now be forcefully eliminated, and
everybody must understand....that the country needs meat! (Fehér 1960, 12;
quoted in Berend 1990, 98)
Overall, even though the policy of industrialization continued, the emphasis on
military industrialization was eased and other sectors of the economy were being
developed concurrently.

Reforms of 1968 - 1979.
When, in the 1950s, the pro-reformists and the ‘conservatives’ debated about the
further economic future of the country, they did not argue whether any problems existed
or not, they argued how to go about fixing the problems that the system created. The
conservative wing that won the debate at that time argued that it was not the system that
was wrong, but its ‘excesses,’ and, thus, the economic reforms of the 1950s aimed at
trimming those ‘excesses.’ When, in the 1960s, the old problems started re-appearing
with even greater intensity it became apparent that the piecemeal reforms did not bring
the result that their proponents were hoping for. István Friss, head of one of the Central
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Committee Departments, in the 1950s strongly opposed an introduction of a full-scale
reform. In 1971 he wrote:
Initially, it seemed that the reforms of the economic mechanism would not
touch the theoretical problems of a socialist economy. It turned out, however, that
a revision of practice necessitates also revision of its theoretical foundations...
....the laws of our present socialist economy must be established by ourselves,
relying on the analysis of our own observations...
First, it can be stated that according to all experience hitherto gained, the
activity of all units of economic activity cannot be rationally regulated from a
single center. Economic decisions can be correctly taken only where the needed
local and professional knowledge is greatest.....
Second, it may be stated that certain decisions must be taken centrally...
Thirdly, central economic decisions must be enforced upon enterprises and
local bodies in such a way as to interfere least with their autonomy and initiative,
that is, by means of economic regulators indirectly influencing their activities,
rather than by direct instructions...
Fourthly, it can be stated that a substitution of economic methods for control
by central plan or central instructions assumes, or rather requires, an expansion of
commodity and money relations...
Fifthly, a system of economic mechanism built upon a decentralization of
economic decisions, a substitution of indirect influencing for direct instruction, an
expansion of commodity and money relations, and the regulative functions of the
market, necessarily assumes also that some of the prices should depend on the
market, on free agreement between buyers and sellers. (Friss 1971, 50-54)
In the 1940s – 1950s rapid industrialization was partly attained through the
mobilization of additional labor resources in general and through attracting a greater
number of peasants and women to industry. By the 1960s the surplus of manpower had
been exhausted and economic growth could no longer be obtained by creating new jobs.
So, the extensive development methods had to be replaced with intensive ones stressing
technological development and productivity.
During the growth of our national economy, so far mainly of an extensive
character, there has been a marked rise in employment; a large new labor force
has entered industry, commerce and other branches of the economy. The ratio of
active wage earners (excluding pensioners) has reached 81 percent of the
population of working age; almost twice as many people are employed by
industry than in 1949. The reserves for development of an extensive character are
facing today depletion on a national scale; in some areas they have been already
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exhausted. We must switch over increasingly to an intensive development, that is,
to a type of economic growth which is primarily realized through technological
progress, better organization of labor and production, growing skill and
productivity of the workers, more effective utilization of productive resources. In
other words, through a rise in the efficiency of social labor. (Nyers 1966, 21)
The policy of import-substitution pursued from the very beginning anticipated
that the country’s dependence on other countries, especially capitalist ones, would
decrease over time; the trade with capitalist countries initially was seen as a necessary
evil that had to be endured out of necessity. In contrast to these expectations at the
beginning of the 1960s Hungarian debt to non-Comecon countries almost tripled from
1,600 million forints in 1959 to 4,100 million forints in 1963 superseding the value of its
exports to them.76 “According to a confidential report, ‘The [balance of payments] deficit
has had to be offset by further borrowing and the rescheduling of existing credits.’” 77 In
other words, the economic policies of the time not only failed to create a self-sufficient
economy, but also drove the country into even greater dependence on foreign credit.
The problem, thus, was two-fold. On one hand the economy of shortage that had
developed in Hungary became highly dependent on foreign imports as gap-fillers; on the
other hand, the goods produced for export did not generate enough inflow of hard
currency, because of their inferior quality. Even though in accord with the piecemeal
reforms of the 1950s various measures had been taken before 1968 to increase the quality
of the product and promote technological development to produce goods of better quality,
the situation did not improve. The main reason for the failure of the measures, as with the
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rest of the reforms of that time, was that they were not targeting the core of the problem –
the economic mechanism itself.
At the time when these feelings were manifesting themselves in Hungary, other
countries of the socialist bloc, including the Soviet Union, were debating the possibilities
for economic reforms as well. On the international scene the Cold War was replaced by
the politics of détente and the Soviet Union was further stressing its commitment of no
return to the Stalinist era.
Encouraged by these favorable international developments Hungary started to
open up as well. In the beginning of the 1960s travel to foreign countries, including the
West, became once again possible.78 In 1962 the famous Kadarian policy principle,
“’Whoever is not against us is with us!’”

79
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differences in the society that ranged from removing the discrimination for university
entrance for people with ‘other’ backgrounds to accepting churches and religious people;
“believers belonging to any of the denominations can exercise their religion freely. There
is no discrimination to their disadvantage. They are citizens with equal rights in our
country.” 80 This shift to a more open and tolerant society also created an atmosphere in
which the ideas of a radical reform of the economic mechanism could no longer be
simply dismissed for ideological reasons.
The political system became much less repressive. The overwhelming
majority of the old ‘caste’ privileges, such as special shops, were also abolished.
Leading politicians, too were obliged to pay rent for their housing. There was no
78

Before 1956 travel was almost impossible, even to the socialist countries. (Berend, The
Hungarian Economic Reforms, 135.)
79
80

Berend, The Hungarian Economic Reforms, 135.

János Kádár, Report to the Ninth MSZMP Congress, 1966, Open Society Archives, Central
European University, Budapest, Hungary.

Karapetyan, Zinaida, 2005, UMSL, p. 103

cult of an ‘infallible leader’ any more, and the supremacy of the legal system over
political expediency was strengthened. All these changes laid the foundations of a
new political style and became a stepping-stone for efforts at restoring the kind of
human rights which had previously been disparaged and set aside. Even though
most of the alterations were paternalistic government concessions that involved
no change in the monolithic system, the developing ‘enlightened absolutism’ of
the 1960s helped to create the main preconditions for economic reform.
Under these circumstances, the Hungarian authorities did not resort to the
traditional administrative intervention or to organization and reorganization, nor
did they opt for a course of inefficient, partial corrective measures when
confronted again with economic trouble. (Berend 1990, 136)
The reform itself took effect on January 1, 1968.81 Measures to ease the transition
to the new system such as further decreasing the number of compulsory plan indicators
and gradually increasing enterprises’ independence, however, had been introduced
gradually since 1966. The reform itself introduced the market as a regulating mechanism
in addition to central planning. Planning remained important as a tool for formulating
national economic goals, but it no longer prescribed to enterprises what to produce and
how. In other words, planning of production was eliminated. (In the beginning the plan
was still to provide directives for production of a number of products, but this was just a
temporary transitional measure.) Enterprises were to formulate their own plans according
to the conditions of the market (even though somewhat restricted). The plan bargaining
system that had developed between enterprises and government, therefore, was
eradicated. To ensure the fulfillment of the national economic goals, the government was
to use indirect methods or economic regulators to steer companies in the ‘right direction.’
What will actually happen is that administrative constraints will be replaced by
economic means of influence; these will be primarily the factors prompting the
enterprises to adequate actions. Economic means, such as state collection of
accumulation, rules regulating the use of foreign exchange, the price and wage
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policy, and the credit policy are the actual means for transmitting the national
economy’s objectives to the enterprises. ( Nyers 1966, 26)
The transformation of the price system was probably one of the most important
steps in the reform process. The rigid price system of the Soviet style economy, which
failed to account for the production cost and world prices and in which producer prices
and consumer prices were not interconnected, was at the core of many problems that the
country was facing. Since the reform of 1968 was designed as a gradual process, the price
mechanism was to change gradually as well. In the beginning, the economy, having been
closed to the influence of the world market for so long, could not have been subjected to
the world-prices at once. “It would have been as if the windows of a hothouse had been
opened wide in the middle of winter so that the plants might acclimatize to natural
circumstances.” 82 The system that was introduced, therefore, consisted of three types of
prices: fixed prices, prices moving within certain limits, and free prices. Fixed prices
were used for basic raw materials for industrial production, basic agricultural products
(milk, meat, etc.), and basic consumer products (bread, sugar, flour, etc.).83 Prices
moving within limits were used for capital goods, manufactured consumer goods, and
processed food.84 Initially, 70 percent of the industrial producer prices were either fixed
or could only move within certain limits; a few years into the reform process, the
proportion dropped to 36 percent.85 Free prices were used for everything else. In addition
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a variety of factors were now incorporated into the calculation of domestic prices that
made them more realistic.
Fewer changes were made to consumer prices initially; the plan was “to bring
consumer prices and inputs closer together ....gradually, over a period of ten to fifteen
years.” 86 In the beginning, 50 percent of them were either fixed or regulated.87
At the enterprise level the reform abolished the system according to which
enterprises had to supply their output to a central organ, which then distributed it among
other enterprises according to pre-determined planned quotas (exports had to go through
especially licensed foreign-trade enterprises). After 1968 enterprises were free to seek
their own domestic partners (with only some exceptions). The situation with foreign-trade
was more complicated, because different rules had to be set for trading with the Comecon
countries and with the West. Trade with Comecon had to continue to be conducted
through governments negotiating what to trade and at what price. The only change that
was introduced in Hungary in that respect was that enterprises were invited to participate
in the negotiations. Trade with the West was still accomplished through foreign-trade
enterprises, but the relationship between manufacturers and foreign-trade enterprises
changed. From 1968 manufacturers could establish direct contact with foreign companies
and directly participate in negotiations. Their relationship with foreign-trade enterprises
became commission based according to which they would authorize a foreign-trade
enterprise to buy or sell a certain product and would pay a commission for their services.
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From 1972 enterprises were even allowed to establish joint ventures with western
companies.
A large share of enterprises’ profit was appropriated into the budget through
different taxes; whatever was left went into different enterprise funds, the investment and
the profit-sharing funds being the largest. Since the state taxed enterprises at a flat rate,
enterprises had an incentive to increase their profit, because a larger amount of it would
then be left in their hands.
Centrally financed investment projects remained as a central element of the
system, although their proportion was expected to decrease.88 “Company investment
accounted for only 39 percent of all investment spending in 1968. The figure was
expected to reach 54 percent in 1969 and 57 percent in 1970.” 89 In addition enterprises
could apply for a bank loan if they wanted to pursue an investment project that exceeded
their investment fund.90
Originally, the amount of profit that could be distributed into the investment and
profit-sharing funds was decided centrally; shortly after the reforms were introduced the
direct regulation was replaced by indirect measures like imposing a high tax rate.91
Even though the enterprise wage bill was still regulated, enterprises were no
longer told how many people to hire and what wage to pay.92 To balance out income
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differentials, the proportion of indirect benefits such as free medical assistance and
education was gradually increased so that it eventually reached half of the income paid in
money.93
Enterprise structure remained the same, but the second phase of the reform was to
facilitate the creation of small- and medium size enterprises and dismantling of
monopolies.94 Enterprise units received a chance to become independent; according to
Révész, due to the decentralization efforts the number of state firms increased during the
first years of the reform.95
Probably one of the most significant achievements of the reform of 1968 was
liberalization of agriculture from state control and direction. “The end of paternalist state
intervention and the consolidation of market relations turned the cooperatives into
genuine businesses, while reinforcing a cooperative self-management that ranged from
free decision-making about production and liberation from the monopoly of the state
purchasing organization to the liberty to sell under market conditions.” 96 Household
farming and non-agricultural activities of agricultural cooperatives were endorsed and
further promoted as well. This would prove to be an important factor in private sector
development in Hungary that is discussed at greater length in chapter 4.
Even though the 1968 changes were just the first steps in the reform course,
which was to be a process over time, the first years after the reform had been introduced
already saw some major improvements: the third five year plan (1966-1970) was fulfilled

93

Berend and Csató, Evolution of the Hungarian Economy, 314.

94

Ibid., 315.

95

Révész, Perestroika, 79.

Karapetyan, Zinaida, 2005, UMSL, p. 108

to a greater extent than the previous plans, the annual rate of growth increased,
productivity improved, the standard of living rose, and shortages eased, just to name a
few.97
The anti-reform voices after the reform was introduced started their attack on the
reforms in the name of protecting workers’ interests and socialism. 98 Fueled by the rise in
income differentials and the speedy increase of the peasants’ standard of living, which at
times superseded the workers’ standard of living, the anti-reform movement waged an
attack on the private initiative, cooperative ownership, household farming, and nonagricultural activities of cooperatives – everything that was openly generating higher
profits than the state sector.99 The attacks on the economic mechanism were also coupled
with the wide-spread ideological campaign criticizing the bourgeois values and trying to
assert the correct socialist morals.
The attack on the main principles of the new mechanism – the introduction of the
market principles and abolishing of plan directives, though, proceeded in vain. The proreformist side of the party and of the government continuously stressed their adherence to
these main principles of the reforms. The partial victory of the counter-reform movement
was in the little changes that were seeking to revert the economic mechanism to its old
form.100
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The first such change was introduced in 1973 when the government re-established
central supervision of the fifty largest industrial enterprises.101 Next came the revision of
economic regulators such as an increase in the proportion of company profits
appropriated by the state, moving some investment projects from under company control
to under the control of the central government, various limits on company funds, profits,
etc.102 In other words, these changes were a way for the government to exercise control
over enterprises even though the latter formally retained their independence, which they
had acquired under the new system of 1968.
The main ‘achievement’ of the anti-reform movement was the halt of the second
stage of the reform that was planned for the beginning of the 1970s. The reforms
introduced in 1968 were transitional measures that were to be replaced by even more
aggressive measures at the second stage.103 As the second stage was taken off the agenda,
the reforms not only were discontinued, the transitional measures were retained, which
inevitably led to malfunctioning of the system.
The international situation that seemed favorable to the reform movement in
1968, shifted sides in the beginning of the 1970s again and provided a supportive ground
for the opposition. The Hungarian reforms that initially seemed to coincide with the
reforms in other socialist countries at the end went far beyond the changes introduced in
any other country.104 As a result, criticism of Hungary as deviating from socialist ideals
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started to reappear in the beginning of the 1970s everywhere throughout the socialist
camp, of course with the Soviet Union in the lead. The world crisis of 1973 at first helped
the anti-reform movement, because the initial response was to try to keep its influence
‘outside of the Hungarian borders’ and protect the country from it. Since it was only
possible with increased government involvement in the regulation of the economy,105 it
coincided with and encouraged the anti-reform sentiments.
There can be no doubt that the reform introduced in 1968 meant a qualitative
change as against the earlier control system, in spite of its several compromises,
solutions that were meant to be transitory and the widespread use of “brakes”. 106
But the evolution of the reform stopped short already in the early seventies, in
spite of favorable economic results, international economic and political
conditions that could be said ideal, and following that some backward steps were
made. Next we reacted to the world market price explosion with a delay and not
with too great conviction, assuming that the exclusion of external market impulses
from the internal processes, and later its strong damping would be suited for
maintaining the earlier smooth balanced growth we got used to, for avoiding the
economic conflicts (necessarily having political implications). The result was –
quite contrary to central intentions – a conspicuous growth in the distance
between enterprise efforts and economic rationality. (Antal 1979, 263)
Five years after the world oil crisis, though, it was becoming apparent that its
consequences were there to stay, and if the protectionist policies that heavily relied on
104
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borrowing were to be continued, they would lead the country to insolvency. The proreform course was once again revived with emphasis on the expansion of exports.

Reforms of 1978-1988.
As the other countries of the socialist bloc were facing similar problems, the
understanding of the Hungarian reform process came under a different light. Now even
Soviet economists were discussing the possibility of applying the Hungarian measures to
the situation in the Soviet Union.107
The debate in Hungary revived the forgotten ‘second stage’ of the reform of 1968.
The price system was modified once again.108 This time economic activity was
divided into competitive and non-competitive sectors. In the competitive sector, the
prices for energy and raw materials were set at “the prevailing most expensive purchase
[import] prices” and the manufacturing prices for companies whose hard-currency
exports accounted for more than 5 percent were to be based on export prices “in
convertible currency.” 109 This so-called international competitive price system covered
35 percent of national income.110 Manufacturing enterprises whose hard-currency export
did not exceed 5 percent were to use so-called follower prices – “a firm with a similar
profile whose domestic prices were export determined would be selected as a ‘leader,’
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and the ‘follower’ firm would have to follow its lead in pricing.” 111 In the noncompetitive sectors - services, construction, construction materials, agriculture, and food
processing, prices continued to be determined centrally.
Consumer prices, which by 1978 overall were 4 percent lower than producer
prices, were modified as well. The changes were still very partial, though, – centrally
ordered price increases, the elimination or reduction of some subsidies, changes to the
turnover tax; they did not alter the basic problem of the producer-consumer price
mismatch.112
In 1985 price reform was again on the agenda. This time a Price Club of state
enterprises freed from all pricing regulations was created, and more goods were set to be
sold at free prices. “As a result of these measures, Hungary’s price system was almost
fully liberated by the end of the communist period.” 113
Small changes to the banking system started to be introduced at the beginning of
the 1980s with the establishment of ten small banks, two join venture banks in Budapest,
and two Hungarian banks operating in the West.114 They owed their creation to the
shortage of central funds to finance small investment projects and, hence, the idea to
establish funds independent of the government budget to carry out those tasks. The
socialist banking system was finally restructured in 1987. A two-tier system was set up
instead, with National bank taking on a role of a central bank responsible for “monetary
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policy, international credit transactions and control of the domestic money market,” and
commercial banks operating on a “competitive, profit-based system” set up to deal with
all the banking needs of enterprises.115
Further steps towards decentralization were taken. First and foremost, in 1980
branch ministries were finally abolished and a single Ministry for Industry was created
that no longer had direct control over enterprises. “The new ministry was to avoid
detailed company oversight and deal instead with strategic decision making with regard
to large-scale industrial development and the introduction of modern technology. The
new ministry retained ownership of the state industrial firms but lacked departments to
run those firms. The size of its staff was less than half that of its predecessors.” 116
Starting in the beginning of the 1980s the decentralization of large enterprises
granting independence to their units was put on the agenda and implemented, albeit
slowly, as well. As a result of this policy, the number of state industrial enterprises rose
from 702 in 1979 to 1,007 in 1986.117 Overall, more than 4,000 new enterprises emerged
and the number of trusts (monopolistic enterprise conglomerates) declined from 24 in
1980 to 9 in 1985.118
The central control of the economy in a socialist type economy (at least the type
that developed in Eastern Europe) also covered the control of the cash flow. At the
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enterprise level it was done through keeping all the finances in different funds in the State
Bank. At the individual level it was done through regulation of wages. For that reason,
the wages could not be set free. At the same time, there was a need to create a system that
would link financial rewards to individual performance. In 1968 a step in that direction
was taken through setting up enterprise wage funds and replacing centrally set wages
with average wage levels that could be manipulated within certain limits. In the 1980s
this system was abolished as well and individual wages were no longer regulated. Since
the state still strove to preserve control over aggregate cash flow, a limit on the total wage
fund was introduced instead. Additions to the wage fund above the limit were added to
the total profit and taxed at 50%.119
Far-reaching changes were introduced at the enterprise level. From the middle of
the 1980s, the management of large and medium-sized enterprises was transferred to
enterprise councils and the management of small enterprises to the general meeting of all
employees or employees’ representatives. 120 With this some property rights to enterprises
were transferred to the new management bodies as well: “they can make decisions about
issuance of bonds for investment purposes, transfer assets, mergers with other enterprises,
and about important employment problems.” 121 By 1986 sixty two percent of state
industrial enterprises were managed by enterprise councils and fifteen percent by
workers’ general meetings, with only twenty three percent of state industrial enterprises
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remaining under direct state supervision (according to Adam, primarily enterprises in bad
condition).122
Even after the ministerial structure was modified, company managers remained
under the control of and were responsible to the minister and not the company. In 1984,
the Company Act of 1977 was amended to give the authority to appoint and dismiss
enterprise management to company councils or, in the case of companies with fewer than
200 employees, to the general meeting of company workers.123 “The post of company
manager was placed on a competitive basis. With a term of office of five years, company
managers were made accountable to the company itself instead of the minister.” 124
Various laws of 1982 established nine new organizational forms for carrying out
private economic activity and loosened regulation and licensing requirements for small
artisans and individual tradesmen.125 The most prominent of the new organizational
forms were work partnerships. There were two types of completely independent, private
partnerships – an economic work partnership (GMK) and a civil legal association (PJT).
GKMs could provide services and undertake production activities, but could not do
commerce; they could have up to 30 members; and there was no limit on the number of
close relatives of members that could work for GKMs (except siblings).126 PJTs were
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smaller in size, only up to four members, and were meant to provide an organizational
form for private small retail traders.127
The most popular type of partnership became the semi-independent company
work partnership (VGMK) (or ISZSZCS – its counterpart in agricultural cooperatives).
VGMKs were semi-independent, because they had to have a parent company that
provided the material base (equipment, materials, etc,) and was liable for any obligations
that the partnership undertook.128 They were independent, because they independently
contracted for work with any state enterprise129 and were free to organize their work
process any way they wanted: “they were free to discard the division of labor designed by
the firm for the same tasks and reinvent a new and more flexible work organization.” 130
All the partnerships in a sense just institutionalized practices that either had been
going on informally, in the case of some private business activities, or had developed in
response to the limitations of the system, which was the case with semi-independent
partnerships. VGKMs simply institutionalized the practice that had developed at the state
enterprises, according to which an individual worker or a group of workers would bargain
with the management to give them overtime work that had a higher hourly pay, thus
avoiding the state imposed restrictions on wages.131 “Managers found that they were able
to circumvent the strict regulations limiting wages because VGMK work was not paid out
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of the wage fund but from the firm’s expense account. The VGMKs allowed companies
to keep their best workers and provide others with incentives to work hard.” 132

Final Days of Communism, 1988 – 1990.
The biggest obstacle to all the changes at the enterprise level was the Corporation
Act of 1875 that was outdated and inadequate, but was still in effect. The new enterprise
law was finally adopted on January 1, 1989 that established various forms of corporate
organization such as limited liability company, joint-stock company, company limited by
shares, etc., and guaranteed legal protection of the assets of private firms. The Law on
Transformation followed that mandated all state-owned enterprises to transform into
corporations by 1992.133 Even though that was the beginning of the privatization process,
the phase that is normally referred to as a spontaneous privatization,134 the Law on
Transformation did not necessary imply that the enterprises had to be privatized;
“Transformation of a state-owned enterprise into a corporation is a prerequisite for
privatization, and sometimes the two acts take place simultaneously; but transformation
itself does not necessarily create a private firm.” 135 The Law on Entrepreneurship with
Foreign Participation adopted in 1988 and amended in 1990 legalized foreign ownership
of Hungarian firms. In 1990 the State Property Agency was created to supervise the
process of privatization.
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Unlike in the Soviet Union where similar laws were introduced at about the same
time, but could not fully operate, these laws in Hungary were functional due to the other
systemic changes that the country’s economy had undergone simultaneously, such as
various price reforms and making enterprises more independent.
The economic reforms of the 1980s provided the foundation for the
transformation of the economy in the 1990s. The quick and peaceful regime change in a
matter of a few years at the end of the 1980s guaranteed a stable political environment for
the future transition process so vital at times of big transformations.

Conclusion
Major criticisms of all the economic reforms discussed above always stress the
contradictions between the intentions to create a free market environment and the
system’s ‘inability’ to realize them. It is argued that the nature of the communist system
was antagonistic to any kind of a market mechanism and, thus, the system always found a
way to create obstacles for any meaningful changes to occur. This research does not
necessarily contend these ideas. The Soviet system that Hungary originally adopted was
based on the principle of a fully controlled economy and no room for market or marketlike relationships was left. Obviously, to introduce any kind of market elements into that
kind of a system would be met with resistance from the forces opposed to the change.
This can be clearly seen from the brief historical analysis presented above.
The intent here, though, was to shift the focus of the analysis from what the
reforms failed to accomplish to what they did achieve. It is not the failed attempts at
restructuring the system that put the former communist countries at different starting
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points at the beginning of the transition process at the end of the 1980s. It is the debates
and little changes that had been introduced or evolved on their own before the transition
process that gave some of the countries a head-start.
In the case of Hungary it becomes obvious that the ‘typical’ Soviet economic
model was not so typical: centrally planned directives for enterprises had been replaced
by economic regulators some twenty years prior to its collapse, and so was some central
regulation of prices; the market, even if limited, existed on par with central planning;
private initiative had been gradually introduced into the system so much so that in the
beginning of the 1980s it was officially recognized; the need for orienting to the world
market prices had been voiced and accounted for since the reforms of 1968.
The basic underlying difference in the Hungarian experience had been the
approach to reforms and their more systematic application. Up until 1989 the main
approach to reforming the mechanism in the Soviet Union could not really be called a
reform; it was constantly rather an attempt to ‘improve’ the mechanism by the means of
‘making more efficient’ some of its elements. In Hungary the reforms were indeed
drafted to modify the mechanism itself. For example, ‘more freedom’ to enterprises in the
Soviet Union was understood as replacing existing plan targets with other ones (for
example, replacing the gross output index with the ‘realized’ gross output index (sales)),
and was very resistant to the idea of freeing enterprises from centrally determined targets.
In fact, when the reformers in the Soviet Union were discussing the possibility of letting
enterprises draw their own plans, they did not for a minute imagine abolishing central
production plans at the enterprise level; they rather imagined that enterprises would be
given certain targets and they would have to build their own plans around those targets –
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that is simply shifting the enterprise planning process from the ministries and glavks to
enterprises themselves, but keeping it based on the same principles. The Hungarians
removed production plans altogether and made enterprises free participants of the market
in 1968; and, despite the setbacks in the 1970s, this feature of the reform was never
abandoned.
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CHAPTER 4
STATE AND PRIVATE SECTOR IN HUNGARY AND RUSSIA BEFORE THE
TRANSITION

The measures introduced by the governments in the former communist countries
after communism collapsed were meant to facilitate the creation of a market economy, as
discussed in chapter 1. Despite the seeming complication of the matter, what the first
steps were to accomplish was to facilitate the establishment of private activity, especially
small-scale private activity, and competition by freeing the market and enterprises from
government control and by liberalizing prices and trade. What I have tried to argue
through the analysis in chapter 3 is that Hungary had been taking steps in that direction
already during communism and that the concern for market and private initiative had
been a part of the discourse long before the full-fledged transition to the market started.
The next step in the analysis is to demonstrate whether the differences in the two
countries’ developments yielded any different results as well before the transition process
started. That is if the state sector in Hungary operated any differently from the state sector
in Russia and if private initiative had been accepted on a much larger scale in Hungary
than in Russia.
This chapter focuses first on the structural difference of industry in Hungary and
Russia on the verge of the transition process. Then I examine Hungarian state enterprise
to contrast its behavior with the typical Soviet state enterprise presented in chapter 1. A
discussion of the so-called ‘second economy’ under which private initiative, legal and
illegal, was classified in the communist times follows. The chapter concludes with the
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discussion of what implications all these differences have on the transitions in Russia and
Hungary in general in the 1990s.

Structure of Industry and Economy
Every textbook on the structure of Socialist industry will tell you that the former
socialist economies were dominated by production enterprises of a large size. This was
normally illustrated by the proportion of the people working for enterprises of different
sizes. For example, in 1960 54.3% of the industrial labor force in the Soviet Union was
employed in enterprises with more than 1,000 persons, and in 1964 that number increased
to 59.6%.1 In Hungary the figures were 58.8% and 82.5% respectively.2 Moreover,
production was also highly concentrated: “By 1979 [in the Soviet Union] enterprises
employing more than 1,000 workers accounted for more than 70% of the value of
industrial output, employed almost three-quarters of all industrial workers, utilized more
than 80% of the capital funds but constituted only 17.5% of the total number of
enterprises;”3 “In 1975 in Hungarian industry the three largest producers supplied more
than two thirds of production in 508 and 6374 product aggregates.”5
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As was discussed in chapter 3, though, the process of reorganization of Hungarian
industrial enterprises began in the early 1980s under the policies of the communist
government. By 1986 it had already brought some tangible results: the number of state
industrial enterprises rose from 702 in 1979 to 1,007 (43% increase) in 1986 with the
number of industrial enterprises employing fewer than 100 people rising from 50 (7% of
all industrial enterprises in 1979) to 229 (23% of all industrial enterprises in 1986), the
number of enterprises employing 101-500 people changing from 190 (27%) to 281
(28%), and the number of enterprises employing more than 500 people changing from
462 (66%) to 495 (49%).6 The slight increase in the number of enterprises employing
more than 500 people is attributed to the decomposition of even larger organizational
units, trusts (“monopolistic enterprise conglomerates”); according to Brada, the number
of all trusts decreased from 24 in 1980 to 9 in 1985.7
I could not locate data for the distribution of industrial enterprises in Russia or the
Soviet Union by size, but the statistics presented in Table 1 for the number of production
associations indicates that in Russia in the 1980s the reverse process was observed - the
further amalgamation of enterprises into bigger production units continued. (Here I opted
to use the statistics for the Russian Republic, rather than the Soviet Union, because it
provides a better comparison for the case studies at hand.) Any dissolution of enterprises
into smaller units could not have proceeded on a large scale, because the total number of
production organizations did not increase much, as happened in Hungary (Table 1).
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Table 1. Number of Production Organizations and Production and Scientific-Production Associations for
the Russian Soviet Federalist Socialist Republic.

Total number of production organizations

1980

1985

1986

1987

1988

25,400

26,300

27,300

27,300

27,200

(+3.5%)

(+3.8%)

(0%)

(-.3%)

2239

2186

2266

2382

(+6%)

(-2.4%)

(+3.7%)

(+5.1%)

(production and scientific-production
associations, industrial combines and enterprises
(including enterprises belonging to production
and scientific-production associations)).
Number of production and scientific-production

2110

associations.
Source: Narodnoe Khozyastvo RSFSR, 1988.

Table 2. Number of Small Business Partnerships and their Participants, Filling Annual Tax Form at the
End of Each Year.
Partnerships
Business Partnerships (GMK)
Number
Number of participants
Company Work Partnerships (VGMK)
Number
Number of participants
Specialized Work Partnerships (ISZSZCS)
Number
Number of participants
Other Work Partnerships
Number
Number of Participants
Total
Number
Number of Participants
Percent of employed*
Source: Róna-Tas 1997, 146-148.

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

4,629
27,647

7,340
47,999

9.314
60,303

10,941
72,541

11,185
74,793

9,837
103,864

17,775
201,085

20,267
241,945

21,490
266,917

19,117
241,461

1,276
42,193

2,243
75,651

2,523
89,147

2,768
102,233

2,337
86,224

463
6,636

622
8,472

833
10,587

1,484
5,360

2,199
9,302

16,205
180,340
3.5%

27,980
333,207
6.5%

32,937
401,982
7.9%

36,683
447,041
8.8%

34,838
411,780
8.1%

* Calculated as a percentage of employed people as of the 1980s census (5,068,840 people). The census
data are available from the Hungarian Census Web-site at
http://www.nepszamlalas.hu/eng/volumes/06/00/tabeng/1/load02_1_0.html. Considering that the number
of employed increased only by 1.9% from 1970 (4,973,946 employed people) to 1980, and that in 1990
the number went down to 4,527,157 (an 11% decrease from 1980), the increase in the percent of people
participating in private partnerships cannot be attributed to demographic trends.

The private sector was also different in the two countries. The introduction of the
new forms of organizations for private activity in Hungary in 1982 changed the structure
of small-scale private production activity as well. The percent of people legally
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participating in private partnerships of different kinds increased from 3.5% in 1983 to
8.1% in 1987 (including full-time and part-time participants) (Table 2).
Table 3 presents the data from Soviet official statistics on the percentage of
employed population in different sectors. The data report zero percent of people engaged
in private labor activity as small craftsmen and artisans, which means that their number
was very minimal. According to Anders Åslund, legally registered private enterprise
before 1986 did not exist in Russia.8 The cooperative, then, which was legalized in 1988,
was the first legalized form of private enterprise that was allowed to engage in smallscale production activities.
Table 3. Percent of Employed by Sector in the Russian Soviet Federalist Socialist Republic.
Sector

1970

1980

1985

1986

1987

1988

State sphere

87.8

92.3

93.0

93.1

93.1

92.6

Agricultural collectives

10.0

6.6

6.0

5.9

5.8

5.5

Production and service cooperatives

-

-

-

-

0.1

0.5

Private labor activity, etc.

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.1

0.2

Household plot

2.2

1.1

1.0

1.0

0.9

1.2

Total

100

100

100

100

100

100

Source: Nrodnoye Khozyaistvo RSFSR, 1988.

According to a representative survey conducted in 1981, before the introduction
of partnerships, full-time legal private sector (small artisans and traders) in Hungary
constituted 3.8% of the labor force, but another 27.9 percent of Hungarians regularly
engaged in some part-time private activity9 retaining their full-time employment with the
state sector (Table 4). Notice that illegal private activity recorded in the numbers is

8

Anders Åsland, “The Development of Small Enterprise,” in Russia’s Post-Communist Economy,
ed. Brigitte Granville and Peter Oppenheimer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 349.
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limited to non-license private activity and not activity that is prohibited by law. The labor
contract category included people that contracted with state enterprises for occasional
jobs.
Table 4. Private Sector Activity in Hungary by 1981.
Private Sector Activity

Percentage of Participation

None

68.3

Part-time

27.9

Household farming

21.3

Nonagricultural Labor (Artisans and Services)

5.0

Labor contracts

2.5

Renting

1.0

Full-time

3.8

Source: Róna-Tas 1997, 117.

In a study of Soviet immigrants in Israel in the 1970s 8% of the participants
indicated that they had participated in some kind of private activity (primarily excluding
agriculture) while they were residing in the USSR.10 In the 1980s a study of Soviet
immigrants in the United States showed that 13% of those interviewed participated in
some kind of private work (excluding agriculture) while they were residing in the
USSR.11 Considering how low the official statistics were, the private activity had to have
been predominantly carried out illegally. Since the scope of private activity allowed by
the law was very limited, which will be discussed later, most of the illegal private activity

9

It appears that the part-time private activity recorded here includes licensed as well as nonlicensed activity.
10

Gur Ofer and Aaron Vinokur, The Soviet Household under the Old Regime (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1992), 47.
11

Paul R. Gregory, “Productivity, Slack, and Time Theft in the Soviet Economy,” in Politics,
Work, and Daily Life in the USSR: a Survey of Former Soviet Citizens, ed. James R. Millar (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1987), 271.
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was actually in spheres prohibited by law (as opposed to be illegal just due to the
violation of licensing regulations).
To summarize, this brief analysis demonstrates the following. Hungarian state
industry was much less centralized than Russian industry and had been moving towards
decentralization throughout the 1980s. The legalization of new forms of private
organizations in Hungary in 1982 resulted in the proliferation of small-scale private
activity, including industrial private activity, a number of years before the market
transition started. Whereas a large percentage of the Hungarian population engaged in
part-time legalized private activity, Soviet citizens normally engaged in illegal private
activity. As a result, the overall structure of the Hungarian economy before the transition
to market started was much more saturated with small scale legal private activity than the
Russian economy.

Behavioral Differences
The typical Soviet enterprise behavior that was described in chapter 1 was often
understood to be common for the East European region overall. It is not uncommon to
read a description of the Hungarian economy before 1989 along the following lines some changes had been introduced after 1968, which had introduced market elements
into the system, but the central control prevailed and the basic conditions of “the
economy of shortage, the redistribution of revenues virtually independent of
performance, bureaucratic economic control and the policy of full employment” 12
remained unaltered; therefore, no significant changes at the enterprise level had taken
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place either. While one cannot challenge the truthfulness of this view, one has to
understand that it does not necessarily imply that the Hungarian economic mechanism by
the 1980s, nevertheless, completely resembled the Soviet type system. The problem lies
in what one chooses to use as a measure for comparison – the market allocating
mechanism or the Soviet command economy. The above mentioned views put forward
the arguments that present the areas of the Hungarian system where the market
mechanism failed to work; and that, naturally, amounts for extensive criticism. An
alternative view, which I present here, is to examine the changes that the market
mechanism did introduce that altered Soviet-type economic mechanisms.
Changes along these lines were well summarized by Támás Bauer, 13 which is
worth quoting at some length:
Many Hungarian critics of the functioning of the economic system after
1968 point out how strong the role of state authorities in everyday enterprise
decision-making continued to be, how often formal and especially informal
commands were issued by the authorities....While in the first years of the reform
one could hope that commands would be exceptions, after 14 years one must
admit that they were issued quite frequently indeed. Nevertheless, they were no
longer part of a comprehensive system.
Enterprises consult the ministry while drafting their plans and even submit
the plan to the ministry; in turn, the ministry often directs the enterprise to do or
not to do something. But neither the ministry nor the planning office total up the
plan figures supplied by the enterprises.
This is facilitated by another important change. Despite frequent
intervention in material allocation and inter-firm relations by the branch
ministries...the central allocation of materials and products was abolished as a
system. Even the tensions in materials supply after the oil crisis in the mid
seventies did not result in a general return to the old system.
It is the lack of aggregation and dis-aggregation in planning, the fact that
plan figures are submitted only for consultation and not for approval, and that
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György Bõgel, Vincent Edwards, and Marian Wax, Hungary since Communism: the
Transformation of Business (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1997), 49.
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Támás Bauer, “The Hungarian Alternative to Soviet-Type Planning,” Journal of Comparative
Economics 7 (1983): 304-316.
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enterprises generally have to buy materials and not to apply for them, that makes
the system different from traditional Soviet-type planning.
One of the most important consequences of the changes is that plan
fulfillment – especially the fulfillment of the output plan – ceased to be the basic
success indicator of enterprises. It is true that profit has not become the dominant
success indicator that it should be according to the logic of the NEM....But it was
always actual performance....and not fulfillment of a plan that counted. This is
something that remains an endeavor or maybe a hope in the Soviet Union and
other CMEA counties with directive planning. (Bauer 1983, 305-306)
The author goes on to say that the reasons for plan bargaining practice, through which
enterprises in the Soviet Union negotiate for lower plan targets, ceased to exist as well.14
In other words, the logic of enterprise behavior was changed.
In the same vein Burawoy and Lukács discover that as a result of all the changes
that Hungary had undergone, the country by the 1980s had developed a different
distinctive type of enterprise management (what the authors referred to as a ‘factory
regime’), what they labeled as ‘bureaucratic hegemonic.’
The enterprise no longer controls the distribution of scarce goods and services,
such as housing, child care, televisions, cars, food, clothing, etc. These are now
available either through the market (purchasable with forints) or through
distribution by the state. Management loses its capacity to extract submission
through its monopoly of scarce consumer goods but does not develop new power
based on the threat of firing or laying off workers. Management has to elicit the
consent of workers, through financial incentives, bonus systems and piece rates,
the distribution of overtime, or participation in lucrative ‘economic work
partnerships.’ But there isn’t a cadre of party activists mobilizing rank-and-file
workers to participate in production campaigns, to achieve plan targets, or to scale
new heights in output records. (Burawoy and Lukács 1992, 33)
This style was contrasted with the Soviet type factory regime, labeled bureaucratic
despotic regime:
management, with the aid of trade union and party, extracts submission from
workers due to their dependence on enterprise supply of goods and services. At
the same time management is dependent on the spontaneous cooperation of
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workers to meet the exigencies of uncertain supplies of materials and machinery.
Management uses its monopoly over scarce consumer goods to reward a leading
cadre of activists – such as Stakhanovites or heroes of labor – who become
involved in directing production, set norms to be emulated, or surveil rank-andfile workers. (Burawoy and Lukács 1992, 33)
The differences between the two systems accounted for the fact that when the
authors undertook a comparative study of an American and a Hungarian factory, the
organization of work in the latter defied almost every stereotype that existed about a
typical socialist enterprise, whereas the former resembled them much more closely:
The technical efficiency at Bánki’s [the Hungarian enterprise] machine shop was
greater than at Allied’s [the American enterprise]. In comparison with Allied,
Bánki operators work as hard if not harder and produce higher-quality work,
norms are better adjusted to jobs, pressure for innovation is more continuous,
planning on the shop floor is more effective, the external labor market is better
able to tie rewards to skills and experience, and bureaucratic rules that interfere
with production are more limited. (Burawoy and Lukács 1992, 78)
The authors did not argue that this was the case for every state enterprise in Hungary,
which in fact was shown by their own research at a different Hungarian enterprise that
displayed “the distinctive problems of shortages, inefficiency, and bad planning.”

15

What

they did conclude was that those Hungarian enterprises that were semi-autonomous units
of larger enterprise (that was the case with Bánki) were more likely to operate as
efficiently as a western enterprise than the ones that were not (which was the case with
the other Hungarian enterprise), because the former were further removed from politics.16
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“While the enterprise center will bargain with the state its constituent firms are more
insulated from the wider political arena.” 17
The idea that affiliate units of large state enterprises in Hungary in the 1980s often
indeed operated more efficiently and on the market principles is also upheld by Dobák
and Tari:
At some large enterprises, the flexibility and the entrepreneurial spirit of internal
divisions and plant units undoubtedly increased [in the 1980s]. In the possession
of capacities put at their disposal, they were able to ‘switch over’ to manufacture
products requested by the market, within a relative short period of time. (Dobák
and Tari 1999, 332)
Lanyi noticed that the traditional framework of analysis of enterprise behavior
that was commonly used in the 1980s was not receptive to understanding their market
behavior.18 “If we examine how the state strives to guide its enterprises instead of using
public plan instructions, and how the enterprises respond to this, however great and
however accurate a mass of data we may obtain, it will not be appropriate for telling us
how the market operates and what the market behavior of the companies which constitute
the market actually is.... It might take a form that can be imagined departing from the
relationship between the state and its enterprises.” 19 The author ‘found’ his research
method in the results of a different Hungarian study, which ‘by accident’ revealed the
following market-oriented set of behaviors of one of the companies in the study:
production and development focusing on sales; cost-conscious economic management;
the marketing activities powerfully built into the company’s organization; good relations
with suppliers and reliable customer service; and internal planning, accounting and an
17
18
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incentive system, serving the enterprise objectives.20 The author then applied these and
other characteristics (strategic planning, formulating the business strategy of the
company; modern organization systems, computerization; strong, open profit-orientation;
market policy, competitive activity) to an analysis of the behavior of 21 Hungarian
companies, information about which was collected as part of a different study.21 Of the
twenty one companies, fourteen demonstrated “some ensemble of rules for successful
market behavior;” and seven companies of the fourteen had “an elaborate system of
coherent rules [for successful market behavior].” 22
The evidence that demonstrated the kinds of market behaviors that the Hungarian
state enterprise was missing during the communist regime is of course far more abundant
than the studies arguing otherwise. The main problem is that in the 1980s, when most of
the studies were conducted, their main goal was to prove that the reforms had to be
continued and go beyond the partial measures introduced henceforth; hence, the strong
emphasis on the shortcomings of the market mechanism in the country. The
achievements of the reforms, therefore, did not seem to warrant much attention, because
they were only ‘partial.’ In addition, the yardstick of comparison was always the
enterprise in the market economy, rather than the enterprise in the traditional Soviet
economy. Comparisons of that sort always concentrated on the enterprise behavior as
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influenced by the differences in the macro-economic organization of the two societies
(market mechanism vs. controlled market mechanism), which could not explain (and did
not strive to explain) the variation in the enterprise behavior of different socialist
countries.
The studies introduced above by far present very limited evidence of efficiency
and market orientation of Hungarian state enterprises during the communist regime. Their
purpose here is to rather demonstrate that there was much more variation in the behavior
of Hungarian enterprises than normally was assumed, because its communist system was
treated as being identical to the Soviet system.

The Second Economy
Any conventional analysis of communist legacies in the former communist
countries is limited to the analysis of the state socialist sector. The analysis of the nonstate economy rarely steps beyond agricultural production. Yet, the presence of the
extensive second economy in all of the former communist countries is well known and
more or less well documented.23 Possibly the second economy has not been given much
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merit in the transition process, because it is not uniform and it is hard to control and
change through official rules and regulations. Nevertheless, it existed and was
significantly different in both countries.
This section of the chapter compares the state of the second economy in Hungary
and Russia before the transition to the market started. I borrow the definition and
typology of the ‘second economy’ from the volume edited by Maria £oœ
. 24 According to
the definition, the second economy is distinguished from the ‘primary’ economy on the
basis of ideological reasons to include “all areas of economic activity which are officially
viewed as being inconsistent with the ideologically sanctioned dominant mode of
economic organization.” 25 The caveat here is in the word ‘sanctioned’ – an activity may
not be ideologically ‘sanctioned’, but nevertheless be legal. In other words, ‘ideologically
sanctioned modes of production’ refer to the sectors that were normally perceived to
concord with the dominant Marxist-Leninist ideology in general - the state ownership of
production and the cooperative (or collective) ownership of agriculture; and the second
economy refers to every other economic activity outside of these two sectors, both legal
and illegal.
On the basis of this definition four types of activities of the second economy can
be distinguished: (1) legal second economy inside the primary sector; (2) illegal second
economy inside the primary sector; (3) legal second economy outside the primary sector;
and (4) illegal second economy outside the primary sector.26 Table 5 demonstrates some
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production-related activities of each type that proliferated in both countries in the middle
of the 1980s.
Table 5. Second Economy Activities by their Legal Nature and Relation to the Primary Sector.

-

Legal

-

Within the Primary Sector
1
semi-private production units (Hungary)
over-time work by employees (Hungary)
private economic work partnerships
(Hungary, from 1982)
private contract work for state enterprise
(Hungary before 1982)

2
- illegal private production within state
enterprises (Soviet Union)
- false reporting of the enterprise capacity
(Soviet Union)

Illegal

Parallel to the Primary Sector
3
- private agricultural plot (Hungary, Soviet
Union)
- artisans and craftsmen (Hungary, Soviet
Union)
- cooperatives (Soviet Union, legal from
1988)
4
- engagement in private economic activities
outsides of the state sector specifically
prohibited by the law (Hungary, Soviet
Union)

The list of activities in Table 5 is by no means comprehensive; it is rather very
schematic. Any activity that is listed as legal can shift into the area of illegality if
licensing and other regulations necessary to perform it are not observed. What the table is
meant to suggest, rather, is the extent of legal private production-related spheres in
Hungary and the limits in the Soviet Union. Due to institutional differences in the two
countries, activities, which could only be undertaken illegally in the Soviet Union, found
legal grounds in Hungary. As a result, black market activity in the Soviet Union was
much more extensive than in Hungary as well.
According to a CIA estimate, the legal private sector generated 10% of Soviet
GNP in 1968, 76% of which came from agriculture, 22% from housing construction, and
2% from services.27 Grossman also notes that since the proportion of the private sector in
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GNP had been on the decline prior to 1968, it must have declined even further after 1968
constituting by the end of the 1970s less than 10%.28 In Hungary, according to Gábor, the
legal second economy most likely generated at least one-fifth (20%) of GNP.29
An estimate of the illegal private sector in the Soviet Economy and Hungary is
even harder to come by. According to Grossman and Feldbrugge, the best estimate that
most observers could offer for the Soviet Union was that it was significant.30 Probably
the best indication of the predominance of legal or illegal private activity and their overall
purpose can be inferred from the types that most proliferated in the two countries.
I would like to start the analysis with private activities that proliferated parallel to
the primary sector. In the USSR the legal private activity outside of the state sector
(except for cooperatives) was regulated by the Constitutional provision that permitted
individual labor activities only in the spheres of small-scale craftsmanship and
agriculture, services to the population, and other types of activities, based exclusively on
the person’s own labor or the labor of family members. 31 Employment of one individual
by another was prohibited. Engaging in certain types of private activities constituted a
crime. Among those, for example, were processing of food, printing activities, being an
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independent tailor, or making rugs from material woven by the maker (it was allowed to
make rugs from material provided by the customer).32
In Hungary the scope of private scale economic activity was determined by the
policies of the government and not the Constitution. The Hungarian Constitution
contained a provision that recognized “the socially useful economic activities of smallscale producers,” but, besides warning that “private property and private initiative must
not be prejudicial to the interests of the community,” did not detail what those activities
were.33 The history of the Hungarian government’s treatment of small-scale industry
from the beginning of the communist regime to its end provides a good example of this
attitude in practice.
First, from 1946 to 1953, due to official policies, the number of industrial workers
engaged in private small-scale industry decreased from 57 percent to less than 4
percent.34 In 1953 a new policy was introduced that promoted small-scale industry by
granting credits and providing materials to artisans and licenses for establishing smallscale industrial enterprises more available; within a year the number of license-holders
more than doubled.35 The new policy was sabotaged soon afterwards, only to be revived
in 1957 now even providing subsidies to those private activities that complemented the
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activities of the state sector.36 Within a year the advent of private industry was slowed
down yet again.
The boom of small industry, that had only just begun, was soon stopped by the
central determination to adjust artisans’ incomes to the earnings of the workers of
state-owned industrial enterprises and by the renewed efforts to make artisans join
cooperatives. From 1958 onwards, difficulties of material purchase, prices pressed
low by official regulations, and discrimination (compared with the position of
workers of socialist industry) played a part in the year-to-year decrease of the
number of artisans, and the output of small industry was also failing. (Gábor and
Horváth 1987, 134 – 135)
After the reforms of 1968, small-scale private industry was revived again, but this time
the central authorities tried to divert its activities towards the service sector rather than
industrial production. To this end, the tax burdens of private service providers was eased
and the new ventures were exempt from taxes.37 Finally, in the 1980s private small-scale
industrial production was slowly revived again, starting in 1981 with the easing of their
tax burden and then in 1982 with the introduction of new forms of private economic
organization already discussed above.
The Hungarian approach, thus, was different in at least two ways. First, the
Constitution of the Soviet Union communicated to the people the country’s low tolerance
for private activity, whereas the Hungarian constitution communicated its acceptance.
Second, the prevailing form of control over forms of private activity in the Soviet Union
was through the criminal code; the Hungarian government often resorted to financial
controls like taxes to curb unwanted undertakings.
The result of the different approaches was that Hungary, proportionally, had the
largest legal private sector in the region and the Soviet Union the smallest. “The Soviet
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Union has permitted the lowest level of legal private commercial activity in Eastern
Europe. The largest amount is in Hungary, where between 1970 and 1983 the number of
private shops and restaurants doubled, to 19,293, to constitute 26 percent of all shops.” 38
The closest to legally organized private production units within the primary sector
in Hungary were what Kalman Rupp called semi-private enterprises.39 The 1967 law on
agricultural cooperatives encouraged the latter to establish industrial subdivisions to
produce auxiliary items for agricultural work. Semi-private enterprise was a private
equivalent of a cooperative’s industrial subdivision. It was established and run by
entrepreneurs, but formally was a part of a cooperative. The entrepreneurs agreed to pay
the cooperative a certain percentage of their income (sometimes up to 60 percent) in
exchange for official status. “’The co-op gives us a letterhead and a bank account; that’s
it. In exchange we have to deliver 60 percent to them.’” 40 The abolition of certain
restrictions (such as on inter-firm trading and labor mobility) by the economic reform of
1968 made it possible for private enterprises to obtain various inputs and resources
without necessarily resorting to the help of the black market.
The major difference between these semi-private enterprises and their Soviet
counterparts is in their legal status. The semi-private enterprise in the Soviet Union was
an illegal activity set up against the law, normally by someone with power and
connections or money under the facade of a state industrial enterprise or an agricultural
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cooperative for personal benefit. Whereas the Hungarian semi-private enterprise had ‘a
letterhead and a bank-account,’ its Soviet counterpart operated absolutely incognito:
The infiltration takes place in the following way. A private enterprise will
coexist, under the same name and under the same roof, with a state factory. This
kind of private operation cannot exist on its own without the cover of the state
facility. In this symbiotic relationship the state factory operates perfectly
normally. It is run by an officially appointed manager and technical supervisor,
and it manufactures goods as called for by the state plan, goods that appear on the
factory’s books and are distributed through commercial channels for sale. In
criminal cases dealing with this sort of underground operations such goods are
referred to as being “accounted for.” But alongside these official goods the same
factory is manufacturing goods whose existence is not reflected in any
documents; they are unaccounted for, or, to use underground business jargon,
‘left-hand’ goods.
The ‘left-hand’ goods are produced with the same equipment, operated
and supervised by the same personnel, as the official goods. But the raw materials
and other supplies needed for their manufacture and the labor costs are paid for
not by the official factory administration but by some private person. This person
owns the goods, sells them, and profits by their sale. It would not be irregular to
call such a person the owner of a private enterprise. Tens of thousands of these
underground factories scattered throughout the country manufacture knitwear,
shoes, sunglasses, recording of Western popular music, handbags, and many other
goods much in demand by consumers.
...There are such close links between the various centers that an
underground system of private industry may be said to exist alongside the official
state system.
There are companies and multimillion-ruble family clans that own dozens
of factories and have access to a tentacular sales network, but there are also smalltime entrepreneurs, who do not always own even a whole factory, but only a
single workshop. (Simis 1982, 147)
As was already mentioned the establishment of these ‘private’ enterprises or any
other type of production activity in the Soviet Union was a privilege of the people either
already in power and with connections that could utilize the state or cooperative
resources to produce for private gain or people with enough money to pay their way
through the system. The Hungarian semi-private enterprise was an entrepreneurial
venture in all its respects (it is worthwhile to extensively cite Kalman Rupp’s
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observations regarding the semiprivate enterprise so that the reader could get a feeling of
how much different it was from its counterpart in the Soviet Union):
As a first step in the establishment of a semi-private plant, the potential
entrepreneur contacted the leaders of the cooperative. He then presented his plans
for the proposed plant, including an assessment of the expected profitability of the
activity. The co-op leadership assessed the offer and an informal agreement was
negotiated between the two parties.
....The entrepreneur bought machines, machine parts, and tools as ‘scrap
materials,’ or purchased them from private artisans. In some cases the leader of
the plant had been a private artisan himself before establishing the semiprivate
plant, and he brought his machinery to the co-op. In the earlier phases of the
emergence of semiprivate plants the initial investments in equipment were
financed predominantly by plant leaders [the entrepreneurs], sometimes with
‘specialists,’ highly skilled workers and technicians, who were also parties to the
venture. The co-ops did not provide any cash, or only very limited amounts.
Usually no bank credits were used, and there were no free investment grants from
the state to finance the establishment of the plants. (Rupp 1983, 11-12).
The semiprivate enterprise in Hungary benefited its ‘mother’ organization overall
and not only its managers, as was the case in the Soviet Union:
As a net result, the presence of semiprivate plants led to enormous growth
and agricultural modernization in those agricultural co-ops that had semiprivate
industrial facilities. Co-op level profits derived from semiprivate plants were also
used to increase wages in agricultural divisions and to improve services and fringe
benefits for co-op members, including the aged. The central managers of the coop also benefited in terms of increased wages, fringe benefits, and prestige. Often,
co-ops that had substantial semiprivate components were in a dominant position
in co-op mergers, which further added to the prestige of co-op leaders and to coop organizational growth. (Rupp 1983, 14).
Semi-private enterprises in Hungary that first appeared “outside the routine
channels of formal organizations” in a few years achieved a high degree of
institutionalization.41 Even during the beginning of the 1970s when the conservative side
of the government came to dominate the decision-making process and administrative
pressure was asserted on the cooperatives that had semiprivate enterprises, the enterprises
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were not dismissed or declared illegal, but the central management of the cooperatives
simply took over their assets (by buying their equipment to put the production process
completely under cooperative ownership). Semi-private activity that proliferated in the
Soviet Union constituted a crime, because it utilized state property for private gain, for
which the USSR Criminal Code prescribed a maximum sentence of five years with
confiscation of property.42 Normally, people charged with such crimes were also charged
with stealing socialist property and abusing their official position.43
False reporting of enterprise capacity was similar to the establishment of these
‘private’ enterprises, because the excess production was sold through the black market to
benefit the enterprise management.
At the level of regular workers private industrial activity in the two countries
differed as well. The Soviet worker was either illegally paid for his/her compliance to
participate in underground production or used state premises to fulfill a private order. The
latter constituted a crime as described before, although was rarely punished for its
insignificant scope.44
In Hungary it appears that the market, even though limited, and the lifting of
restrictions on labor mobility gave the worker the power to bargain for better wages
within the framework of state production.45 Managers had to find ways to provide
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additional pay to good workers within the wage limit restrictions imposed by the state. At
the factory level this was often accomplished through the assignment of over-time work
that often paid double the regular hourly wage. “The basic norm becomes the object of
bargaining and dispute; an agreement is then concluded which serves, at least
temporarily, to guarantee a stable production quota for the factory managers and a stable
wage for the workers.” 46 (This was briefly mentioned in chapter 3 as well.)
Another form of private activity in Hungarian enterprise was carried out through
part-time labor contracts. According to Róna-Tas, even though the government, up until
the 1980s, tried to keep private activity out of the state sphere, part-time legal labor
contracts nevertheless took place, normally for jobs that required professional expertise.47
This limited discussion of private activities in the two countries has been
presented to demonstrate how different their dominant form in the two countries was.
Whereas in the Soviet Union it was primarily illegal, in Hungary it found legal ways to
operate. Even a brief look at the literature on the second economy in the two countries
reinforces this observation: while any study on the second economy in the Soviet Union
necessarily boils down to the discussion of its criminal nature, studies on the Hungarian
second economy stress the existence of a large segment of legal private activity among
the general population primarily carried out on a part-time basis.48
This discussion carries a number of applications for the current research. First, it
demonstrates that, institutionally, the Hungarian economy was more receptive to private
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activity than the Soviet economy. Second, and as a consequence of the first, the black
market and economic corruption were an integral party of the Soviet economy, due to its
predominantly criminal nature, which was not the case in Hungary. Third, the main
strategy of private activity in the Soviet Union was to avoid being caught by the
authorities; there was no threat of competition or any other market-induced limitation,
because there was no market; the only competition was the poorly operating state sector.
Hungarian entrepreneurs, on the other hand, operated in a less restricted environment
with some elements of the market present, which meant that the rationale of
organizational operation was absolutely different from that of a typical Soviet
entrepreneur. Fourth, whereas the Hungarian communist government often resorted to
economic means for regulating private activity, the Soviet government outlawed the
majority of it and used the criminal code to curb it.
Two important observations are in order. Kalman Rupp in his study of Hungarian
semi-private enterprises notes some discrepancies between conclusions presented in
literature on the Soviet second economy and the findings of his study. First, he finds, as
was illustrated above, that the presence of a semi-private enterprise was beneficial to the
cooperative with which it was affiliated overall, and not just its leaders.49 In contrast,
literature on the Soviet second economy only stresses the personal gains of cooperative
leaders obtained through bribes as the only gain from establishing ‘private’ enterprises. 50
Second, which logically ties in with the first observation, the literature on the Soviet
second economy, particularly in the production sphere, portrays it as a realm of the
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privileged. The observations on the second economy in Hungary rather showed that it
was a venue that provided opportunities for the ‘unprivileged’ strata of the society:
Second-economy production and, to some extent, markets are seen as important
mechanism toward greater autonomy and greater bargaining power of lower
participants in the hierarchical structure of the planned economy.... In this context,
semiprivate plants provide opportunities for entrepreneurs, workers, and
cooperatives – individuals and organizations that are being denied access to
resources allocated to the dominant groups in the planned economy. Most of the
second economy is for ‘second-class’ rather than ‘first-class’ passengers. (Rupp
1983, 99).
These discrepancies between the literature and Rupp’s empirical findings seem to
demonstrate not the inadequacy of the empirical observations on second economies in
communist states overall, but rather the differences between the second economies of the
Soviet Union and Hungary. As with the assumptions regarding the working of a socialist
enterprise, which have been discussed above, the observations on the second economy in
the communist states were primarily based on research in the Soviet Union. The
assumption that all communist countries were alike was upheld here as well. As a result,
any discussion of the second economy came to be dominated by examples of criminal
second economy activities and the corrupt nature of the government officials. This is not
to say that the second economy in Hungary did not have those elements. But it is to
demonstrate that predominantly, private production activity on a large scale in the Soviet
Union was a prerogative of the privileged and was an illegal undertaking from start to
end, and in Hungary it was legal and common among regular people.

Legitimacy and Corruption
One important point to remember when analyzing the impact of government
policies on economic development is the degree of their legitimacy. Legitimacy indicates
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how much laws and regulations are adhered to by the people. By implication, low levels
of legitimacy entail high levels of corruption and black market activity.
Legitimacy of the government varies from country to country depending on the
legal tradition of a particular country. According to Merryman, a legal tradition reflects
historically developed attitudes about the role and nature of law in the society and about
the way it should be implemented and used.51 Legal tradition translates cultural values
into the legal system. 52 The legal traditions of Hungary and Russia had been developed
on different principles.
Hungary is often referred to as a country of lawyers. According to Pogany, precommunist Hungary was a country where the rule of law dominated.
By and large, ‘the absolute supremacy or predominance of regular law’ was a
feature of Hungary’s pre-Communist legal system, while law was reliably
enforced, general in application and ‘applied uniformly to all cases within its
terms.’ The law was therefore ‘predictable and calculable in its general
consequences.’ In addition, ‘equality before the law, or the equal subjection of all
classes to the ordinary law of the land’ was at least formally recognized in
Hungary during much (though not all) of the first half of this century and,
increasingly, during the latter decades of the nineteenth century. (Pogany 1999,
144)
This tradition of legalism was widely preserved through communist times so much so
that when the country stepped on the road to transition in the 1990s it was one of the few
to have an operating legal system and a high degree of constitutional legitimacy. “In
Hungary, the rule of law has been astonishingly well established at this level [the
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constitutional level]. Hungary probably has a better track record on this question than
most democracies with longer pedigree.” 53
The Russian legal tradition is drastically different. In general terms, it is based on
two factors: absolutism and the communal organization of society. Absolutism Russian
style entailed an existence of some sovereign that guided the country in the right direction
– the one who knew the ‘truth.’ 54 Before 1917 the Tsar was such a sovereign, who was
often referred to as ‘our father Tsar’ ( batushka zcar’); after 1917 the communist party
and its leaders (‘Father Stalin’ and ‘Grandpa Lenin’) replaced the Tsar.

55

In such a

system the sovereign becomes the final vestige of authority that supercedes the law.
The communal form of life that dominated pre-Revolutionary Russia (which was
described in chapter 2) upheld this system by placing all its faith and trust in the
sovereign and, at the same time, detesting and neglecting rules and laws. The Tsar was
father and protector of the people, but laws were infringements of the outside world on
the tightly knit community.
In Russian peasant communes, most affairs were regulated by customary
practices, which were generally regarded as having greater significance than state
law. Matters were decided on an ad hoc basis ‘according to justice’ rather than on
the basis of carefully spelled-out legal norms. The peasants’ attitude toward statederived law was one of suspicion and, when possible, disobedience...
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‘The peasant deemed it ‘immoral’ to deceive a neighbor or relative, but to
deceive a government official or landlord was quite a different matter – indeed,
that was a moral deed worthy of encouragement. (Newcity 1997, 51).
Consequently, the legal tradition that developed in the Soviet Union was one that
placed the elite above the law, but ‘allowed’ ordinary people to break the law whenever
possible, because it never possessed ultimate authority anyway.
These differences in the two countries’ legal traditions translated themselves in
the much higher level of criminalization and corruption in the Soviet economy, as could
be clearly seen through the development of its second economy. Simis, a former Soviet
citizen, summarized very well just how saturated with corruption Soviet society was:
Thus the Soviet Union is infected from top to bottom with corruption –
from the worker, who gives the foreman a bottle of vodka to get the best job, to
Politburo candidate Mzhavanadze, who takes hundreds of thousands of rubles
protecting underground millionaires; from the street prostitute, who pays the
policemen ten rubles so that he won’t prevent her from soliciting clients, to the
former member of the Politburo, Minister of Culture Ekaterina Furtseva, who
built a luxurious suburban villa at the government’s expense – each and every one
is afflicted with corruption. (Simis 1982, 297).

Ideological Acceptance of Private Activity
Last, but not least, the ideological and common acceptance of private activity and
entrepreneurship were drastically different in the two countries as well.
One of the major postulates of the Marxist-Leninist ideology of the Soviet Union
was public ownership of the means of production. The Soviet Constitution of 1936 stated
that the foundation of the Soviet economy was the socialist ownership of the means of
production with the complete elimination of private ownership of the means of
production.56 The Constitution of 1977 omits the latter part, but instead it specifies what
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may constitute personal property of citizens, and that does not include the means of
production – “articles of everyday life, personal consumption and convenience, the
implements and other objects of a small-holding, a house, and earned savings.” 57
In contrast, the Hungarian Constitution of 1949, which was overall drafted after
the Soviet Constitution of 1936, stated “In the Hungarian People’s Republic the bulk of
the means of production is owned, as public property, by the state, by public bodies or by
co-operative organization. Means of production may also be privately owned.” 58 It did
not specify what constituted private property, but guaranteed constitutional protection of
all property acquired by labor and contained a provision warning that private property
and private enterprise must not run counter to the public interest.59 This small feature is
normally disregarded in the comparison of the Soviet Union and Hungary. It nevertheless
indicated that the Hungarian communist ideology was much more tolerant of private
ownership and activity than the ideology that developed in the Soviet Union.
This was clearly manifested in the official discourse of the party leaders as well.
In 1962 János Kádár introduced a new policy approach based on the following principle –
‘Whoever is not against us is with us!’ As was mentioned in chapter 3 this policy line
brought acceptance of the ‘alien’ elements as an integral part of the society working for
the benefit of its people. The private entrepreneur (the bourgeois) was no exception. In
his reports to the Party’s Congresses in 1966 and 1970, for example, Kádár said:
Small people and the petit bourgeois citizens of towns who work as small
craftsmen and small traders are also respected members of our society. While not
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giving up the fight against the spirit and actual cases of parasitism, everybody
considers the work of a given number of small craftsmen and small traders as
useful. They fill a social need and therefore their activity is socially useful; and
their work will be needed in the future also. (Kádár 1966)
In our society the number and proportion of the small bourgeoisie, of small
craftsmen, traders, and other representatives of the private sector are small. For
the benefit of our great social aims the small bourgeoisie also follow us. They
have fitted into the new social order. They accept the aims of building a socialist
society and with the work of the conscientiously working majority among them,
especially in the fields of services and supplies, they usefully serve the public
interest, the assets of our society. (Kádár 1970)
Whereas these were very minimal remarks in speeches that lasted three to four hours
long, they nevertheless illustrated the specifics of Hungarian socialism that was alien to
Soviet culture, where this kind of a discourse became only possible after Gorbachev’s
policy of glasnost was introduced.
Likewise, Szelenyi points out that in Hungary the term bourgeois by the middle of
the 1970s began to acquire a positive meaning: it was starting to refer to people with
more independent thinking, with values and behaviors that were different from the
collectivist values promoted by Communists.60 By the 1980s the term was beginning to
acquire entrepreneurial connotation.61 In the same vein, Bogel points out that by the
1980s the commonly accepted image of entrepreneurs in Hungary portrayed them as “a
kind of Robin Hood battling against an unsympathetic and bureaucratic state, definitely
growing rich and becoming the men of the future, so long as they were smart and
assiduous enough.” 62
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In contrast, attitudes toward private activity in the Soviet Union were always
negative, portraying private entrepreneurs as thieves and thugs. Here is how an American
observer, who spent the years when the small industrial cooperatives were being born in
Russia observing their development, described the common feelings about cooperators
(first Russian legal entrepreneurs) in the late 1980s:
By April Fool’s Day 1989 there were officially ninety-nine thousand three
hundred cooperatives employing two million people in the USSR., and the
conflict63 had turned to violence. Cooperators, the ‘hooligans’ whom Pravda64
endlessly referred to as ‘wheeler-dealers and scoundrels,’ were shot and beaten,
their business set ablaze by professional arsonists abetted by citizens pouring
gasoline on the flames. Many cooperators would be stoned or clubbed with
planks. So fierce would the hatred become that nineteen cooperatives were set
afire in one day in the Turkmenian city of Nebit-Dag, with six fire engines called
to the scene destroyed by a mob of black marketeers, alleged plainclothes by
KGB agents, and disgruntled crowds screaming ‘capitalisti’ [capitalists]. Other
cooperatives would meet the same fate. Firebombings and black-market hand
grenades were a favorite method of destruction, as were the burning and drowning
of cooperative sheep and cattle, with no thought given to the country’s
abominably widespread hunger. After Vladimir Plotnikov’s cooperative pig farm,
built atop a garbage dump on the outskirts of Moscow, was burnt down under
suspicious circumstances, local residents openly rejoiced at the fate of Plotnikov
and his ‘bourgeois pigs.’ ( Copetas 2001, 47).
These differences in attitudes towards private activity were responsible in one
country, Hungary, for providing a fertile ground for the development of private
entrepreneurship when all the institutional barriers were finally removed, and in the other,
Russia, for creating another obstacle that private entrepreneurs had to overcome in
addition to a myriad of institutional barriers and criminal developments.
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Conclusion: Implications for Transition
The discussion presented in this chapter is just a sketch of various aspects of the
economic sphere in which Hungary and Russia differed during their communist
development. The logical question that one may ask next is what implications does this
have for the countries’ transition process in the 1990s? Let me present just a few general
observations here. The next four chapters will discuss the implications for enterprises and
businesspeople as was observed through a survey conducted in Spring/Summer of 2004
in the two countries.
Politically, the transition processes in the 1990s in the two countries progressed
pretty much along the same lines of legal tradition as was described above: Hungary
opted for a constitutional democracy while Russia settled for a strong presidential
republic.
The Hungarian Constitution establishes a strong Constitutional Court that already
in the beginning of the transition process widely exercised its powers and struck down a
large number of laws passed by the Parliament as unconstitutional. According to Örkény
and Scheppele it is not uncommon for the Hungarian President to consult with the
Constitutional Court on the constitutionality of a law before signing it or on its own
competency; or for the Prime Minister to ask the Court for advice on how a program can
be redrafted to comply with constitutional provisions.65
In stark contrast, the two presidents that Russia has had since the beginning of the
transition process have clearly displayed their disregard for, and superiority to, the
‘supreme law’ of the country. In September of 1993, as a result of months-long tensions
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and disagreements between the executive and the legislative branches and after a number
of attempts to curb the powers of the latter through some unconstitutional moves,66
President Yeltsin signed a decree completely annulling the power of the legislative body
(the power of the Supreme Soviet and the Congress of People’s Deputies) and
introducing a constitutional reform in the Russian Federation. The President’s actions
were in violation of the Russian Constitution, which prescribed that if the President
attempted to dissolve a legally elected legislative body, he would lose his powers
automatically. The Supreme Soviet and the Congress of People’s Deputies issued a
resolution stating that as a result of his actions, the power vested in President Yeltsin
ceased to exist, and the Constitutional Court upheld the legislative resolution. As we
know, though, Boris Yeltsin not only remained in power, the legislature was indeed
dissolved, elections to the new legislature were held within a few months, and a new
Constitution was drafted to give the president almost unrestricted powers. The resultant
regime, as Kagarlystky described it, was “a particular authoritarian regime, and Yeltsin
stands closer to Pinochet than to Reagan or Thatcher.” 67 The current Russian President,
Vladimir Putin, not only welcomed the system that he inherited from his predecessor, he
developed it to a much higher level:
The main characteristics of Mr. Putin’s regime are the brutal crackdown in
Chechnya; the neutering of political opposition; the creation of a rubber-stamp
legislature; the crushing of media independence; the strengthening of the siloviki
of the military and security establishment; the emergence of a cult of personality;
and a bullying assertiveness towards Russia’s neighbors. (Anonymous 2004, 8)
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The legal tradition has had its mark on the economic transition as well. As was
mentioned earlier, Hungary is believed to be one of the few countries that embarked on
the transition process equipped with a legitimate legal system:
“In contrast to the Soviet Union and the former socialist countries of Eastern
Europe, which have had to lay the foundations of a new economic legal order
after 1990, Hungary arrived at the change in its political, social and economic
systems with a relatively developed system of law that was partially equipped of
the requirements even of a market economy, one that was serviceable, and it did
work, once stripped of its attributes of socialist ideology.” ( Sárközy 1993, 3)
For Russia, this is a dream that is still to come true. The legal order that the country
inherited from the Soviet Union was anything but legal; “for the Soviet manager the
notion that the purpose of the law is to create a framework to encourage and assure
prosperous business organizations and efficient transactions was considered absurd.” 68
The perception of laws as existing only to be broken continues.
Likewise, the Hungarian economy after ten years of transition is still much more
receptive to small-scale private initiative than the Russian economy. The existence of a
multitude of various private legal small-scale organizations during communist times and
the accessibility of private small-scale activity to the public in general had laid the
foundation for the development of private entrepreneurship during the transition process:
Post-transition Hungary inherited an environment that was moderately
favorable to small-scale business due to reforms beginning in 1968 and
particularly in the 1980s. The post-transition years did not jeopardize the
achievements of the reforms, nor were public administration and government
disrupted. Consequently, social and political instability – a critical factor for
potential entrepreneurs and owners, in particular small ones – never reached
threatening levels.
The social attitude towards SMEs [small and medium size enterprises],
SME owners and entrepreneurs is fairly positive, and social perception of private
67
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property rights is good....Criminal organizations, although present, do not appear
to threaten social, economic and political stability. Although bureaucratic red tape
is a problem for SMEs, it is of decreasing importance. (Dallago 2003, 78)
The Russian business environment is drastically different from the environment
that entrepreneurs enjoy in Hungary:
After two years of rapid growth, measured SME expansion stopped in
1994. This resulted from concealment of an increasing part of the SME sector
from official statistics, loss of their exclusive position, and the withdrawal of
economic resources from the sector, reflecting the changing functions of SMEs in
the Russian economy. Economic barriers to market entry rose significantly while
administrative barriers have largely remained unchanged over the last decade.
(Radaev 2003, 131-132.)
The share of small and medium size enterprises in the overall number of
enterprises and employment in Hungary is even greater than the EU average. According
to a Hungarian research company, GKI Co.,69 the share of small and medium size
businesses (enterprises employing less than 250 people) in the European Union by 2001
constituted 98.7% of all businesses, over 90% of which were micro-businesses
employing less than 10 people.70 According to the same report, the proportion of SMEs in
Hungary by 2001 were 99.9%, ninety six percent of which were micro-businesses.71
Obtaining a clear picture of the proportion of small and medium size businesses in
Russia is complicated due to the problems with the definition. Official statistics only
distinguish between two groups of businesses – ‘small businesses’ and ‘medium and
large businesses.’ The definition of the size of a small business varies for different types
of economic activities – in manufacturing, construction, and transport it is a business
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employing not more than 100 people; in agriculture - not more than 60 people; in retail
trade and services - not more than 30 people; and not more than 50 people in every other
sector.72 According to calculations by the Center for Small Entrepreneurship, the
proportion of small businesses in 2003 in Russia was 66.5% including individual
entrepreneurs and farms, both of which are considered small businesses in the Russian
official statistics.73 According to the same source, the proportion of medium-size
businesses (up to 250 employees) in 2003 was 27.8%; and the proportion of enterprises
with more than 250 employees was 5.7%.74 The total percentage of small and mediumsize businesses overall is quite high – 94.3%, but considering that the small businesses
group includes enterprises with as many as 100 employees, the proportion of microbusinesses must be very minimal. In other words, the country’s market is still dominated
by larger size enterprises than one would normally find in a developed market economy.
The economy overall is dominated by oligarchs with a high concentration of wealth and
power in a few hands.
Finally, the best way to point at the different natures of the transition processes at
the enterprise level in the two countries is through the following observation. When
literature describes difficulties that Hungarian enterprises were facing during transition, it
points to the decrease in the demand for their product; thus stressing the market logic of
their behavior prior to transition. When literature describes difficulties that Russian
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enterprises were facing during transition, it points to the decrease in state orders for their
product, thus stressing the command economy logic of their behavior prior to transition.
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CHAPTER 5
SURVEY METHODOLOGY AND RESPONDENTS’ DESCRIPTION

The next few chapters present analyses of the survey data. This brief chapter
describes the survey methodology, the questionnaire and the data collection process,
presents a descriptive summary of the survey respondents and their companies, and
compares, where possible, the respondents to the companies that refused to participate in
the survey. Chapter 6 focuses on the analysis of the respondents’ business practices.
Chapter 7 describes the reported outside constraints that the respondents face every day,
and the reported political and economic events that have had a lasting effect on their
business environment and their work.

Survey Methodology
The survey of manufacturing enterprises1 in the Northern Great Plain region of
Hungary and the Saratov region of Russia was carried out from February to July of
2004.2 The target was to obtain a minimum of 50 responses for each country (1 response
per enterprise), because it is the lowest number of observations from which, statistically,
generalizations onto the population can be made. Obtaining a much higher number of
responses was not feasible due to financial and time constraints. Responses were to be
obtained from one of the top managers of each company – someone who participates in
the decision-making process and is aware of what is going on in the organization overall.

1
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Since most literature cites a 30% non-response rate as a norm, and I did not find
any examples of surveys conducted in similar circumstances that could prove otherwise, I
opted to use a conservative estimate of 50%. So, I started the survey with a sample of 100
Hungarian enterprises. After a month and a half of data collection only about 30
responses were obtained from that sample; the rest of the companies from the sample
either did not want to participate, had wrong phone numbers, did not list phone numbers,
did not pick up the phone, or did not exist anymore. So, another random sample of 100
companies was drawn to obtain the necessary number of responses (the companies from
the first sample were included in the population list when the second sample was drawn).
In Russia a sample of 200 companies was drawn from the beginning.3
A total of one hundred and nine responses were obtained – fifty-four from
Hungary and fifty-five from Russia. Four of the fifty-five Russian companies were
discarded from the analysis, because they were service providers only. In Hungary the
majority of the responses (44) were obtained through structured personal interviews; the
rest were sent out and received by mail, fax, or e-mail with follow-up phone calls
conducted to clarify ambiguous answers. Six students from Nyíregyháza College and the
University of Debrecen and two interpreters were hired to conduct and translate the
interviews.4 In Russia a local research center Miromark5 collected the data through
structured personal interviews (24), phone interviews (30), and e-mail (1).

3
4

See Appendix 2 for details on the sampling procedure.

The interviewers had to go through a training session, during which the questions of the survey
were explained to them, and they were given instructions on how to conduct an interview. After the data
were collected and translated, I either met with the interviewers personally or contacted them via e-mail to
clarify the answers. After each interview was translated I met with the translator to clarify the meaning and
to rephrase the parts that were not clear.
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The survey was designed to meet two goals. The first goal was to collect
information on the question whether or not businesspeople from one country
systematically display a more market oriented behavior than businesspeople from the
other country as can be seen through their company’s business practices. The second goal
was to isolate and then compare outside factors including what political and economic
events the businesspeople in the two countries believe have influence on their business
environment and their work. I have hypothesized that 1) Hungarian businesspeople will
systematically display more market oriented behavior than Russian businesspeople, and
2) regardless of the political and economic developments in the two countries in the last
two decades, the businesspeople in both countries will perceive no or little change in their
business environment and their work as a result of those events.
The questionnaire consisted of three sections: 1) Organization’s Description and
Respondent’s Information, 2) Business Practices, and 3) Personal Opinion.6
The information from the first section of the survey was to provide the descriptive
data about the enterprises and respondents to control for the effects of variables that have
been found in other studies to have independent effect on managerial behavior and
business practices.7 In other words, whether the company is in private or state ownership,
foreign or domestic ownership, whether it has been privatized or not, the size of the
company, when the company was established, the age and gender of the respondent, and

5

www.miromark.ru (in Russian). The Russian interviewers were given instructions regarding the
survey and the questionnaire as well. After the data were collected, I met with the interviewers to discuss
the answers that were not clear.
6
7

See Appendix 3 for a copy of the questionnaire.

For a good overview of the literature see K. Liuhto, The Transformation of the Soviet Enterprise
and Its Management: A Literature Review, ESRC Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge
Working Paper No. 146 (Cambridge, UK: University of Cambridge, 1999).
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whether the respondent has ever had western style management training or not may each
have more influence on a respondent’s behavior than what country the respondent came
from, and it is necessary to account for those independent effects in the analysis.
The second part of the questionnaire focused on how the companies operate whether they have a mission statement or not, whether they set strategic goals and
develop a plan to reach those goals or not, whether and how they evaluate their
organization’s performance or not, whether they monitor their competitors’ performance
and compare their product to their competitors’ product or not, and whether they measure
their customers’ satisfaction or not. The companies were also asked to specify what their
mission statement was, what their goals were, how they developed their plan or strategy,
and what measures they used to evaluate their organization’s performance.
The last three sets of questions of this second part of the questionnaire were based
on the concept of market orientation developed in the field of marketing and defined as
“a set of activities or behaviors relating to market intelligence gathering, market
intelligence dissemination cross-functionally within a firm, and the action responses
based on this intelligence.”8 Different measurements have been developed to measure
market orientation,9 but the overall idea is to determine whether or not the organization
gathers information about its customers and competitors, disseminates the information
among different departments, and takes actions in response to it. Considering how new

8

Rohit Deshpandé, “Introduction,” in Developing a Market Orientation, ed. Rohit Deshpande
(Thousand Oaks; London; New Deli: SAGE Publications, 1999), 3.
9

For examples see John C. Narver and Stanley F. Slater, “The Effects of Market Orientation on
Business Profitability,” Journal of Marketing 54(4) (1990): 20-35; A. K. Kohli, B. J. Jarowski, and A.
Kumer, “MARKOR: A Measure of Market Orientation,” Journal of Marketing Research 30 (1993,
November): 467-477; R. Deshpande, J. U. Farley, and F. E. Webster, Jr., “Corporate Culture, Customer
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the concept of market orientation must be to the former command economies, I opted to
shift away from using some pre-determined categories to measure it and rather let the
businesspeople tell me if the concept had any importance for their work and what
methods they used to measure it. The three sets of questions, thus, were developed with
the focus on competitors, product’s quality, and customers (questions 17 through 19.2,
Appendix 3). The first question of each set assessed the manager’s view of how
important a particular component was for an organization in their business environment;
the second question of each set characterized how often their own organization paid
attention to it, and the third question captured what methods their organization used to
measure it.
It is appropriate to clarify the use of the term “market orientation” in the analysis
below. From now on the term will not refer just to the concepts described above but will
be loosely used to refer to any behavior that seems to be based on free market principles
and is in contrast to behaviors resembling the traditions of the command economy. In
other words, the analysis attempts to detect the presence of the new market-oriented
mentality and the traces of the old traditions in the responses of the respondents. No predetermined sets of behaviors that can be identified as market-oriented are employed but
rather the attempt is to characterize respondent’s behavior as market-oriented or not.
The third part of the questionnaire captured political and economic events the
respondents thought had had an influence on their business environment, to what extent
those events influenced their business environment, their work, and the relationship

Orientation, and Innovativeness in Japanese Firms: A Quadrad Analysis,” Journal of Marketing 57 (1)
(1993): 23-37.
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between businesses and government, and the characteristics of that influence in each
case.
The questionnaire consisted of a mixture of open-ended, yes/no, choice, and index
questions. Whereas the use of most of these types is self-explanatory, I have to briefly
explain the seven-point index to avoid any confusion in the discussion below. The index
was used to measure the degree of importance of a particular behavior (questions 17, 18,
and 19) or the extent to which a particular event had influence on the respondents’
business environment, their work, and the relationship between government and
businesses (questions 22, 23, 24, and 25). The index ran from 1 to 7 with 1 standing for
‘no importance’ or ‘no influence’ whatsoever and 7 standing for ‘great importance’ and
‘great influence’ (Figure 1). For example, an answer of 1 to question 19 “Is it necessary
for the organization in your business environment to regularly evaluate its customers’
satisfaction” would mean that it is not necessary at all for an organization in their
business environment to regularly evaluate their customers’ satisfaction, and an answer of
7 would mean that it is very necessary; the answers in between would indicate the degree
of importance with 4 normally suggesting that the respondent is not sure if it is important
or not.
Figure 1. The seven-point index used for questions 17, 18, 19, 22, 23, 24, and 25.
not at all
1

2

3

4

5

6

to a great extend
7

The survey was administered in the native language in each country. The
questionnaire was translated into Hungarian by an English teacher from Nyíregyháza
College whose native language is Hungarian. It was back-translated into English by
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another English teacher from Nyíregyháza College whose native language is English, to
check the accuracy of the Hungarian translation. I translated the questionnaire into
Russian myself and, thus, a back translation was not necessary. Two pre-test interviews
were conducted in Hungary - one with a manager from a large company in Nyíregyháza
(one of the bigger cities in the region) and the other with a manager from a smaller
company in a small town; some modifications were made to the survey instrument as a
result of the pre-test.

The Regions
The territory of the Russian Federation, that is usually referred to as simply
Russia, covers a total area of 17,075,200 square kilometers, borders fourteen countries,
has a population of 143,782,338 people, and incorporates eighty-nine administrative
divisions of various types - 49 oblasts, 21 republics, 10 autonomous okrugs, 6 krays, 2
federal cities, and 1 autonomous oblast.10 Its territory stretches from Europe to Asia. The
Saratov Region is located in the South West of the country (see Figure 4.1, Appendix 4).
Hungary covers a territory of 93,030 square kilometers, borders seven countries,
has a population of 10,032,375 people, and is administratively divided into 19 counties
and the capital city. The North Great Plain Region is located in the North East of the
country (see Figure 4.2, Appendix 4).
The diversity of climates, geographies, ethnicities, and cultures in Russia make it
a difficult country to study. Almost every administrative unit is unique. At the same time
its long history of center-periphery division provides a good starting point. All
10

The World Fact Book, 2004. Available at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/rs.html
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throughout pre-communist and communist history the center – first St. Petersburg, and
then Moscow, absorbed most of the country’s resources. The common perception during
communist times was that the whole country ‘was working’ for Moscow. It was not
unusual for a product of a local factory of a small provincial town to only be found in the
stores of Moscow. Its infrastructure has always been better developed; its residents have
always enjoyed a privileged living; and it has always been on the forefront of
development and innovation. The markets of local towns today are more or less abundant
with goods and services, but Moscow attracts all the other resources necessary for
development - foreign capital, foreign assistance, new technology, people, know-how,
etc.
Foreign perception of the country is often based on what foreigners see in
Moscow. This is a much distorted view, because the city is like no other in the country. A
common perception about the Muscovites is that they are so self-centered that they not
only look down upon other ethnicities and nationalities, but on the rest of the country as
well.
The Saratov region that was chosen for the study probably does not represent any
particular interest in itself – it is just one of the many. It has its own history and its own
specifics, but in terms of economic development there is nothing unique about it. This, in
turn, makes it a perfect subject for this study, because it represents a typical Russian
provincial region that does not enjoy all the privileges of the center. In this regard it is as
good as any other, and the conclusions drawn from the interviews with regions’
businesspeople can be applied to a large number of regions in the country.
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Even though Hungary is a smaller country, it has its own regional diversity as
well. The closer one goes to the Western borders of the country, the farther one gets
removed from Eastern Europe, and not only geographically. One of the Hungarian
respondents made a parallel comparison: what Eastern Hungary is to Ukraine, so Western
Hungary is to Eastern Hungary. One of my assistants, who was originally from the very
Western part of Hungary, once remarked that when he had told his family that he was
moving to Nyiredgyhaza (a town close to the border with Ukraine), his parents even
asked him if it was still in Hungary.
Despite these perceptions, the region in itself does not represent an odd-ball when
compared with the other administrative units in the GDP per capita, the employment
structure, and an overall economic health index (see Appendix 5). The general results of
the survey, therefore, can to some extent be generalized to some other areas of the
country. Moreover, its location in the East makes it a better fit for comparison with the
Russian region, because such factors as the proximity to the West and the foreign
influence that, for example, have favored greatly the Western Transdanubian region, do
not have to be factored into the analysis.
The only consequence that the choice of the region may have for the survey
results is the respondents’ attitude towards membership in the European Union. Since the
Western part of Hungary has had more exposure to and more relations with the West than
the Eastern part, the attitude may be different in that part of the country. Since
membership in the European Union does not constitute the center-piece of the study, this
feature of the region does not pose a problem for the comparative analysis that follows.
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Respondents
The total number of usable responses was 105: 51 from Russia and 54 from
Hungary. The majority of the Hungarian responses came from the food products,
beverages, and the tobacco industry (17%), the basic and fabricated metals industry
(15%), the textile and textile products industry (13%), and the manufacturing of paper
products, publishing and printing industry (11%) (Table 1). The distribution of the
Table 1. Distribution of Responses by Industry, Hungary
Manufacturing Categories

Hungary

Hungary

Hungary

Responses .

Non-Responses Percent in
2
the Region

1. (DA) Manufacturing of food products, beverages and tobacco
2. (DB) Manufacturing of textiles and textile products
3. (DC) Manufacturing of leather and leather products
4. (DD) Manufacturing of wood and wood products
5. (DE) Manufacturing of pulp, paper and paper products;
publishing and printing
6. (DF) Manufacturing of coke, refined petroleum products and
nuclear fuel
7. (DG) Manufacturing of chemicals, chemical products and
man-made fibers
8. (DH) Manufacturing of rubber and plastic products
9. (DI) Manufacturing of other non-metallic mineral products

9 (17%)
7 (13%)
2 (4%)
4 (7%)
6 (11%)

22 (16%)
19 (14%)
10 (7%)
9 (7%)
8 (6%)

20%
13%
4%
7%
6%

0

0

0%

1 (2%)

2 (2%)

2%

3 (6%)
2 (4%)

5 (4%)
6 (4%)

6%
3%

10. (DJ) Manufacturing of basic metals and fabricated metal
products
11. (DK) Manufacturing of machinery and equipment n.e.c.
12. (DL) Manufacturing of electrical and optical equipment
13. (DM) Manufacturing of transport equipment
14. (DN) Manufacturing n.e.c
Other
Total

8 (15%)

24 (18%)

16%

3 (6%)
2 (4%)
1 (2%)
4 (7%)
2 (4%)
54 (100%)

15 (11%)
8 (6%)
1 (1%)
5 (4%)
0
134 (100%)

9%
6%
1%
6%
0%
100%

1

1

Manufacturing categories of five companies were changed from the original categories assigned to them by the Statistical office.
Three were re-coded to match their own description; two were included in the other category, because their production process ranges
from the production of dolls to sugar and flour packaging.
2
Calculated on the basis of the population list, from which the sample for the study was drawn; no changes to the original
manufacturing categories were made.

companies among different industries in the responses closely reflects the distribution of
companies among different industries in the region (compare the percentages in the
second and the fourth columns of Table 1) with only the paper, publishing and printing
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industry slightly over-represented in the responses (11% of the responses come from that
industry, whereas only 6% of the companies in the region do). A very similar dynamic is
observed when the respondents are compared to the companies from the sample that did
not respond (Table 1). In other words, the Hungarian respondents closely represent the
population from which they had been drawn and there is no systematic difference
between the companies that responded to the survey and the companies that did not.
Therefore, there should not be any industry-specific distortions in the results of the
survey.
The situation is different with the Russian sample. Even though the food,
beverages, and tobacco industry does make up the largest percentage of the companies on
the population list - 28%, the percentage of responses that came from that industry is
much higher – 47% (compare the second and the fourth columns of Table 2).
Consequently, a number of other industries are somewhat underrepresented in the survey
– manufacturing of textiles and textile products, chemicals and chemical products, rubber
and plastic products, with electrical and optical equipment group under-represented the
most (compare the second and the fourth columns of Table 2). In other words, the
respondents do not closely resemble the population that they represent, which may distort
the results of the survey and render them less reliable. Moreover, the industrial make-up
of the companies that responded to the survey is different from the industrial make-up of
the companies that did not respond with the food, beverages, and tobacco industry again
being the most overrepresented in the responses (compare columns two and three of
Table 2). Considering the diversity of industries represented in the survey and the low
number of companies representing most of the industries, it is hard to assume the definite
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Table 2. Distribution of Responses by Industry, Russia
Manufacturing Categories

Russia
Response

2

Russia

Russia

Non-Responses Percent in
3
the Region

1. (DA) Manufacturing of food products, beverages and tobacco
2. (DB) Manufacturing of textiles and textile products
3. (DC) Manufacturing of leather and leather products
4. (DD) Manufacturing of wood and wood products
5. (DE) Manufacturing of pulp, paper and paper products; publishing
and printing
6. (DF) Manufacturing of coke, refined petroleum products and
nuclear fuel
7. (DG) Manufacturing of chemicals, chemical products and manmade fibers
8. (DH) Manufacturing of rubber and plastic products
9. (DI) Manufacturing of other non-metallic mineral products

24 (47%)
1 (2%)
1 (2%)
0
5 (10%)

14 (12%)
8 (7%)
0
5 (4%)
3 (3%)

28%
7%
1%
2%
6%

0

0

0%

0

4 (3%)

4%

1 (2%)
4 (8%)

4 (3%)
8 (7%)

5%
10%

10. (DJ) Manufacturing of basic metals and fabricated metal
products
11. (DK) Manufacturing of machinery and equipment n.e.c.
12. (DL) Manufacturing of electrical and optical equipment
13. (DM) Manufacturing of transport equipment
14. (DN) Manufacturing n.e.c
Other1
Total

3 (6%)

13 (11%)

6%

15 (13%)
16 (13%)
10 (8%)
4 (3%)
16 (13%)
120 (100%)

11%
11%
5%
4%
0%
100%

4 (8%)
1 (2%)
1 (2%)
4 (8%)
2 (4%)
51 (100%)

1

After the survey data had been collected and I started to analyze the results I discovered that the list of the manufacturing enterprises
obtained from the Statistical Office of the Saratov Region included some non-manufacturing enterprises. These enterprises are
classified under the other category in the table. The analysis that follows includes two companies that would not normally be classified
under manufacturing – one company develops quarries and the other company develops and implements business solutions. I decided
to keep them in the analysis, because their field of business is close enough to manufacturing.
2
Manufacturing categories of three companies were changed from the original categories assigned to them by the Statistical office to
match their own descriptions.
3
Calculated on the basis of the population list, from which the sample for the study was drawn, minus the non-manufacturing
companies that were included in the list by error. In other words, the list, from which the sample for the study was drawn included 629
companies in total, 72 of which were non-manufacturing, but the percentages in this column were calculated taking 557 (629-72) as a
100% instead of 629.

presence of non-response or response bias for most of the industries. The food,
beverages, and tobacco industry represents the main concern, because the companies
from that industry were clearly more prone to participating in the survey than not. The
question, then, is whether there is something so different about this industry that sets it
apart from the other industries and that may influence the results of the analysis to such
an extent that wrong conclusions are drawn. I keep this in mind as I proceed with the
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analysis and flag results showing anything very different about the responses of the
companies from that group.
The distribution of the responses by the size of the town where the company is
located is quite similar to the distribution of companies in towns of different size in the
Saratov region overall and to the distribution of non-responses in towns of different sizes
(Table 3). There is probably just a slight over-representation of companies from towns
Table 3. Distribution of Responses by the Size of the Town Where the Company is Located, Russia1
Town Size

Russia

Less than 3,000

2 (4%)

4 (3%)

4%

3,000 – 9,999

4 (8%)

8 (7%)

8%

10,000 – 19,999

4 (8%)

3 (3%)

5%

20,000 – 49,999

7 (13%)

10 (8%)

9%

50,000 – 99,999

3 (6%)

4 (3%)

6%

100,000 – 249,999

6 (12%)

22 (18%)

19%

250,000 and more

25 (49%)

69 (58%)

49%

Total

51 (100%)

120 (100%)

100%

Number of people

Responses

Russia

Non- Responses

Russia

2

Percent in the Region

1

The city population data were downloaded from http://www.perepis2002.ru/ct/html/TOM_01_04_4.htm (2002 Census; in
Russian).
2
Percent of companies on the population list that come from towns of these sizes.

with populations between 20,000 and 49,999 and a slight under-representation of
companies from towns with populations between 100,000 and 249,999 people (compare
columns 2 and 4 for the 20,000-49,999 and 100,000 – 249,999 groups respectively in
Table 3). The latter happened primarily because of the erroneous data supplied by the
Statistical office. There are only two towns with populations between 100,000 and
249,999 people – Engels (population of 193,984 people) and Balakovo (population of
200,470 people), but the majority of information provided for the companies in Engels by
the Statistical office was incorrect and, thus, it was impossible to contact most of them.
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As a result there are fewer interviews from companies in Engels than there should have
been.
Considering the importance of the Center in the Russian economic life, the main
concern was overrepresentation of companies from big cities (Engels, Balakovo, and
Saratov (population of 873,055 people)). Fortunately, the proportion of responses that
came from Saratov is the same as the proportion of companies on the population list
(49% in both cases, Table 3); and even though a larger proportion of companies from
Saratov did not respond (58% of non-responses came from Saratov as opposed to 49% of
the responses, Table 3), the difference is not large enough to present a concern for nonresponse bias.
In the Hungarian case, companies from some smaller towns are somewhat underrepresented (compare columns 2 and 4 for the 3,000-9,999 and 10,000-19,999 groups in
Table 4) and companies from some larger towns are somewhat over-represented
Table 4. Distribution of Responses by the Size of the Town Where the Company is Located, Hungary1
Town Size

Hungary

Less than 3,000

6 (11%)

14 (11%)

8%

3,000 – 9,999

8 (15%)

28 (21%)

20%

10,000 – 19,999

5 (9%)

20 (15%)

16%

20,000 – 49,999

10 (18%)

12 (9%)

14%

50,000 – 99,999

3 (6%)

10 (7%)

8%

100,000 – 249,999

22 (41%)

50 (37%)

34%

250,000 and more

0

0

0

Total

54 (100%)

134 (100%)

100%

Number of people

1

Responses

Hungary

Non-Responses

Hungary

2

Percent in the Region

The city population data were downloaded from http://www.nepszamlalas.hu/eng/volumes/06/area.html (2001 Census; in
English).
2
Percent of companies on the population list that come from towns of these sizes.
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(compare columns 2 and 4 for the 20,000-49,999 and 100,000-249,999 groups in Table
4), but not significantly enough to influence the results of the survey analysis. There is
also no systematic difference between the distributions of the companies that responded
to the survey and the companies that did not respond (Table 4).
It appears that the “boundaries” between bigger and smaller towns in Hungary in
terms of their status are not as distinct as they are in Russia, where the Center (even if it
is only a regional center) historically has always attracted more resources than the
periphery. Quite a large proportion of Hungarian manufacturing enterprises in the region
are located in smaller towns, and the only two big cities with a population between
100,000 and 249,999 people – Nyíregyháza (population of 113,281 people) and Debrecen
(population of 198,905 people), have only about 15 or 20 percent more companies than
the other cities (Table 4). This, in fact, indicates that smaller towns overall are active
participants in the economy in general. In Russia, in contrast, forty nine percent of all
manufacturing enterprises on the population list came from the ‘capital’ of the region –
Saratov, with another 20% located in the next two biggest cities – Engles and Balakovo,
and only 30% were located in towns with a population of less than 100,000 people (Table
3).11
The majority of the Hungarian respondents (42%) employ between 5 and 19
employees, whereas the majority of the Russian respondents (41%) employ between 20
and 49 employees (Table 5a). Overall, the Hungarian respondents are in companies

11

The distribution is almost the same if the companies are divided into small enterprises (less
than 100 employees) and medium and large enterprises (100 or more employees) (see Appendix 6). What
emerges is that even though the number of small companies on the population list is only 20% of all small
companies in the region, the proportions of companies with less than 100 employees in different towns in
the region should be the same as the proportions of companies with less than 100 employees in different
towns in the sample, because the latter were selected randomly.
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Table 5a. Distribution of Responses by Company Size (6 categories)
Size of the company

Hungary

Hungary

Hungary

Russia

0-4 employees

4 (7%)

0

0

2 (4%)

5-19 employees

23 (43%)

77 (57%)

57%

5 (10%)

20-49 employees

12 (22%)

33 (25%)

23%

21 (41%)

50-99 employees

3 (6%)

16 (12%)

8%

10 (19%)

100-499 employees

10 (18%)

7 (5%)

10%

9 (18%)

500 and more employees

2 (4%)

1 (1%)

2%

4 (8%)

Total

54 (100%)

134 (100%)

100%

51 (100%)

Responses

Non-Responses

Percent in the population1

Responses

Table 5b. Distribution of Responses by Company Size (3 categories)
Size of the company

Hungary

Hungary

Hungary

Russia

Less than 20 employees

27 (50%)

77 (57%)

57%

7 (14%)

20-49 employees

12 (22%)

33 (25%)

23%

21 (41%)

More than 50 employees

15 (28%)

24 (18%)

20%

23 (45%)

Total

54 (100%)

134 (100%)

100%

51 (100%)

Responses

Non-Responses

Percent in the population1

Responses

1

The population list from which the sample of Hungarian companies was drawn was not supposed to include companies that have
fewer than 5 employees, but four of the respondents were in that group.

smaller in size than their Russian counterparts – 50% of the Hungarian companies have
20 or more employees as compared to 86% of the Russian companies (Table 5b). In fact,
according to the distribution of the Hungarian companies on the population list the 5 to
19 employees group is even underrepresented in the responses (only 42% of the
companies fall into this category in the responses, whereas 57% of all the manufacturing
companies in the region do) and the companies that employ between 100 and 499
employees are somewhat over-represented (19% of the responses came from that group,
whereas only 10% of the companies in the region employ that many people) (Table 5a).
Companies that employ between 100 and 499 employees were also more likely to
respond to the survey than not – the companies from this group constituted 18% of the
responses and only 5% of the non-responses (Table 5a). Since bigger companies often
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have different resources at their disposal than smaller companies, their behavior often
differs from that of smaller companies. Hence it is necessary to be alert in the further
analysis of any indication that the bigger companies are skewing the results.
Unfortunately, detailed employment data for the population list of the Russian
manufacturing enterprises could not be obtained.12 According to the division of the
companies into less than 100 employees and 100 and more employees that was provided
by the Statistical office, the groups make up 76% and 24% of the companies in the region
respectively.13 According to Table 5a, 74% of the responses came from companies with
less than 100 employees and, respectively, 26% of the responses came from companies
with 100 or more employees, which reflects the population data.
Table 6. Distribution of Responses and Non-Responses by Company Size, Russia
Size of the company

Russia

Russia

Small (less than 100 employees)

16 (31%)

62 (52%)

Medium and Large (100 or more employees)

35 (69%)

58 (48%)

Total

51 (100%)

120 (100%)

Responses

Non-Responses

It appears that a larger proportion of the Russian companies that have less than
100 employees did not respond (52% of the companies that did not respond have less
than 100 employees vs. 31% of the companies that responded, Table 6) and,
subsequently, a larger proportion of the companies with 100 or more employees

12

First, the Statistical office in Saratov indicated that the data would be available in the Fall of
2004, but when the request was sent to them in October of 2004 they said that the requested information
was considered classified.
13

According to the Statistical Office, the list of companies with less than 100 employees (243
companies) that they provided for the analysis was a 20% random sample of all the companies with less
than 100 employees in the region. According to this there are 1215 (243*5) companies with less than 100
employees altogether in the region, which would make it 76% of all companies in the region (1215 / (1215
+ 386 (companies with 100 or more employees in the region)).
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responded (69% of the responses vs. 48% of non-responses, Table 6). Even though the
division of companies in these two size groups is very crude and does not provide enough
detail to make any more specific assumptions about companies of what size were less
likely to participate, the difference is significant enough to warrant attention when
analyzing the results of the survey.
Table 7. Distribution of Responses by Ownership
Ownership type

Hungary

Russia

Private

52 (96%)

50 (98%)

Private, not privatized

44 (81%)

18 (35%)

Private, privatized

6 (11%)

32 (63%)

Private, not known if privatized or not

2 (4%)

0

State owned

1* (2%)

1 (2%)

Mixed state and private ownership

1** (2%)

0

Total

54 (100%)

51 (100%)

* In the process of being privatized.
** The state has only some intangible assets in the company, but the respondent did not specify what
kind of assets.

Ninety six percent (52) of the Hungarian respondents and 98% (50) of the Russian
respondents were in private ownership (Table 7). Whereas 63% (32) of the Russian
companies were at some point privatized, only 11% (6) of the Hungarian companies were
(Table 7). The Russian companies that are in private ownership and have not been
privatized were all established after 1990. It reflects the fact that private ownership was
not allowed in Russia/the Soviet Union before the economic reforms of the late 1980s –
1990s. The situation was different in Hungary (as also became apparent from interviews
with the Hungarian respondents) – a large number of enterprises in the country in the
1990s were transformed into private ownership through partial or complete buy-outs of
cooperative enterprises, which, by the middle of the 1980s accounted for 20% of
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economic activity in the country.14 Cooperative ownership is different from state
ownership, and, thus, the fact of buying out a company from cooperative ownership does
not constitute privatization. At the same time it is a different process from establishing a
company anew as well and may be as important of a factor as privatization in
determining organizational behavior. Unfortunately the survey instrument did not
incorporate that factor and, thus, it cannot be established which Hungarian companies
that answered “not privatized” have been bought out from a cooperative and which have
not. As a result, we can not differentiate between the Hungarian companies that were
established anew and those that changed from one form of ownership to another. As a
consequence of this shortcoming, it is impossible to know how many of the 41 (76%)
Hungarian companies that were established after 1990 and are now in private ownership
had actually existed before as a cooperative under a different name or in a different form
(Table 8).
Table 8. Distribution of Responses by Whether the Company was Established Before or After 1990
Year Established

Hungary

Russia

Established on or before 1990

13 (24%)

31 (61%)

Established after 1990

41 (76%)

20 (39%)

Total

54 (100%

51 (100%)

In the Russian case, though, it is clear, as we know that all of the 31 (61%)
enterprises that had been established before 1990 and are now in private ownership used
to belong to the State and were at some point privatized (Table 8). A cooperative sector
was present in the Soviet Union at the time of the transition as well, but it was formally

14

Éva Ehrlich and Gábor Révész, Hungary and Its Prospects, 1985 – 2000, Budapest, Akadémiai
Kiadó, 1995), 17.

Karapetyan, Zinaida, 2005, UMSL, p. 177

legalized only in 1988, was very small, and, thus, did not play the same role in the
country’s economic transformation as it did in Hungary.
Since there are hardly any state run enterprises in the responses, it is not useful to
talk about the respondents in terms of whether they have been privatized or not - there is
no group with which to compare them (normally one analyzes whether privatization
changes how companies operate and compares them with the companies that are still in
state ownership). What will be useful, though, is to distinguish between the companies in
terms of whether they have ever been in state ownership, i.e., companies that are in
private ownership right now, but at some point used to belong to the state, or not (the
private companies that were established from scratch). Due to the shortcoming of the
survey instrument, this dichotomy by and large can only be useful in explaining the
answers of the Russian respondents; in the case of Hungary a significant component is
missing, which can lead to misinterpretation of the results. What can be done, though, is
an assessment whether those 8 Hungarian companies that fall into the “have been in state
ownership” category show any stark differences from the companies that have not.
The predominant number of the companies that responded to the survey in both
countries was in domestic ownership (91% of the Hungarian companies and 94% of the
Table 9. Distribution of Respondents by Foreign/Domestic Ownership
Ownership

Hungary

Russia

100% domestic ownership

49 (91%)

48 (94%)

100% foreign ownership

4 (7%)

0

Mixed domestic & foreign ownership

1 (2%)

1 (2%)

Confidential Info

0

2 (4%)

Total

54 (100%)

51 (100%)
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Russian companies) (Table 9). Since there is not much variation here15 discerning the
influence of foreign ownership on organizational behavior will not be a concern in the
analysis.
Eighty four percent and eighty five percent of the Russian and Hungarian
respondents respectively were male and 16% and 15% respectively were female (Table
10).
Table 10. Distribution of Respondents by Gender
Gender of the Respondent

Hungary

Russia

Male

46 (85%)

43 (84%)

Female

8 (15%)

8 (16%)

Total

54 (100%)

51 (100%)

Fifty percent of the Hungarian respondents indicated that they had had some kind
of management training and 50% indicated that they had not had any (Table 11).16 This is
compared to only 20% of the Russian respondents that had had some kind of
management training and 80% that had not had any (Table 11). The distribution of the
answers by gender follows a similar pattern. Fifty percent of the Hungarian female
respondents and 50% of the Hungarian male respondents have had some kind of
management training, and the other 50% have not (Table 11). This is compared to 12%
and 21% of the Russian female and male respondents respectively that have had some

15

The owners of the four Hungarian companies that are in 100% foreign ownership come from
two diverse regions – Western European and Eastern Europe. This means they cannot be included in the
same category and treated as the same, and, thus, any comparison of them against the other, domestically
owned companies, would be uninformative.
16

Some of the Hungarian respondents indicated that they participated in some “communist”
management courses; these responses were coded as “no management training,” because the concern in this
research is whether the exposure to western style management in particular predisposes a businessperson to
act differently.

Karapetyan, Zinaida, 2005, UMSL, p. 179

kind of management training and 88% and 79% of the Russian female and male
respondents respectively that have not had any management training (Table 11).
Table 11. Distribution of Responses by Gender and Management Training
Management Training

Hungary

Russia

Some Management Training

27 (50%)

10 (20%)

No Management Training

27 (50%)

41 (80%)

Total

54 (100%)

51 (100%)

Some Management Training

4 (50%)

1 (12%)

No management Training

4 (50%)

7 (88%)

Total Female

8 (100%)

8 (100%)

Some Management Training

23 (50%)

9 (21%)

No Management Training

23 (50%)

34 (79%)

Total Male

46 (100%)

43 (100%)

Female

Male

The majority of the Russian respondents were younger than the majority of the
Hungarian respondents - 65% (or 33 respondents) were between the ages of 35 and 45
with the oldest respondent less than 55 years old (Table 12). In contrast, the majority of
the Hungarian respondents (23 respondents or 42%) were between the ages of 45 and 55
with 9 respondents (17%) more than 55 years old (Table 12).
Table 12. Distribution of Responses by Age
Age Group

Hungary

Russia

Less than 25 years old

0

0

25-35 years old

6 (11%)

5 (10%)

35-45 years old

16 (30%)

33 (65%)

45-55 years old

23 (42%)

13 (25%)

55 and above

9 (17%)

0

Total

54 (100%)

51 (100%)
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Finally, the predominant number of the respondents overall (88 respondents or
84%) were directors/top managers.17 The rest were either directors’/top managers’ top
assistants or directors/top managers of certain divisions, e.g., sales, marketing, human
resources. The transcripts of the interviews show that the predominant number of the
Hungarian respondents were owners or co-owners of the companies that they were
interviewed about and the predominant number of the Russian respondents were not.
Unfortunately, the survey instrument did not incorporate that distinction into a question
and, therefore, we cannot safely assume which respondents owned the business and
which were simply hired to do the job.

17

The terms ‘director’ and ‘top manager’ will be used interchangeably throughout the analysis.
“Director” is the Russian equivalent of the ‘top manager.’ In the Russian business world the word
‘manager’ is normally used for lower level positions. For example, “a sales representative” is normally
called a “sales manager” or a “secretary” is often referred to as an “office manager.”
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CHAPTER 6
BUSINESS PRACTICES
This chapter presents an analysis of the survey respondents’ business practices
with the focus on any systematic differences between the two countries that allows
concluding that the respondents from one country are more market oriented than the
respondents from the other country. As mentioned in Chapter 5, the term ‘market
orientation’ is utilized very broadly to refer to any set of behaviors that are based on
market-based principles and are different from behaviors resembling the old traditions of
the command economy. I also have hypothesized that the Hungarian businesspeople will
display a more market oriented behavior than the Russian businesspeople.

Mission Statements
The business practices part of the questionnaire began with inquiry about
organizations’ mission statements. Seventy five percent (38) of the Russian respondents
did not have a mission statement and ninety four percent (51) of the Hungarian
respondents did (Table 1). When asked to specify, though, most of the Hungarian
respondents simply understood “mission” as their “strategic goals.” This could be seen
either from the kind of the answers that they gave: “Short term: developing the
commercial section. Long term: to develop the plant, to buy up-to-date machinery and
technology...” or from them explicitly stating so: “Our actual goals are to maintain the
present volume of production, to stabilize our position in the market, and to develop a
certain technology needed for the requirements of this era….” or from the fact that they
used the same answer when asked about strategic goals of their organization. These
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examples and similar responses were discarded as mission statements and were added to
the answers regarding current goals of the organizations, because the respondents
themselves did not perceive them as mission statements, even though at times they were
no different from the mission statements given by other respondents. This left us with 351
Hungarian companies (65%) for the analysis of their mission statements.
Table 1. Distribution of Companies by Whether They Have a Mission Statement or Not.
Does your organization have a mission statement?
Yes:
Used for the analysis

Hungary

Russia

51 (94%)

13 (25%)

35 (65%)

13 (25%)

No

3 (6%)

38 (75%)

Total

54 (`100%)

51 (100%)

As can be seen from Table 1 even with some of the Hungarian mission statements
discarded, the proportion of the Hungarian companies that have a mission statement is
still much larger than the proportion of the Russian companies (65% and 25%
respectively), which may be an indicator that Hungarian companies are more market
oriented than Russian companies. However, two objections can be brought against such a
conclusion. First, previous research has shown that even some of the Fortune 500
companies and top service and manufacturing companies do not have a mission
statement: of the 218 Fortune 500 companies that responded to a survey by Pearce and
David,2 40% did not have a mission statement,3 and of the 181 responses received by

1

One company did not want to disclose its mission statement as confidential information and,
thus, was also excluded from the analysis.
2

John A. Pearce and Fred David, “Corporate Mission Statements: The Bottom Line,” The
Academy of Management Executive 1, no. 2 (May 1987): 109-116.
3

Ibid., 110.
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Fred R. David4 from Business Week 1000 top service and manufacturing firms 59% did
not have a mission statement.5 Nevertheless, these companies are not considered less
market oriented than the ones that have a mission statement. Secondly, what may be
more important than the proportion of companies that have a mission statement is their
content. “The mission statement needs to be longer than a phrase or sentence, but not a
two-page document. And it should not be overly specific. That is, it should not include
dollar amounts, percentages, numbers, goals, or strategies. Nor should it include specific
objectives, strategies, and policies, which are better left to the strategic plan.”6 Most of
the Hungarian respondents simply listed the elements of their mission statements as they
would list their objectives or goals, often in a very incoherent manner; for example: “Fast
reliable servicing, quality products, advanced technology, reasonable prices, utmost care,
flexibility, the customer is always right.” The majority of the 13 Russian mission
statements are simple one-liners like “Production of high quality products” or “Creating a
civilized market for information technologies.” In other words, the majority of the
companies in both countries do not have a well-written mission statement.
Literature suggests nine components that should be included in the mission
statement: target customers (who are the company’s customers?), principal products
and/or services (what are the company’s major products and/or services?), geographic
market (where does the organization seek customers? In what geographic area does it
compete?), technology (what are the company’s core technologies?), concern for

4

Fred R. David, “How Companies Define Their Mission,” Long Range Planning 22 (February
1989): 90-97.
5

Ibid., 92.
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survival/growth/profit (what are the company’s economic objectives?), company
philosophy (what are the company’s beliefs and values?), desired public image (what are
the company’s public responsibilities?), employees (what is the company’s attitude
towards its employees?), and company self-concept (what makes the company different
from the rest? What are its competitive strengths?).7
Table 2. Distribution of Responses by Mission Statements’ Components (percent of the companies
that have a mission statement: 35 in Hungary and 13 in Russia; the totals add up to more than 100%,
because some companies have more than one component in their mission statement)
Mission Statement Components

Hungary

Russia

Target customers (who are the company’s customers?)

2 (6%)

3 (23%)

Principle products and/or services (what are the company’s major
products and/or services?)

7 (20%)

7 (54%)

Geographic market (where does the organization seek customers? In
what geographic area does it compete?)

6 (17%)

2 (15%)

Technology (what are the company’s core technologies?)

2 (6%)

0

Concern for survival/growth/profit (what are the company’s economic
objectives?)

23 (66%)

0

Company philosophy (what are the company’s beliefs and values?)

13 (37%)

10 (77%)

Desired public image (what are the company’s public responsibilities)

2 (6%)

1 (8%)

Employees (what is the company’s attitude towards its employees?)

2 (6%)

1 (8%)

Company self-concept (what makes the company different from the
rest? What are its competitive strengths?)

2 (6%)

0

As can be seen from Table 2 none of the Russian companies included the
technology, the concern for survival/growth/profit, and the company self-concept
components in its mission statement. The two Hungarian companies that included the
technology component in their mission statements did not specify what kind of
technology they wanted to use; they simply mentioned that they wanted to base their
6

Forest R. David and Fred R. David, “It’s Time to Redraft Your Mission Statement,” The Journal
of Business Strategy 24, no. 1 (Jan/Feb 2003): 12.
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work on “advanced technology” in one case and most modern, high-technology in the
other. The most often mentioned component by the Hungarian companies was the
concern for survival/growth/profit (23 companies or 66%): “To get a bigger market
share;” “To remain on the market;” Expand our business;” “Taking over a new machinepark.” Two mission statements that were also included in this group simply expressed
concern for supporting the family and, thus, survival: “Just to live, feed the family;”
“Supporting the family is the main aim; none of the family members works anywhere
else, so we are absolutely independent from state enterprises; we make our own living.”
The component that was the second most often mentioned by the Hungarian
companies (13 companies or 37%) and the most often mentioned by the Russian
companies (10 companies or 77%) was the company philosophy (Table 2). In both cases
it mainly included such concerns as producing quality products, constantly improving
quality, or satisfying demands of the market and the customers: “Quality work for
affordable prices” (a Hungarian respondent); “To do a good and honest job” (a Hungarian
respondent); “In the service of all-time interests of clients with the maximum regard for
food safety” (a Hungarian respondent); “Production of [goods] precisely and on-time” (a
Russian respondent); “1. The customer is always right; 2. If the customer is not right, go
to 1; 3. If we still conclude that the customer is not right, it means it's not our customer”
(a Russian respondent).
The second most mentioned component by the Russian companies was the
product and/or services: “Production of high quality [product] for different kinds of
ground transportation and … for the needs of modern construction fully meeting demands

7

Pearce and David, “Corporate Mission Statements,” 110-112; David and David, “It’s Time to
Redraft Your Mission Statement,” 12, David, “How Companies Define Their Mission,” 92.
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of the market;” “Supplying high quality [product] to our town.” This component and the
geographic market component received almost equal attention in the Hungarian
companies (7 and 6 companies respectively): “To support domestic communications
industrial market with …; to be the main supplier of … in Hungary;” “To fulfill the
public duties that we have taken upon us – to inform the people of [our town].”
None of the mission statements in the study included all 8 components, but, again,
previous research shows that it is not uncommon even in advanced market economies.8
The mission statement of only one Hungarian company included as many as five
different components:
From the program of the company: To establish a company, which is the leader
and accepted in its goal-markets, where the use of high-technology is necessary in
the field of …; an organization, which develops continuously, optimally, and
structurally. As a result of trustworthy, effective, cost-efficient work completed
on time, makes a name for itself. It always works with the most modern
technology. It ensures abundant supply of its products to its partners [customers].
(Components: the principle product, the technology, the concern for
survival/growth/profit, the company philosophy, the company self-concept.)
The mission statements of one of the Russian and one of the Hungarian
companies included four components:
No particular mission, except for providing people with well-paid employment so
that they can support their families and children - that's the main mission. Paying
salaries on time. Creating respectful living. In the future when the company
develops more, we want to start providing financial help to children and old
people. We also want to start designing school furniture. (A Russian company.)
(Components: the desired public image, employees, the product, and the company
philosophy)
To support domestic communications industrial market with …; to be the main
supplier of … in Hungary. (A Hungarian company.) (Components: the target
customer, the product, the geographic market, and survival/growth/profit.)

8

David and David, “It’s Time to Redraft Your Mission Statement,” 12-13.
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Three Russian companies (23%) and six Hungarian companies (17%) covered
three different components in their mission statements; two Russian companies (15%)
and four Hungarian companies (11%) covered two different components in their mission
statements; and, finally, seven Russian companies (54%) and 23 of the Hungarian
companies (66%) focused on only 1 component in their mission statements.
Of the Hungarian respondents, whose companies did not have a mission
statement, one explained that his company completely depends on government’s funding
of local schools, who are his primary customers: “We had once [a mission statement], but
I can’t say it for sure now, since our last year’s production was two-thirds of two years
before. We completely depend on the local government and how much money they give
to schools. I can make plans for nothing, if there are no customers.” In other words, the
respondent understood his mission as his action/production plan for the future. Another
Hungarian respondent said that they just want to meet the market’s demand for their
product, but did not consider it as their mission. Similarly, a Russian respondent
commented that their organization strives to develop “people by publishing books,” but
did not consider it as their mission either. One last comment was from another Russian
respondent who said that he has never thought about it:” I just want to know what
tomorrow will bring…and I can't always do that.”
To summarize, from the above analysis we can see that only one Hungarian
company had a more or less coherent mission statement (the company that had five
components in its mission statement) and not a single Russian company had a wellwritten mission statement that the company had prepared as part of their business
strategy. None of the companies’ mission statements included all of the components
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identified in the literature. The mission statements from both countries included about an
equal number of components. A larger number of Hungarian companies had a mission
statement, and, all together, the mission statements of the Hungarian companies covered
more of the components than the mission statements of the Russian companies.
One would assume that whether a company has a mission statement or not would
highly depend on whether its top manager has ever had some kind of western style
management training and, thus, has been exposed to the idea of a mission statement, or
not. Interestingly enough, in our case, there appears to be no correlation between the two:
of the 35 Hungarian respondents whose company had a mission statement 35% (19) had
some management training and 30% (16) did not (Table 3). For the Russian respondents,
the proportions are 10% and 15% respectively (Table 3).

Table 3. Distribution of Companies by Whether They Have a Mission Statement or Not and by Whether
Their Manager Has Ever Had Any Management Training or Not
(percent of the total number of responses)

Yes

Hungary
No
Some
Management
Management
Training
Training
19 (35%)
16 (30%)

Russia
No
Some
Management
Management
Training
Training
5 (10%)
8 (15%)

No

8 (15%)

11 (20%)

5 (10%)

33 (65%)

Total

27 (50%)

27 (50%)

10 (20%)

41 (80%)

Does your organization
have a mission statement?

One feature stands out in the description of the Russian respondents that have a
mission statement as compared to the Russian respondents that do not have a mission
statement – the majority of them (10) have more than 50 employees (Table 7.1, Appendix
7). In addition, the majority of the companies in the food, beverages, and tobacco
industry – the industry that is over-represented in the Russian responses, do not have a
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mission statement (20 of 24 companies) (Table 7.1, Appendix 7). No major differences
are present between the Hungarian companies that have a mission statement and the ones
that do not (Table 7.1, Appendix 7).

Strategic Goals
The Russian respondents split almost evenly on the answer of whether their
organization sets strategic goals or not – 47% of the organizations do and 53% do not
(Table 4). Of the Hungarian respondents 81% set strategic goals and only 19% do not
(Table 4).
Table 4. Distribution of Companies by Whether They Set Strategic Goals or Not.
Does your organization set strategic goals?

Hungary

Russia

Yes

44 (81%)

24 (47%)

No

10 (19%)

27 (53%)

Total

54 (100%)

51 (100%)

Of those companies that have strategic goals almost an equal percentage in both
countries (75% in Hungary and 79% in Russia) at least partly focus on issues of growth,
expansion, and development (Table 5). The two most mentioned goals by the Hungarian
companies in regards to growth, expansion, and development were increasing their
market share or gaining new markets (34%) and physical expansion of the company
(25%) (Table 6). These were followed by the goals of development (18%) and increase in
the volume of production (14%) (Table 6). The two most mentioned goals by the Russian
companies in regards to growth, expansion, and development were increasing their
market share or gaining new markets (25%) and developing/offering new types or more
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Table 5. Distribution of Responses by Strategic Goals (percent of the companies that set strategic
goals: 44 in Hungary and 24 in Russia; the totals add up to more than 100%, because some
companies pursue different types of goals simultaneously)
Strategic Goals

Hungary

Russia

Confidential Information/the Respondent did not specify the
goals

2 (5%)

4 (17%)

Growth/Expansion/Development

33 (75%)

19 (79%)

Preserving status quo

9 (20%)

0

Technology oriented goals

15 (34%)

4 (17%)

Improving the quality of the product/increasing its competitive
strength

5 (11%)

1 (4%)

Restructuring internal processes

4 (9%)

1 (4%)

Quality of work/services

9 (20%)

0

Employee oriented goals

4 (9%)

1 (4%)

Table 6. Distribution of Responses by Types of Goals of Growth, Expansion, and Development
(percent of the companies that set strategic goals: 44 in Hungary and 24 in Russia; the totals add up
to more than 100%, because some companies pursue different types of goals simultaneously)
Growth/Expansion/Development

Hungary

Russia

Expanding company/workforce; growth; building new buildings;
adding departments.

11 (25%)

2 (8%)

Development; improving competitiveness (of the company
overall); strategic development; investment programs

8 (18%)

4 (17%)

Widening network of sales outlets / increasing volume of sales /
achieving certain volume of sales

2 (5%)

2 (8%)

Increasing market share / gaining new markets / gaining new
niches on the local market; becoming monopolist in general or for
certain types of products / becoming the first on the market.

15 (34%)

6 (25%)

Attracting more customers/more business partners

1 (2%)

1 (4%)

Developing/offering new types/more types/different types of
products/services

4 (9%)

6 (25%)

Increasing the volume of production / achieving certain volume
of production / producing more

6 (14%)

4 (17%)

Generating more profit/more income/more money

4 (9%)

1 (4%)

types of products and services (25%). These were followed by the goals of development
(17%) and increasing the volume of production (17%) (Table 6). About an equal
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proportion of the respondents in both countries (14% in Hungary and 17% in Russia) set
their goals in terms of production figures – a measure that is used in planned economies
but is alien to practitioners in market economies (Table 6).
The next most mentioned component in both countries’ strategic goals was
technology – 34% of Hungarian companies and 17% of Russian companies aim at
modernizing their factories and/or bringing new technology and/or equipment (Table 5).
Besides the goals of growth and technology, a number of Russian companies mentioned
such goals as increasing the competitive strength of their product, changing something in
their internal organizational structure or processes, or doing something to benefit their
employees (Table 5): “we plan to analyze our product and the market more in order to
increase the competitive strength of our products and attract more customers;” “The main
goal is to establish such a system of document circulation that would let the owners
control and run the company; at times, the situation gets very unhealthy in that regard;”
“To bring the minimum wage to the level of the minimum standard of living for the
working population in our town.” Hungarian companies stressed these issues as well, but
in a larger proportion: 11% strive to improve the quality of their product,9 9% are trying
to change something about the internal structure of their organization, and another 9% set
goals to benefit their employees (Table 5): “To raise income, to improve the planning
system, better quality, lower rate of complaints;” “Our goal is to organize our services in
such a way that they meet our customers' satisfaction and take their needs into
consideration;” “Giving work to … [a certain strata of the society], making their living

9

This also included such goals as developing an ISO standard and becoming Union compatible.
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conditions better, enabling them to live in the 21st century conditions. We would like to
do this in great numbers and let those people be an integrated part of the society again.”
There are two components that are present in the strategic goals of some of the
Hungarian companies but are not mentioned by any of the Russian companies. The first
one is the concern for the quality of the company’s work and/or services: 20% (9) of the
Hungarian respondents said that they aim at being good business partners, doing
trustworthy and efficient work, keeping to the deadlines, lowering the rates of
complaints, producing quality products, and satisfying their customers’ satisfaction10
(Table 5). The second one is what I labeled a ‘preserving status quo’ category - 20 % of
the Hungarian respondents among other things simply try to keep what they have already
achieved – keep their market share, stay competitive, keep the company running, keep
their employees, keep existing business partners, stay alive, and the like. None of the
Russian respondents expressed these concerns.
Of the Russian companies that do not set strategic goals one company explained it
by the fact that what they produce is consumed by the government and state-operated
organizations and, thus, their production plans, and, therefore, their goals, depend on the
government’s plans: “Everything depends on the regional plan; everything that we
produce is consumed by the [government] and other state-related organizations, so it does
not depend on us. How can I make plans if I don’t know the plans of the Primeminister?”11 One of the Hungarian respondents simply said that there is no reason for
them to set strategic goals. One other Hungarian respondent explained that at this point

10

“Improving the quality of the product” and “producing quality product” were considered as
different goals, because the latter does not necessarily mean that the company tries to improve the quality,
rather just keep the quality good.
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their company is not capable of conceiving long-range strategic goals, because they do
not even have capital of their own and they completely depend on other companies. Some
other Hungarian and Russian companies mentioned development, entering new markets,
improving their products’ quality, attracting more customers, and expansion as their goals
in general, but not as their strategic goals.
There are no systematic differences in the characteristics of the companies that set
strategic goals and those that do not (Table 7.2, Appendix 7). Even the Russian
companies from the food, beverages, and tobacco industry split evenly on this question.
One minor feature that is probably worth paying attention to is the distribution of the
responses by the size of the company: the majority of the Russian companies that set
strategic goals (16) have more than 50 employees; the majority of the Russian companies
that have more than 50 employees set strategic goals; and the majority of the Hungarian
companies that do not set strategic goals (9) have fewer than 20 employees.

Plans
The proportion of the Hungarian companies that make a plan or strategy to
achieve their goals is still higher than the proportion of the Russian companies that do
(61% and 43% respectively, Table 7), but the difference is not as large as it was in the
answers to the two previously discussed questions. The main difference appears to be
rather in the way the respondents talked about the process of plan formulation: the
predominant number of the Hungarian respondents in their answers focused on what
methods or procedures they use to develop their plan or strategy, whereas the majority of
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All references to the product have been removed.
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the Russian respondents focused on who makes the final decision (Table 8): ”Analysis in
every department, examining environmental effects, formulation of objectives and
possibilities, setting targets at the managers' level” (a Hungarian respondent); “Ideas (for
goals) come from top management of our company and as long as the cost of their
implementation stays under certain financial limits, we can implement those goals. If the
goals require more money, we have to get approval from our ‘mother’ company” (a
Russian respondent).
Table 7. Distribution of Companies by Whether They Develop a Plan or a Strategy
Does your organization make a plan or a strategy to achieve its
goals?

Hungary

Russia

Yes

33 (61%)

22 (43%)

No

21 (39%)

29 (57%)

Total

54 (100%)

51 (100%)

Table 8. Distribution of Companies by the Methods that They Use to Set Their Goals and Develop
Their Plan (percent of companies that develop a plan – 33 in Hungary and 22 in Russia)
What is the process by which your organization determines its
goals and its plan or strategy?

Hungary

Russia

Answers that focused on methods/procedures only

13 (39%)

3 (14%)

Answers that focused on actors only

1 (3%)

12 (55%)

Answers that focused on methods and actors together

3 (9%)

6 (27%)

Answers that only indicated that the company had a plan

8 (24%)

0

Answers that included references to the plan and the methods

3 (9%)

0

No Usable Answer*

5 (15%)

1 (5%)

Total

33 (100%)

22 (100%)

* The respondents did not give a usable answer to the question of how they develop their plan or a strategy: one respondent
simply said that survival is their main guidance, another mentioned that it only happens through an oral agreement and there are
no written documents, yet another one simply stated that they determine the goals and assign responsibilities; finally, the last
two companies listed some of their goals instead of explaining the process by which they develop a plan or a strategy to achieve
those goals.
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One factor that may have contributed to this difference in the answers is the fact
that the majority of the Hungarian respondents were the owners of the companies that
make all the important decisions themselves and, thus, are comfortable with explaining
why they make certain decision. The majority of the Russian respondents were holding
top positions in the companies, but were not the owners themselves. Eleven of the twelve
Russian respondents whose answers focused on actors only, indicated that the
owners/stockholders of their company set goals, and the director or the top management
or the marketing department develops a strategy or a plan to achieve those goals:
“Stockholders set goals and the management develops a strategy to achieve those goals;”
“Stockholders, sometimes along with top management, set goals, and the top
management with the lower management develop a strategy to achieve those goals;”
“The marketing department develops plan/strategy on the basis of the orders from top
management; the plan/strategy is then presented to the owners for consideration.” (By
“stockholders” all these respondents meant a small number of people (2-3) who owned
all of the stock of the company – in essence sole owners of the company.) This is
probably the first major characteristic of the Russian companies that carries strong
resemblance with the traditions of the communist era – orders come from above and the
management is there to simply implement them.
In contrast, even the one Hungarian respondent that focused on actors only in his
answer painted a more ‘democratic’ style of decision-making process:”The manager [the
respondent], the chief accountant and the subordinates have a meeting, decide on a
project and the finances needed for it, and then try to implement it.” Of the three
respondents that have had some kind of reference to what determines their plan along
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with who decides on it, one gave a similar answer: “We talk about goals and plans at the
meetings of the company's management, but we don't put anything on paper, at least not
officially. We go day by day [see how much we can make today and tomorrow],” and the
other two appeared to be the owners who base their decisions on their personal
judgement: ”After the emergence of the demands I decide upon the execution,
considering the practicality of it [The interviewer: there are these external demands (e.g.
to make a new mixture of concrete for a specific task), which usually means for the
company to invest in something new or develop new products and services; and the
manager decides upon each new occasion if it's worth the money and the work, or not],”
“I don’t usually write it down. I need an intuition, a thought; if I find it a good one, I
discuss it with my wife, and then we decide upon its fate. There are no separate
departments to do this job for me.”
Of the 13 Hungarian respondents that talked about what methods they use to
create a plan or strategy, 10 (30%) analyze, one way or another, their market conditions
before deciding on their plan: “We always consider the needs of our partners/customers,
the market conditions, the change and the constellation of the market;” “We do market
research and produce only what the market needs;” “Our aim is to get as many customers
as possible. Our strategy is to find the market and go after it with production. At first we
try to find the breaches in the market and find those members of the market who are
going to be our partners. The most important part of our work is the improvement of
research, to keep our quality No.1; the other is the exploration of the market. It happens
chiefly through marketing tools and participation in exhibitions in a lot of countries:
USA, Germany, France, Russia, Poland, Czech Republic.”
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Three of the four Russian companies that use market research to develop a plan or
a strategy rely on their Marketing Departments to do that: “The Marketing department
does research and suggests ideas for possible goals, outlines market needs and threats that
the company may face in the near future;” “The marketing department examines the
market for our types of product, and, if they see a niche that they think is not occupied,
they research it and tell us what the market is missing; the company then develops the
missing product.” This trend – the seemingly active role that the Marketing Department
plays in the Russian companies’ business practices and the absence of thereof in the
Hungarian ones – will surface again later on in the analysis to an even greater extent. One
explanation for such an ‘organized’ business environment in the Russian companies can
be the fact that after big state enterprises had been privatized their departmental structure
was not completely abolished, but was modified to fit the new system, i.e., a Marketing
Department was established in place of some old department. Two of the above
enterprises used to be in state ownership, have been privatized, and employ between 100
and 499 employees; and the other one is still in state ownership and has more than 500
employees. Five of the Hungarian enterprises that use market research in their plan
preparation process have less than 20 employees, three have between 20 and 50
employees, and only two have more than 50 employees. In other words, since the
Hungarian companies are smaller, they may not have the luxury of establishing a special
department to perform a particular business task.
It seems that quite a substantial number of Hungarian companies - 1112 (33%),
develop an official document for their plan: “This can be carried through only by such a

12

8 companies that only indicated that they had a plan plus 3 companies that mentioned that they
had a plan and also talked about how they develop their plan (Table 8).
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company plan, in which the company tries to balance its sales plan and finances in the
given year. So, it tries to balance the income obtained from commerce and the necessary
expenditures;” “We always have a business plan. We discuss our business plans in our
meetings together with our aims. Those plans that are the most important for us and could
be realized financially get priority. Luckily, our physical and mental workforce can
always achieve our plans;” “The first step is making a business-review related to the
given year [the year the plan is for]. This is followed by creating of a business plan,
which later gets broken down into company and department goals.” Moreover, some of
those 11 use quite a systematic procedure to develop their plan:
Step 1: we determine the state we’d like to reach after 5 years - the way we want
to see the company in 5 years. Step 2: We reduce this condition to programs, the
programs to classes, organic items; we give dates to these, and determine the tasks
of the items exactly.
We have short-, medium-, and long-term plans. For short-term plans we have
production plans: to complete orders and to have them continuously. For mediumterm plans we develop a strategy to expand a certain product-family. Long-term
plans are to increase our market volume, to develop products and technology. We
make a yearly plan by creating a yearly program (measured by income and other
factors; 90% of the production is made here). We also have weekly and monthly
plans. If production demands are increased, then it implies technological
development, the expansion of the number of employees, and the growth of
human resources as well. It is also controlled back to see if the plan is working at
all.

The majority (7) of these 11 companies have more than 50 employees. None of the
Russian respondents actually clearly said that they develop a written document that
contains their plan or strategy.
Here, substantive differences in the business practices of the respondents finally
start to emerge. In the case of the majority of the Russian companies the owners decide
on the direction that the company should develop and the managers are given the task of
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implementing the owners’ vision. In the Hungarian case, the manager is the owner who,
in the case of a small company, decides what the plan will be, or, in the case of a larger
company, discusses the future plans with his/her subordinates. In both countries bigger
companies have some regular procedures for plan development, but whereas for the
Russian companies we only know that they use their Marketing Department to collect
data for the plan, the Hungarian companies actually create a document to follow as their
plan.
The majority of the Russian respondents that develop a plan or a strategy have
more than 50 employees (16 of 22) and are located in Saratov – the biggest city in the
region (18 of 22) (Table 7.3, Appendix 7). Whereas the majority of the Hungarian
companies that have more than 20 employees develop a plan or a strategy, more than half
of the Hungarian companies with less than 20 employees (15 of 27) do not (Table 7.3,
Appendix 7). The majority of the Russian companies that do not have a plan (17 of 29)
are from the food, beverages, and tobacco industry; in addition, the majority of the
companies from that industry overall do not develop a plan or a strategy (Table 7.3,
Appendix 7). Finally, for the first time the influence of the management training on the
respondents’ behavior is observed - in both countries, the majority of the companies
whose respondents have had some management training develop a plan or a strategy and
the majority of the companies whose respondents have not had any management training
do not (Table 7.3, Appendix 7).
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Performance
The following discussion of the measures that the respondents use to measure
their organization’s performance revolves around the following dichotomy: profit and
market-related measures vs. old style volume of production and similar measures.
Table 9. Distribution of Companies by Whether They Measure Their Performance or Not
Do you measure your organization’s performance?

Hungary

Russia

Yes

53 (98%)

43 (84%)

No

1 (2%)

8 (16%)

Total

54 (100%)

51 (100%)

Ninety eight percent of the Hungarian companies and eighty four percent of the
Russian companies evaluate their organization’s performance (Table 9). The comparison
of the methods that the companies in the two countries use gives unpredictable results: a
large percentage of the Russian companies (26 companies or 60%) use profit as their
measure, and their proportion is higher than the proportion of the Hungarian companies
that do (20 companies or 38%) (Table 10). The percentage of the companies that use the
volume of production as one of their measures is very similar in both countries – 26% (14
companies) in Hungary and 28% (12 companies) in Russia, and only a slightly lower
percentage of the Hungarian companies (11% vs. 19% of the Russian companies) use
sales numbers as a measure of their organization’s performance (Table 10).
Naturally, this is not the result that one would expect having hypothesized that
Hungarian companies are more market oriented than Russian companies. I expected the
percentage of the Hungarian companies that use profit as their measure to be much higher
in general and to be higher than the percentage of the Russian companies that use profit
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Table 10. Distribution of Companies by the Measures That They Use To Evaluate Their Performance
(percent of companies that evaluate their organization’s performance – 53 in Hungary and 43 in Russia; the
totals add up to more than 100%, because companies use more than one measure simultaneously )
Measures companies use to evaluate their organization’s performance

Hungary

Russia

1. Profit and/or profitability* 1

20 (38%)

26 (60%)

2. Answers that were referring to profit*

4 (8%)

0

3. Other financial measures*
Ø Accounting
Ø Revenue/Income
Ø Turnover
Ø Fulfillment of our financial plan
Ø Fulfillment of our business plan
Ø Budget
Ø Some financial aspects
Ø Some other answer2

13 (25%)
2**
3**
5

4 (9%)

4. Volume of sales, sales plan

6 (11%)

8 (19%)

5. Volume of production, number of orders, number of contracts, number
of clients, volume of total work, how much of our production capacity is
utilized, performance of the production process

14 (26%)

12 (28%)

6. Prices on our products

0

3 (7%)

7. Our market share

0

3 (7%)

8. Volume of goods stored in the warehouse

0

1 (2%)

9. Quality of our product

5 (9%)

1 (2%)

10. Release of new types of products/# of new models released

0

3 (7%)

11. Customer Satisfaction

4 (8%)

0

12. Fulfillment of orders/following deadlines/number of complaints

8 (15%)

1 (2%)

13. Other: Social package; how comfortable the workplace is, sanitary
norms

0

2 (5%)

14. No Usable Answer

4 (8%)

0

1

1
1
1
1

2
2
1
1

Profitability was only mentioned by Russian enterprises.
One Hungarian respondent gave an answer that makes me believe that the company indeed uses an
evaluation of its revenues and expenditures to measure their organization’s performance, but the respondent
was not clear about it: “Production value, sold quantity, incoming orders, energy expenditures, incoming
bank fees.” This company’s answer was coded in 5, 4, and 3, and the reason that it was coded in 3 was
because it seems to me that the respondents would not be analyzing their expenditures if they did not
estimate their revenues or at least how much money comes in, which would be a more market-based type of
behavior.
* Mutually exclusive categories except for one case – a Russian company, whose answer was counted in
the profit/profitability category and in the other financial measures category.
** One company indicated both the income and accounting as their way to measure their organization’s
performance
2
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as their measure, in particular. I expected the percentage of the Hungarian companies that
use production and sales numbers as measures of their organization’s performance to be
much lower than the percentage of the Russian companies.
A few explanations can be offered to understand the results. Focus on the profit
category first. In addition to the twenty Hungarian companies that clearly stated that they
use profit as a measure of their organization’s performance, four more companies (8%)
though not using the word “profit” seemed to be referring to profit in their answers: “We
measure it by the ratio of expenditures to income.;” “We measure it through analyzing
expenses and income;” “We compare the revenue, efficiency and the costs.” In addition a
large number of the Hungarian companies (13 or 25%) mentioned some other financial
measures like revenue, income, money circulation, turnover, or gave an answer that was
not very specific, but was obviously referring to financial measure: “We measure it by
financial aspects” or “the work of the accountant,” or even indicated the use of a
computer program to do a complete system measurement:
We do a complete system measurement (by price, income, expenses, and all the
other factors completely). There is a lever-balance, too: a monthly evaluation
(which doesn’t contain some lesser things), and a precise balance in every three
months, which measures the performance in the respects of income, expenses,
payments, taxes, and many other things, with the help of a computer program.
In other words, these companies did not use the term “profit” as the measure of their
organization’s performance, but they did use measures that were clearly not an old-style
command economy type of measures as we know them. If we combine the answers in the
above three categories (1,2, and 3 of Table 10), then the proportion of the companies that
use some kind of financial measure to evaluate their organization’s performance becomes
70% in both countries (37 companies in Hungary and 30 companies in Russia).
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So, this poor use of business terms may explain why so few Hungarian companies
actually indicated profit itself as their measure. That does not explain, however, why so
many Russian companies did. Or perhaps the reason is very similar. Regardless of its
seeming unimportance in the Soviet economic system, profit as a measure still existed in
the ‘old days’ and was one of those plan figures that enterprises had to fulfill. Andrew
Freris goes as far as to argue that profit played an important role: “Enterprises in the
Soviet Union do exercise a degree of control over the formation and execution of their
plans notwithstanding the degree of centralization of investment decision. Profits are an
important variable in the decision-making of the enterprise because they are a part of the
plan and also because they are the main source of bonuses.”13 In other words, it is just
one of those measures that the enterprises have carried through the transition from before,
because it fits the new system. In fact, 16 of the 26 Russian companies that use profit as
their measure used to be in state ownership and 1 company still is. Even though the
majority of the Hungarian companies that use profit are in private ownership and have
never been privatized (17 out of 20), we do not know how many of them existed in some
other form of ownership before the restructuring and, thus, cannot really make any
conclusions in this regard. One thing that does stand out about these Hungarian
respondents, though, is that the majority of them have not had any management training
(Table 7.5, Appendix 7).
Apart from the above mentioned differences, there are a number of countryspecific measures. Only Russian companies mentioned prices on their products, their
market share, the volume of goods stored in the warehouse, release of new types/models,

13

Andres Freris, The Soviet Industrial Enterprise: Theory and Practice (London & Sydney:
Croom Help, 1984), 26.
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social package, and the comfort of the workplace as their measures of organizational
performance. A larger proportion of the Hungarian companies use the quality of their
product and the quality of their services (whether they follow the deadlines or not) as
their measures (Table 10); and only Hungarian companies mentioned customer
satisfaction. In other words, besides using the volume of production and the volume of
sales, Hungarian companies by and large utilize market-based measures to assess the
work of their companies. Some of the Russian companies, on the other hand, still exhibit
some old habits, which are especially pronounced in such measures as the volume of
goods stored in the warehouse, number of new products released, and the social package.
Of the Russian companies that do not evaluate their performance, the majority
have less than 50 employees and come from towns with a population of less than 50,000
people; all of them are from the food, beverages, and tobacco industry (Table 7.4,
Appendix 7). All of the Russian companies, whose respondents have had some
management training, measure their organization’s performance; and it seems that the
younger the respondent the more likely his/her company to measure its performance – all
5 of the youngest Russian respondents’ companies measure it, only 12% of the
respondents between the ages of 35 and 45 are with the companies that do not (4 of 33),
and as much as 50% of the respondents between the ages of 45 and 55 work for
companies that do not measure their organization’s performance (4 out of 9 companies)
(Table 7.4, Appendix 7).
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Competitors
All of the Hungarian respondents indicated that their companies have competitors
on the market. Six (12%) of the Russian respondents either do not have any competitors
or they don’t know if they have any competitors; some of them explained that there was
no need for them to know that. Another 2 Russian respondents said that they did not care
if they had any competitors or not: “I never considered it. It does not matter to me;” “We
don't measure it. Don't even think about it. We have our niche on the market.” Even
though the proportion of these 8 companies overall is quite small (16%), they represent
the clearest example that we have seen so far of the communist legacies in the business
practices of the Russian respondents.
Thirty five percent of the Hungarian respondents and twenty four percent of the
Russian respondents indicated that it is very necessary for an organization in their
business environment to regularly evaluate its competitors’
performance/strengths/weaknesses/strategies (they marked an answer of 7 on a seven
point index) (Figure 1). Twenty three percent of the Hungarian respondents and forty
three percent of the Russian respondents said it is not necessary at all for an organization
in their business environment to regularly evaluate its competitors’
performance/strengths/weaknesses/strategies (they marked an answer of 1 on a seven
point index) (Figure 1). The distribution of the answers along the index is almost
identical for the two countries with the exception of category 5 –15% of the Hungarian
respondents marked answer 5 on a seven point index and only 8% of the Russian
respondents did (Figure 1). The t score of |2.2478| obtained from the t-test is statistically
significant
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Figure 1. Distribution of Responses to Question 17 “Is it necessary for an organization in your business
environment to have regular evaluation of its competitors’ performance/strengths/weaknesses/strategies?

Since the five categories in between 1 and 7 received fewer answers, I decided to
collapse the answers into fewer categories to see if I could get a better idea of the
distribution of the answers for each country. I created 4 categories out of the existing 7 as
follows: 1 remained unchanged, answers 2 and 3 were combined into category 2, answers
4 and 5 were combined into category 3, and answers 6 and 7 were combined into
category 4. The distribution of the answers in four categories by country is shown in
Figure 2.
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Figure 2. Distribution of Responses to Question 17 “Is it necessary for an organization in your business
environment to have regular evaluation of its competitors’ performance/strengths/weaknesses/strategies?
(the number on the bar is the number of responses)
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Running the t-test on the new variable by country shows again that the difference
between the two countries is statistically significant (we obtain a t score of |2.3106|).
What it tells us is that the Hungarian respondents are more likely to consider it necessary
to evaluate their competitors’ performance/strengths/weaknesses/strategies than the
Russian respondents. In fact, eighty one percent of the Hungarian companies evaluate
their competitors’ performance/strengths/weaknesses/strategies and only forty five
percent of the Russian companies do (Table 11).
Table 11. Distribution of Companies by Whether They Evaluate Their Competitors’
Performance/Strengths/Weaknesses/Strategies
Hungarian Respondents

Russian Respondents

Evaluate

44 (81%)

23 (45%)

Do not evaluate

10 (19 %)

28 (55%)

Total

54 (100%)

51 (100%)

The variation in the responses may not be contributed to some country specific
differences, though, as have been hypothesized, but rather to certain characteristics of the
respondents (companies as well as managers). Of the descriptive information available
some minor differences do appear between the respondents that gave different answers,
but they are mainly confined to the differences between the respondents of the same
country (Table 7.6, Appendix 7). What is at issue is whether respondents with certain
characteristics systematically display similar behavior regardless of their country of
origin. For example, a large proportion of the Russian respondents that did not think it
was necessary for them to evaluate their competitors’
performance/strengths/weaknesses/strategies had never had any management training (20
of 22 respondents, Table 7.6, Appendix 7). This suggests that the management training of
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the manager influences the company’s market orientation. At the same time there is
practically no difference between the Hungarian respondents that have had some
management training and the ones that have not had any (Table 7.6, Appendix 7). This, in
turn, suggests that that characteristic alone is not enough to explain the differences in the
respondents’ behavior and that there is something about Russia that sets the two groups
of mangers apart (the ones that have had management training and the ones that have
not), which is not present in Hungary.
A few other suggestions found in the data are the larger the company, the more
likely it is to perceive it necessary to pay attention to its competitors (more than 20
employees in the Hungarian case and more than 50 employees in the Russian case); and
the older the respondent the less likely he or she is to perceive it necessary to pay
attention to his/her company’s competitors (above 55 in the Hungarian case and above 45
in the Russian case) (Table 7.6, Appendix 7). In fact, if we look at the distribution of the
companies that do evaluate their competitors’
performance/strengths/weaknesses/strategies and those that do not, a larger number of the
Russian companies that employ less than 50 employees do not (Table 7.7, Appendix 7).
In Hungary, though, the companies that employ less than 20 employees make up the
biggest proportion of the companies that do not evaluate their competitors; but even a
much larger number of the companies with the same number of employees do (Table 7.7,
Appendix 7). In other words, there is a much more significant difference between the
companies of different sizes in Russia than in Hungary, which again brings us back to
some country specific differences rather than cross-country ones. The same holds true for
the age of the respondent: a larger proportion of the Russian respondents 45 years or
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older do not evaluate their competitors, but in the Hungarian case the difference is not
there (Table 7.7, Appendix 7).
One concern, again, is probably the fact that 14 of the 22 Russian companies that
did not think it was necessary to evaluate their competitors are from the food, beverages,
and tobacco industry, and that 16 of the 24 companies from that industry do not do any
kind of evaluation of their competitors (Table 7.7, Appendix 7). Otherwise, even though
the data suggest some possible explanations as to what makes a company more market
oriented in regards to paying attention to its competitors, there is no strong evidence that
the differences are indeed attributed to some company specific characteristics rather than
some country specific ones.
Two of the Russian respondents, whose companies do not evaluate their
competitors, indicated that they would like to do it or would be interested in it, but that
their companies do not have anything in place to perform any kind of evaluation. Two
other Russian companies and two Hungarian companies explained their ‘no’ answers by
the fact that they have enough work and, thus, there is no reason to worry about
competition: “We don't really measure it. We keep an eye on the others, but we don't
really care about them; we just work as much as we can, because we have work. If we
didn't have work, then we'd surely envy them” (a Hungarian respondent); “It is
meaningless; we are doing our work, which is the most important” (a Hungarian
respondent); “Don’t do it. We have enough orders” (a Russian respondent). Two
Hungarian companies and one Russian company said that it is simply impossible to
evaluate their competitors, and so they do not do it. One Russian company indicated that
their competitor is not really a competitor, but rather more like a partner: “We talk to
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each other, discuss technology. There is probably only one company in our town that we
can consider a competitor; the rest are just private people. They work alone. With this
one company we have a kind of a ‘gentleman’s’ agreement - we try not to cross each
other's paths. We are more like partners.”
Table 12. Methods That Respondents Use To Evaluate Their Competitors’ Performance / Strengths /
Weaknesses / Strategies (percent of companies that evaluate their competitors’ performance / strengths /
weaknesses / strategies - 44 in Hungary and 23 in Russia; totals add up to more than 100%, because some
companies use more than one method).
Methods the respondents use to evaluate their competitors’
performance / strengths / weaknesses / strategies

Hungarian
Respondents

Russian
Respondents

Industrial Espionage.

0

1 (4%)

Marketing department does it.

0

8 (35%)

Competitors’ reports; reports of a market-research company.

3 (7%)

0

We study/research the market; we monitor their prices, their volume of
production, their volume of sales; we analyze their market share.

12 (27%)

6 (26%)

We evaluate our competitors through their products

13 (30%)

2 (8%)

Info from customers/sellers/other people about our competitors

14 (32%)

2 (8%)

Personal conversations/relations/connections with competitors

10 (23%)

1 (4%)

Indirectly through the opinion of our customers about us, through our
volume of sales, through our profit, by monitoring if we are loosing any
customers.

6 (14%)

3 (13%)

Through info out there; going through paper ads; observations.

7 (15%)

2 (8%)

No specific methods

0

1 (4%)

The companies that do evaluate their competitors’
performance/strengths/weaknesses/strategies use different kinds of methods (Table 12).
There are a number of differences between the two countries. First, even though fewer
Russian companies evaluate their competitors’
performance/strengths/weaknesses/strategies, most of those that do either have a
marketing department that takes care of it (8 companies or 35%) or they do some kind of
market research and analyze their competitors’ prices, sales, and market share (6
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companies or 26%) (Table 12): “We mainly analyze the prices of our competitors - we go
to them pretending we are potential customers and ask what kind of products they offer
and at what price; sometimes we take some ideas from them, if we see something we
like;” “Through secondary sources about the volume of sales of our competitors.”
Five of the companies that rely on their marketing departments did not want to
give out any more information besides the fact that their Marketing department does it
explaining that it is confidential; one other respondent simply said that he did not know
how exactly the marketing department did it. In other words, it is not clear just how much
of an actual evaluation of their competitors those companies do, because the respondents
could not explain it. As was the case earlier in the analysis, these 8 are big companies
(one company employs between 50 and 99 people and the rest employ more than 100
people) and the majority of them (5) used to belong to the state but have been privatized
with one other still in state ownership.
None of the Hungarian companies indicated that they have a marketing
department. Some of them (12 companies or 27%) do perform some kind of market
research, though: “We pay attention to what the competitor has done in the previous
month, what new products it has introduced, what size of the market share it has taken
over, for instance, weather it lured a big customer away from us – we watch it jealously.
We also watch financial reports, commercial data monthly, and there are serious reports
in every quarter.” The majority of the Hungarian respondents either gathers information
about their competitors from their customers/resellers/other people (14 companies or
32%) or focus on their competitors’ products (13 companies or 30%) (Table 12):
I measure it through customers' opinion. There is a meeting for … teachers twice
a year: one is for the primary school … teachers and the other one is for the

Karapetyan, Zinaida, 2005, UMSL, p 212

secondary school teachers. We participate in these meetings as exhibitors. And if
a … teacher comes to us for a talk, then we become aware of the work of our
competitors.
We divided the market with our competitors. They produce plastic tools, we
produce metal tools. We are a company in … but we have had purchase orders
even from Miskolc and Kiskunhalas. From Nyíregyháza through
Hajduböszörmény to Ártánd we have a good relationship with everyone. And I
get information from many contractors. I give information as well of course and
that is why I can always know who is doing which work and what my competitor
is doing the current day. This is a very open market.
We gather information about the competitor’s products via conversations with
other managers. Also, we can examine them once they are out on the market.

About the same proportion of respondents in both countries use the performance
of their own company as an indirect indicator of how their competitors are doing (6 or
14% of the Hungarian companies and 3 or 13 % of the Russian companies, Table 12):
“We don’t have particular methods, generally we draw conclusions from the changes in
the number of our partners - i.e. if we loose a business partner, it means he/she went to
someone else, and vice versa” (a Hungarian businessperson); “We talk to our customers
about our company and the quality of our product. The idea is that if they choose us, it
means we are better; in other words, their evaluation of us is an indirect indicator of how
our competitors are doing” (a Russian respondent).
To summarize, measured numerically, the Hungarian companies do appear to be
more market oriented when it comes to evaluating their competitors, because a much
greater number of them perform some kind of an evaluation. Substantively, however, the
respondents in both countries use quite similar methods with a number of Russian
companies even demonstrating a more advanced approach by having a marketing
department to carry out the task.
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Quality of the Product
The differences between the two countries become even more pronounced as we
move to the set of questions dealing with the comparison of a company’s own products
with those of its competitors. Sixty-five percent of the Hungarian respondents and only
twenty-eight percent of the Russian respondents gave an answer of 7 to question 18 “Is it
necessary for an organization in your business environment to regularly evaluate its
products’ quality vis-a-vis its competitors’ products’ quality?” (Figure 3). Thirty-five
percent of the Russian respondents indicated that it is not necessary at all (as compared to
only 11 percent of the Hungarian respondents) (Figure 3). The t-score of |4.4290| of the ttest comparing the two distributions indicates that the difference between them is indeed
statistically significant.
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Figure 3. Distribution of Responses to Question 18 “Is it necessary for an organization in your business
environment to regularly evaluate its products’ quality vis-à-vis its competitors’ products’ quality?” (the
number on the bar is the number of responses)

An analysis of the respondents’ characteristics shows similar trends as before. All
six Hungarian respondents that do not consider it necessary to compare their products to
their competitors’ products have fewer than 20 employees (Table 7.8, Appendix 7). A
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larger proportion of the Russian companies that consider it important have more than 50
employees (Table 7.8, Appendix 7). Half of the Russian companies that gave an answer
of 1 are in the food, beverages, and tobacco industry (Table 7.8, Appendix 7). A larger
proportion of the Russian respondents over 45 years old think that it is not necessary to
perform any kind of comparison of their company’s products with those of their
competitors (Table 7.8, Appendix 7). Management training of the respondent shows
practically no influence on this question (Table 7.8, Appendix 7).
Forty-seven percent of the Russian respondents and only nine percent of the
Hungarian respondents do not compare their company’s products with their competitors’
products (Table 13). The t score of |4.7314| tells us again that the difference between the
two distributions is statistically significant
Table 13. Distribution of Companies by Whether They Evaluate Their Products’ Quality Vis-À-Vis
Their Competitors’ Products’ Quality
Hungarian Respondents

Russian Respondents

Evaluate

49 (91%)

27 (53%)

Do not evaluate

5 (9%)

24 (47%)

Total

54 (100%)

51 (100%)

Four of the five Hungarian respondents that do not perform any kind of
comparison of their product with that of their competitors’ have fewer than 20 employees
(Table 7.9, Appendix 7). A larger proportion of the Russian companies that does have 50
or more employees, and the majority of the companies with 50 or more employees do
(Table 7.9, Appendix 7). Finally, a larger proportion of the Russian managers over 45
years old do not compare their products’ quality with the quality of their competitors’
products (Table 7.9, Appendix 7). The results are very nonsystematic, however, and do
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not provide a stable ground for concluding if any of those characteristics significantly
influence the respondents’ answers.
Four of the Russian respondents whose companies do not do any evaluation of the
quality of their products vis-à-vis the quality of their competitors’ products, said that they
do not do it, because the products are all the same everywhere and you can only compete
with providing better prices or more or better services. One of the Hungarian respondents
said:” We all know how to do our job – we buy the same materials, use the same
equipment.” Two other Russian respondents said that they simply let the customer make
the decision whose product is better: “Don't do it. It's important, but we don't do
anything; we let the customer choose the producer (according to the price/quality
criteria).”
Table 14. Methods That Companies Use to Evaluate Their Products’ Quality Vis-À-Vis Their
Competitors’ Products’ Quality (percent of companies that evaluate their products’ quality vis-a-vis their
competitors’ products’ quality - 49 in Hungary and 27 in Russia; totals add up to more than 100%,
because some companies use more than one method)
Methods that companies use to evaluate their products’ quality
vis-à-vis their competitors’ products’ quality
More or less structured analysis: buying products, taking them
apart, etc.

Hungarian
Respondents

Russian
respondents

2 (4%)

13 (48%)

Some kind of analysis: comparing products by looking at them, etc.

13 (27%)

1 (4%)

Indirectly through the measures of our performance: volume of
sales of own products; if we don’t have enough work; if we loose
a customer, etc.

6 (12%)

4 (15%)

Talking to customers about competitors’ products

2 (4%)

3 (11%)

Watching the quality of our own products

31 (63%)

2 (7%)

Experience

4 (8%)

3 (11%)

Done by our parent company

1 (2%)

0

No particular method

0

1 (4%)

Respondents’ answers to the question of how their company evaluates its
products’ quality vis-à-vis its competitors’ products’ quality show some interesting
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results. The predominant number of the Russian companies (48% or 13 companies)
compare the two by performing some kind of what I will call a structured analysis of their
competitors’ products - buying them, taking them apart, analyzing their characteristics:
“We buy our competitors' products, take them apart, analyze their technology, determine
bad and good qualities, sometimes take some of their ideas into consideration;” “We have
a lab that compares the characteristics of our products with the characteristics of our
competitors’ products.” Only 4% (2) of the Hungarian companies do so, with another
27% performing some kind of analysis: “Of course we compare… Talking… But we
only compare how the product looks;” “By comparing them together in quality and price
[by looking at them].”
The majority of the Hungarian companies (63%) that said that they evaluate their
products’ quality vis-a-vis their competitors’ products’ quality in reality do not perform
any comparative analysis, but rather make sure that the quality of their products is good,
meets certain standards, or that their customers are satisfied with it (Table 14): “We
produce the product of the best possible quality; there is no other way; this is out of the
question. If somebody cannot afford our honest and clean-handed work, he is not our
guy;” “It is built in the working process through the control points. It is always active.
We filter out damaged products through the process of the work sections. At the end of
this process a quality assurance inspector checks the product again.”
About the same proportion of companies in both countries compare their
products’ quality with their competitors’ products’ quality indirectly through their
companies’ performance: “We can feel it if we don't have enough work to do; we become
suspicious that we did something wrong” (a Hungarian respondent); “We can sense it by
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getting new orders and work, or not” (a Hungarian respondent); “We measure it by the
volume of sale of our own products (if we sell a large quantity of our products, it means
that our quality is better)” (a Russian respondent); “People that buy our products
wholesale tell us how much of our products get sold as opposed to our competitors'
products” (a Russian respondent).
To summarize, the Hungarian respondents appear more market oriented than the
Russian respondents, because a much larger number of them compares their products’
quality with their competitors’ products’ quality. The Russian companies that perform
any kind of a comparison, however, often use more advanced techniques than the
Hungarian companies do.

Customer Satisfaction
Seventy four percent of the Hungarian respondents (40 companies) consider it
very necessary to regularly evaluate their customers’ satisfaction (they gave an answer of
7 on a seven-point index, Figure 4). That compared to only 21% of the Russian
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respondents (11 companies, Figure 4). Only about 5% of the Hungarian respondents and
almost 40% of the Russian respondents gave an answer of 1 – not necessary at all (Figure
4). The t score of |6.9317| tells us that the difference in the two distributions is
statistically significant.
All 20 Russian respondents that gave an answer of 1 had never had any
management training (Table 7.10, Appendix 7). Seventeen of those companies used to be
in state ownership, but have been privatized, and 14 are in the food, beverages, and
tobacco business (Table 7.10, Appendix 7). Nothing particular stands out about the
Hungarian respondents in either case (Table 7.10, Appendix 7).
Ninety-six percent of the Hungarian companies regularly evaluate their
customers’ satisfaction (Table 15). That compared to only forty-seven percent of the
Russian respondents (Table 15). The t-test yields a t score of |6.6904|, which tells us that
the two distributions are statistically different.
Table 15. Distribution of Companies by Whether They Measure Their Customers’ Satisfaction or Not
Hungary

Russia

Measure

52 (96%)

24 (47%)

Do not Measure

2 (4%)

27 (53%)

Total

54 (100%)

51 (100%)

The distributions of the Russian companies that measure their customers’
satisfaction and those that do not show some differences, but the differences are very
minor and insignificant (Table 7.11, Appendix 7). The only major concern still stems
from the fact that a larger proportion of the Russian companies from the food, beverages,
and tobacco industry do not measure their customers’ satisfaction (Table 7.11, Appendix
7). A large number of the companies from this industry group still do, though, which
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makes it difficult to assume that the over-representation of this industry in the responses
is significantly affecting the results in this case.
A number of the Russian respondents that said that their company does not
evaluate its customers’ satisfaction made references to a number of measures that other
companies considered as measures of customer satisfaction. For example, four of these
Russian companies use the volume of their sales or their company’s profit as their only
measure for everything; as can be seen in Table 16 a number of other respondents put
these measures as their measures of customer satisfaction. Another example would be the
companies that do not measure their customers’ satisfaction, but believe that if their
customers come back to them, they are satisfied, or that talk to their customers and listen
to their opinion. The reason that these answers were not included in the following
analysis is because the respondents themselves did not consider them as measures of
customer satisfaction.
One of the two Hungarian companies that do not evaluate their customers’
satisfaction believes that it is not necessary:” It’s not worthy to evaluate it, because
Hungarian customers don’t have much money, they have weak purchasing power and
only cheap products can be sold. People aren't interested in quality.” This opinion stands
alone as the rest of the Hungarian respondents demonstrated that it was important to their
companies to know if their customers were satisfied with their work or not.
Overall, two methods appear to dominate the answers in both countries – the use
of questionnaires or surveys, and personal communications with customers (Table 16).
The respondents from both countries also equally use some measures of their
organization’s performance and complaints or the quality of their product as an indirect
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Table 16. Distribution of Companies by Methods That They Use to Measure Their Customers’
Satisfaction

Customer satisfaction questionnaire; surveys

Hungarian
Respondents
18 (35%)

Russian
Respondents
8 (33%)

From talking to customers

30 (58%)

10 (42%)

Amount of orders, sales statistics, company’s profit

7 (13%)

5 (21%)

Checking quality/complaints

7 (13%)

3 (13%)

If the customer comes back or not/if we keep the contract or not

6 (12%)

0

Other

2 (4%)

2 (8%)

measure of their customers’ satisfaction: “We monitor certain characteristics of our
products; the idea is that if the measurements of those characteristics are good, which
means the quality is good, then, we assume, the customer will be happy” (a Russian
respondent); “We can guess it from the responses, and the amount and content of the
orders” (a Hungarian respondent); “We produce for other companies and when we
deliver the product the customer examines the product by randomly picking one and then
gives a response (if the product is good or not) through the records. We also have to
adhere to a certain Hungarian standard” (a Hungarian respondent); “We work closely
with people that sell our products and they monitor the volume of sales of our products.
We monitor what product sells better and what product doesn't sell as well; some
products disappear instantly; this is how the main product lines develop” (a Russian
respondent).
Only Hungarian respondents (6 respondents or 12%) measure how satisfied their
customers are by whether they come back or not – “We don’t use questionnaires or
similar things at all. It happens through personal discussions; the customer lets me know
if something is not in order or if there is a problem. If he doesn’t say anything, but
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doesn’t return either, that’s a warning to me, too;” “We can measure it by the customer’s
response, there are no questionnaires. We usually work for other companies, and if we
aren’t good enough for them, we are simply replaced by another one.”

Conclusion
One common trend surfaced from the analysis of all the questions discussed
above - the results of the quantitative analysis of “yes and no” and index questions
portray the Hungarian respondents as more market oriented than the Russian respondents,
but the qualitative inquiry into their answers draws a more complex picture. Fewer
Russian companies indeed exhibit market-oriented behavior than the Hungarian
companies, but those that do often use more advanced methods in their work – for
example, having a Marketing Department to evaluate their competitors, or using profit as
the main measure of their organization’s performance, or undertaking a more thorough
and complex comparison of the quality of their product with that of their competitors’.
Company and respondent characteristics overall have no or little influence on the
variation of the responses across the countries with only one concern persistently present
throughout the analysis – a large proportion of the Russian companies that are less
market-oriented come from the food, beverages, and tobacco industry. These results and
their implications are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 8.
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CHAPTER 7
INFLUENCE OF THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT
The analysis in this chapter focuses on three main topics: 1) outside factors that
assist the respondents in their work; 2) outside constraints that create obstacles to their
work; and 3) political and economic events the respondents think have had an influence
on their business environment and their jobs as managers.

External Positive Factors
Seventy three percent of the Russian respondents (37 companies) did not think
that there were any external factors that helped their organization achieve its goals or
execute its plans, or that simply positively affected their organization’s performance
(Table 1). In contrast, sixty five percent of the Hungarian companies could identify some
elements of their environment as positive (Table 1).
Table 1. Distribution of Companies by Whether There Are Any External Factors That Positively
Affect Them
Hungary

Russia

Yes

35 (65%)

14 (27%)

No

19 (35%)

37 (73%)

Total

54 (100%)

51 (100%)

There is no overall systematic difference between the respondents that gave
different answers with one exception - fifty percent of the Russian respondents that could
not identify anything positive about their external environment were in the food,
beverages, and tobacco industry (Table 8.1, Appendix 8). Furthermore, the majority of
the companies from that industry group (19 of 24 or 79% of 24) did not think there was
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anything positive in their external environment that helped them in their work (Table 8.1,
Appendix 8).
The most often mentioned positive factors by the Russian companies were
seasons/holidays (4 companies), economic instability or crises (3 companies), and some
kind of market-related factors (3 companies) (Table 2). The companies that benefit from
economic instability are the ones whose product becomes a necessity when people get
poorer:”Economic instability - people buy more bread.” The market related factors
mentioned by the three Russian companies were the growing demand for their product,
orders from their customers, and growth/development of their product-specific market.
In contrast, market-related factors dominated the answers of the Hungarian
companies (17 companies or 49%, Table 2). The most prevalent of these were good
business contacts, good business partners, and having good relationship with business
partners (10 companies or 29%): “Good work of domestic suppliers, their correct
behavior and exact delivery after agreement. [Interviewer: they depend on domestic
suppliers; everyone who works with them has to be on time and organized, and that's how
their partners are; they contract with only the best.];” “Yes, there are. Business contacts
have a huge share in this. It’s important to know who you make contracts with;” “We are
working together with an office furniture studio, so the work is satisfactorily harmonized
thanks to mutual interests;” “There is another company like ours in [a different town],
who can be considered as a competitor but in reality it is not exactly true. We often help
each other out (for example with transportation).”
One striking difference between the respondents from the two countries appears
in their perception of the degree of positive influence that the political sphere has on their
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Table 2. Positive External Factors (percent of companies that could identify some positive factors –
35 in Hungary and 13 in Russia; totals do not add up to 100%, because some companies mentioned
more than one factor in their answers)
Positive external factors

Hungary

Political

17 (49%)

1

Russia
2 (14%)

political situation/environment

3 (9%)

1 (7%)

government decisions

2 (6%)

0

government programs

2 (6%)

0

government assistance (including in-kind)

6 (17%)

1 (7%)

tenders

5 (14%)

Economic
economic situation/environment

5 (15%)

0

instability/crises

0

3 (21%)

bank credit/loans

2 (6%)

2 (14%)

external factors (foreign markets, exchange rate)

4 (11%)

1 (7%)

taxes

0

1 (7%)

17 (49%)

3 (21%)

business contacts / business partners

10 (29%)

0

customers

3 (9%)

0

EU membership

2 (6%)

0

Seasons/Holidays

0

4 (28%)

4 (11%)

3 (21%)

Market
Including:

Other
1

2

One respondent mentioned both government assistance and tenders in his/her answer.
This group included factors that were mentioned once or twice by different companies and could not
be categorized anywhere else.
2
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businesses. Forty-nine percent (17) of the Hungarian respondents that could identify
some positive external factors attributed certain things to the good political situation
overall or good government programs and decisions, or was appreciative of certain
government assistance including tenders:1 “We have been doing this program for years,
which is motivating. Furthermore we take part in the Ministry and Union support
programs. This system motivates us;” “Yes, the governmental donations [subsidies,
financial assistance] are very important and the donations [subsidies, financial assistance]
of the Labour Center;” “Other factors are the tendering possibilities - though these
heavily depend on different friendships, connections, and interests, one may have.”
In contrast, only 2 Russian companies associated something positive with their
political environment. One of them benefits from some kind of government assistance –
“Sometimes the government gives away some equipment;” the other one thinks that the
political environment overall is helping their work - ” Yes, political - the government and
students' parents are paying more attention to literature/books ["show more interest in
literature/books"]; [as a result] the demand for textbooks is growing.”
Interestingly enough, only two Hungarian respondents2 mentioned European
Union membership and its possible positive consequences as a factor, which, given the
significance of the event, is not what one would expect: “I hope that after we join the
European Union the government will work better and corruption won’t be as bad. It is
much better here in Hungary if we compare ourselves to Ukraine; but if we compare
1

It seems that because of the language specifics or for some other reason what the translators
translated as “tenders” was always referring to some kind of financial support from the government that
either did not have to be paid back or that had “beneficial” terms of payment.
2

One other company mentioned the emergence of new markets as a positive factor, but the
respondent did not clarify if he meant the markets of the European Union or something else and, thus, the
answer was only coded in the market-related factors.

Karapetyan, Zinaida, 2005, UMSL, p 226

ourselves to Austria, for example, Hungary takes place of Ukraine;” “Yes: Possibilities
for developing to EU tenders.”

External Constraints
From the fact that Hungary at the time of the survey was already a sure candidate
for the membership in the European Union and from the general knowledge about the
two countries, one would expect Hungary to have a much healthier and business
friendlier political and economic environment than Russia. One, therefore, would expect
fewer Hungarian businesspeople to complain about external factors impeding their work.
The results of the survey portray a completely different picture. Ninety-one percent of the
Hungarian businesses could identify some negative traits of their environment, and that
compared to only fifty-one percent of the Russian respondents (Table 3).
Table 3. Distribution of Companies by Whether There Are Any External Constraints
External Constraints

Hungary

Russia

Yes

49 (91%)

26 (51%)

No

5 (9%)

25 (49%)

Total

54 (100%)

51 (100%)

Overall, nothing in particular distinguishes these respondents from the rest (Table
8.2, Appendix 8). The majority of the Russian companies that face constraints are from
Saratov (18 of 26) and, as usual, a larger proportion of the Russian companies from the
food, beverages, and tobacco industry gave a no answer – i.e., they do not face any
constraints in their work (15 of 24) (Table 8.2, Appendix 8).
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Table 4. Distribution of Companies by External Constraints (percent of companies that could identify
some constraints – 49 in Hungary and 26 in Russia; totals do not add up to 100%, because some
companies mentioned more than one constraint in their answers)
External constraints

Hungary

Russia

political situation

1 (2%)

3 (12%)

bureaucracy

4 (8%)

0

laws; government policies and regulations

10 (20%)

4 (15%)

lack or insufficient government assistance

7 (14%)

1 (4%)

economic situation

3 (6%)

2 (8%)

high prices

4 (8%)

0

economic instability

0

3 (12%)

bank credits/loans, interest rates

4 (8%)

2 (8%)

economic regulations

7 (14%)

1 (4%)

taxes

19 (39%)

3 (12%)

External factors (foreign markets, etc.)

6 (12%)

3 (12%)

Mention of European Union or EU requirements

6 (12%)

0

Market –related

20 (41%)

7 (27%)

business contacts

5 (10%)

1 (4%)

competition

12 (24%)

4 (15%)

1 (2%)

7 (27%)

11 (22%)

4 (15%)

Political

Economic

Including:

Seasons
Other

1

1

This group included factors that were mentioned once or twice by different companies and could not
be categorized anywhere else.

Forty one percent of the Hungarian companies and twenty seven percent of the
Russian companies identified what I coded as market-originated obstacles to their work:
“Yes, the lack of regular orders - a safety net, so to speak (when we belonged to the state,
we had regular/scheduled orders - and now we have to find orders ourselves)” (a Russian
respondent); “We constantly have to keep up with the demands of potential customers -
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demands that are constantly changing” (a Russian respondent); “Yes. I have to admit that
the Hungarian industrial market is totally sinking. It is in a very bad condition and that is
one of the greatest disadvantages. There is no consuming power and that is especially
true for the East-Hungarian Region.” In addition, half of the respondents in both
countries that mentioned market-related impediments, viewed competition as a negative
force: “There are a lot of smaller shops that take orders/customers away from us” (a
Russian company); “Yes, a lot of cheap Chinese product, the home product looses
market” (a Hungarian company); “There is too big baking capacity for our market, which
is a result of the governmental donation in 1996. There is too much product for the
market, which affects prices” (a Hungarian respondent); “Competition – they bring bad
quality product from Ukraine and sell to my customers” (a Hungarian respondent); “The
cheap merchandise from the Far-East also belongs here. We can’t compete with them in
price and quality (Chinese, etc.)” (a Hungarian respondent). One Russian respondent
expressed his dissatisfaction with the presence of imported product as well, but when
asked if he was referring to his competition corrected himself and said that he views
competition as a positive factor:
Respondent: May be the product that is brought in from abroad; they bring them
in large quantities; their quality is surely better.
Interviewer: Are you talking about competition?
Respondent: Yes. But I view competition positively. If there is competition, you
want to work better, provide better quality.
Whereas seasons and holidays are what bothers the Russian respondents on par
with the market-related factors, the Hungarian respondents are troubled by high taxes: “
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Yes. Taxes3 paid to bureaucrats. It is all right that there are obligations to pay for, to some
degree, but these taxes are too much for us, little companies;” “Yes, payments [to the
government] destroy companies and it is difficult to develop;” “The sum of all taxes that
we have to pay is quite high. We could handle them separately, but all together they take
the majority of our profit; not much is left for us.” Some Russian companies did mention
taxes as a burden, but very few and mainly as the fact that they are constantly changing:
”Constantly changing taxes;” “shuffling of taxes from the federal level to the regional
level and vice versa; tax rates;” “taxes and tax laws are constantly changing.”
As was the case with positive factors discussed previously, the Hungarian
respondents could identify quite a few political or government related factors this time
bringing obstacles to their work. Imperfect laws, bad government policies, and burdening
government regulations seem to be the first on the list of those. Though coded separately,
economic regulations fall into this same group as well, because they are imposed by the
government and depend on who is in the office: “The national economic policies are such
an obstacle (we produce for export, which is very sensible to the changes of the Forint
[Hungary’s national currency]). Although the current economic policy can be considered
good, usually it can’t be predicted;” “The negative effects of financial regulations, taxes,
and social insurance measures. Besides these there are the administrational difficulties
(authorizations), bureaucracy, and the state decrees, which are holding back private
companies always looking for more and more money;” “These are obligatory restrictions.
Many people can live quite well with these “laws”, but we (and the small companies) can

3

In this and some other responses the translation has been altered from the original to replace
words like ‘privations,’ ‘prices,’ ‘attachments,’ which, as translators explained, denoted different kinds of
taxes, with the word “taxes.”
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easily perish from them: licensing regulations, taxes; etc.;” “The restrictive regulations
issued by the state, and the new laws connected to joining the European Union. [The
interviewer: these regulations mostly refer to the taxation, which is unjustifiably high for
Hungarian companies, compared to foreign ones, so they have a multiple disadvantage.
The E.U. laws refer to the quality-increasing demands, so the quality of products has to
fulfill the European standards].”
A number of other Hungarian companies mentioned the changes that have been
made to meet the EU requirements as negative as well: “Withdrawal of the tax allowance
(because of the EU membership) has influenced our views quite disadvantageously. This
is a typical Hungarian problem: they gave them for 10 years, and now things must be
reformed. The company lost a lot – respectively will lose from joining the EU;” “There is
uncertainty because of the EU requirements, and fear because of the inflow of EU
companies. The latter has already begun, and strong competition has emerged.” Given the
small number of companies that talked about the EU membership in either negative or
positive factors probably reveals that the other problems that their companies face
everyday outweigh, at least at this point, any problems that may arise as a result of
joining the European Union. I return to this topic below.
Of the political factors mentioned by the few Russian respondents the political
situations in the country in general and imperfect and frequently changing legislation
were the main concerns: “Laws always change; the political system/regime in the country
is not stable; there are difficulties with tax laws; our life is unpredictable...”
Finally, quite a few Hungarian companies were dissatisfied with the withdrawal
of government financial assistance (subsidies in some cases) or the lack of government
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financial or other kind of support in general; one complaint that came up quite often
during interviews, though was only voiced by two people here, is the preferential
treatment that multinational companies get from the government, often at the expense of
local businesses: “The city gives no support at all. The tenders are self-interested, unfair
(the government publishes them and multinational companies get them.). The smaller,
private companies get very little support;” “Lack of state support (multinational
companies get it).” After one interview a respondent became much more talkative and
gave an example of when a multinational company was opening a new store in their
town, “everybody” went to the grand opening (by “everybody” the respondent meant the
city officials and all the important people), but when their company had its grand
opening, no one showed up, because it was just a Hungarian company.
At this point the responses of the Russian companies require comment. Even
though some of them mentioned various factors like constantly changing laws, imperfect
legislation, bad government policies, and unstable economic or political situation as
drawbacks of their environment, nothing in the overall distribution of the responses
stands out as a major constraint that Russian companies in general have to face in their
work. Moreover, more than a third of the Russian respondents (20 companies or 39
percent) altogether did not think that there were any outside factors that helped their
companies nor that there were any outside constraints that presented obstacles to their
work (as compared to only 3 Hungarian companies).4 In other words, what these
companies were saying was that there was nothing in their external environment that
either positively or negatively upset their equilibrium point (their normal state of being).

4

The majority (12) of these 20 companies are in the food, beverages, and tobacco industry group.
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Combined with the comparatively low number of companies that could pinpoint at some
external constraints, one would be led to conclude that Russian businesses overall just
face a much healthier and business-friendlier environment than Hungarian businesses.
Whereas the lack of positive factors may not be so strange – after all the country is still
going through some tough times, the lack of outside constraints is very odd, especially
considering how much has been written about various problems that Russian
businesspeople regularly encounter from their external environment.5 What we may be
seeing here is either the desire to intentionally overlook that any problems exist, because
of the old-time habit of making things look good even if they are not, or an unconscious
lack of understanding that problems exist, because they have been a part of the business
life for so long that they have become the norm. This is considered in more detail in
Chapter 8.

Political and Economic Events
Remarkably, we see the same tendency in the respondents’ perception of whether
there have been any political or economic events that have had an influence on their
business environment and their work or not. Half of the Hungarian respondents pointed at
the change of the regime in 1989 as one of those major events, whereas none of the
Russian respondents even used the words “regime change” in their answers (Table 5).
‘Perestroika’ – the event that the West sees as the policy that ‘started it all’ – was only
mentioned by 2 Russian managers (Table 5). Probably the closest to the regime change in

5

See, for example, Sheila M. Puffer, Daniel J. McCarthy, and Olga Chudakova Peterson,
“Navigating the Hostile Maze: A Framework for Russian Entrepreneurship,” The Academy of Management
Executive 15, no. 4 (Nov 2001): 24-38.
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Table 5. Political and Economic Factors That Have Had an Influence on the Respondents’ Business
Environment (percent of total)
Political/economic events

Hungary

Russia

27 (50%)

0

Overall political changes
Change of the regime
Perestroika (Russia)

2 (4%)

Putsch of 1991 (Russia)

8 (16%)

Economic changes
When state financing ended
Privatization

1

Establishment of private companies/ownership

0

3 (6%)

5 (9%)

4 (8%)

2 (4%)

0

Crisis of 1998 (Russia)

23 (45%)

Establishment of / shift towards market economy

2 (4%)

1 (2%)

Every election

1 (2%)

3 (6%)

Change of cabinet/government in general

5 (9%)

0

9 (17%)

2 (4%)

0

2 (4%)

Government changes

Policies of the current national government

2

When the current local government took office
3

Joining the European Union (Hungary)

10 (19%)

No Change/Can’t think of anything

6 (11%)

11 (22%)

2 (4%)

0

8 (15%)

7 (14%)

4

No answer
Other
1

5

One of the Hungarian responses coded here read “the period of owner-changes.” Since privatization
was not the only process of owner-changes in Hungary and was widely accompanied by the buy-outs of
companies from cooperative ownership, it is not clear which process the respondent meant. The answer
was coded in this category, because the emphasis here is on the shift of ownership from “old” owners to
“new” and not on how it was done.
2
The government of Péter Medgyessy in the case of Hungary and the government of Vladimir Putin in
the Russian case. Answers that were coded in this category either clearly indicated that the respondent
was talking about the current national government (e.g. saying “Putin” or “current government”) or
indirectly referred to the policies of the current government by linking the changes to the years after the
current government came to power.
3
Some of the answers that were included in this category associated joining the European Union with
2004 – the year when the country was to vote on the issue; some of the answers, though, when talking
about the EU membership associated it with the years after the current national government took office.
4
These two answers were obtained by mail; the respondents refused to answer the questions of part III
of the survey even when they were subsequently called on the phone.
5
This category included events that were only mentioned once, for example: 88 – new tax system;
government’s donation in 1995-1996 to our industry as a result of which a lot of our competitors were
established; new laws; rise of oil prices in 2001
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Hungary in Russia was the putsch of 1991 – the event, a few months after which the
Soviet Union was dismantled and the one-party system was replaced by a multi-party
system. Still, only 8 (16%) of all Russian respondents saw it as something that had had an
important influence on their business environment (Table 5). The crisis of 1998 – or as
most of the respondents called it “the default” – appears to be by far the most important
event for Russian businesses (23 companies or 45% of all Russian respondents mentioned
it, Table 5).

Change of the Regime
Not surprisingly, the majority of the Hungarian respondents that indicated the
change of the regime as an important event in their business lives, thought that it had a
significant influence (answers 5, 6, and 7 on a seven-point index) on their local business
environment (89% of the 27 respondents), their jobs (89%), the skills that are required to
perform their jobs (82%), and on the relationship between government and businesses
(85%) (Figure 1).
In the respondents’ explanations about how the change of the regime influenced
their business environment the positive responses were predominantly related to the fact
that the market became more open, people were provided an opportunity to establish their
own business, and there is more professional freedom in general:
We gained many more and bigger possibilities after the change; the market
opened significantly (earlier only the state companies could deliver to foreign
countries). The possibilities for businesses have grown to a great extent.
I think that the changes were positive because I could start my own business, my
own Ltd. There are many in my business environment who have the same
opinion.
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The establishment of private company forms, because as a manager I was allowed
to form a part of activities of the company according to my own ideas.

Influence on local business environment*

1 – no influence 7 – to a great extent

12

Influence on the job of a manager*

12

10

10
44%

8
6

44%

8
6

30%

30%

4

4
15%

2

15%

2
7%

7%
0

0
4

5

6

4

7

5

Influence on managerial skills
9

7

14

8

12

7

33%

6
5

48%

10
8

30%

4

6

3

19%

2
1

6

Influence on relationship between
government and business

4

11%
4%

4%

2

3

30%

2

4%

7%

4%

7%

3

4

5

0

0
4

5

6

7

1

2

6

7

Figure 1. Influence of the Change of the Regime on Business Environment, Manager’s job,
Managerial Skills, and the Relationship between Government and Businesses as Reported by the
Hungarian Managers.

* The total is 26 answers, because in both cases one of the respondents (different respondent in each case) did not know
what answer to give. Also, even though the distributions of the answers for these two questions look exactly alike, the
distributions of companies across the answers are different, though primarily for answers 4, 5, and 6.

Some respondents, along with acknowledging the new possibilities that were
opened up before people, voiced their dissatisfaction with the growing involvement of
politics in economic and business life as a result of the change:
The change of the regime opened new possibilities in people's life. Since then
with every new government some certain reorganization can be felt, which is very
unfortunate. The ‘direction of the wind’ constantly changes, which influences
companies as well. There is no stable financial background... Government
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changes do not have that great of an effect, but the respectability of a company
depends on whether it goes with or against the “wind”. [Interviewer: if the
company has good connections with a certain party and that party is in the
government, the company will be supported.]
There were positive and negative changes as well. Positive is that the people got
the opportunity to try their own luck in the market; in other words, to have and
control their own business. Negative ones have been mentioned - the economy
became more controlled by politics and laws are constantly changing.
Some negative feelings were also associated with the way the transition process
went:
Many of the state companies ceased to exist or were given to private individuals.
Along with these a huge chaos emerged in the business life. The whole change
proceeded in a very unorganized way; the open-eyed (watchful) people or the
ones who were in the right place at the right time came out with huge profits from
it, while others, who may even have had better managerial skills, vanished in the
sink.
The markets were cut off in the political life; the economic connections were also
broken. Many of the companies became bankrupt, especially in this industry.
Many were affected negatively by these changes. Everything had to be rebuilt
from the beginning. The changes should have been executed more cautiously. Till
then [before the change] we produced and transported our own products, even to
eastern European markets. After we could only do wage-work.
I can’t explain this properly, but everybody tried to evade the laws of that time,
and searched for gaps in the regulations. Then using these gaps people could do
anything, even if they weren’t competent in doing it.
For me the era before the change of the regime was better; there was order and
normal competition on the market. Now it is a bit of a chaos, faster and definitely
finance-centered (before, it was strict, but just).

Even though some respondents also mentioned the loss of customers and orders,
the strengthening of the competition, and the turbulent times of the transition process
before the new system got established, as consequences of the regime change, they did
not necessarily perceive them as negative:
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The whole continuum happened (the few years of "wild-capitalism" after the
change of the regime), but the market conditions are safer nowadays; the
economy and market are more calculable. There are plenty of competitors, plenty
of similar products. It is getting more and more difficult to convince the customer
that our work is the best.

Unfortunately, in terms of the impact of the regime change on their professional
life, a large number of respondents misinterpreted the question (question 23.1 “Please
specify the effects of each change on the job of a manager like you”) to mean the
influence on the life of a manager and not on the job of a manager, or thought of it in
terms of skills required to perform the job of a manager. The latter responses are analyzed
below along with the analysis of the questions on managerial skills. The former group
included answers like “They all [other managers] tried to change to adapt to the new
situation; those who didn't succeed in their old work places, started a new business;” or
“These changes didn’t occur at once. The good experts and professionals had a chance to
establish themselves in a job, and that is also the case at present;” or that it was important
to be close to the people in power to keep your workplace and that the skills did not really
matter; that those managers that went to work for the multinational corporations were
luckier than the others; that at the beginning of the transition process those people that
could take advantage of other people came out as winners, whereas, at present,
connections – knowing the right people - are more important; that the system of interests,
i.e., motives for doing things, of those in power in companies or in government changed.
Of the respondents that gave suitable answers some indicated that the regime
change gave them more freedom in organizing their work and time, more responsibility,
and a more active part in the decision-making process. Constantly changing laws, lots of
taxes, and lack of reliability and predictability in business life have surfaced on the
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negative side of the process. One respondent said that the tasks of the job have been
broadened and that the manager now has to work harder taking more risks and striving to
achieve better results. Another respondent noticed that the manager today has to
continually educate himself/herself, build up a wider range of connections, devote more
time to work, and, overall, be mentally fit for the job.
Interestingly enough, 10 (37%) of the twenty seven respondents believed that the
skills that were required to perform the job of a manager before the change of the regime
were not much different from the skills that are currently required:
They [qualities and abilities] were roughly the same. Maybe the eminence and the
self-assurance counted more than other qualities. The leading candidates had to go
through a lot of filter. [Interviewer: they had to be "checked" by the government
and the party before they could become managers.] (Answer 2 on a seven-point
index)
Market economy had already been established in the 1970s, so the same
characteristics were enough to make a living. (Answer 5 on a seven-point index)
When I started to work, connection and loyalty to the party was not significant. I
began to work in 1986, in my opinion, in that environment, the same requirements
existed. The same abilities were necessary as now. (Answer 7 on a seven-point
index)
Roughly the same. The connections existed too at that time [the ability to find and
establish business connections]. The reliability [between business partners] was
also very important. (Answer 7 on a seven-point index)

Eight of these ten respondents, however, marked answers 5 to 7 on a seven-point
index for the question that asked them to what extent they thought the regime change
affected the skills required to perform the job of a manager (Figure 1). In other words,
there seems to be a discrepancy – on one hand, the respondents think that the skills were
practically the same, on the other hand, they indicate that the regime change had a
significant influence on the skills required to perform the job of a manager. For some of
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them the discrepancy can probably be attributed to those minor differences that the
respondents did mention, thus, thinking of them as something that had a big influence:
“The same abilities were needed, but in another way. The politics played a bigger role at
that time” (answer 5 on a seven-point index); “Theoretically the same ones were needed.
Probably the relations with workers changed” (answer 6 on a seven-point index); “All of
the things mentioned before [the skills currently required] except the ability of taking
risks. And of course the blessed abilities of ‘imp backbone’ and a ‘long tongue’” (answer
6 on a seven-point index); “They were almost the same. And you had to be adapted to the
party, too [you had to meet the party’s requirements]. The workers weren’t known as
much by their managers” (answer 6 on a seven-point index); “Business contacts had a
stronger function, but suitability and professional competence were also required”
(answer 7 on a seven-point index).
Fourteen (52%) of the twenty seven respondents believed that before the change
of the regime different skills were required, although only 6 of these fourteen were
absolute in their opinions (and as we can see there is no discrepancy in their answers):
To get a position no skill was needed; you were appointed to do the job.
Dictatorship was an accepted management form. (Answer 4 on a seven-point
index)
The most important thing was loyalty to the party. Although I wasn’t a manager at
that time, but I assume, things went on in a different way. The workers meant a
faceless crowd, who seldom or even never met with their managers in person.
(Answer 6 on a seven-point index)

During the socialist regime, it was necessary to be loyal to the party and have a
connection with the party. That didn't concern me, though. (Answer 7 on a sevenpoint index)
Before the Transformation [the change of the regime] everything was simpler.
The party, the state “took care” of everybody. That was an entirely different
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world, one cannot compare the two. But livelihood was better than nowadays.
(Answer 7 on a seven-point index)
Totally different. I was a department manager in milk industry, so a subordinate. I
was always told what to do but one thing is certain, I needed endurance every day
[this is one of the skills that the respondent said is necessary today]. (Answer 7 on
a seven-point index)
The other 8 respondents maintained that some of today’s skills were still present then, but
they were either secondary or not as important:
Before the change good professional knowledge was enough to do this job.
Everything became a bit more complicated. (Answer 4 on a seven-point index)
The professionalism wasn’t as important as it is nowadays; rather the loyal
attitude towards the regime was dominant. (Answer 5 on a seven-point index)
Before the change of the regime, one needed the right political background, fame,
needed to come from a working class family; reliability was the most important
criteria: no matter what idiocy the party said, one had to agree. Those qualities
that are needed today were secondary. (Answer 5 on a seven-point index)
There was controlled economy. That meant handed tasks with independence cut
down. (Answer 6 on a seven-point index)
Not much of the current ones while we were subordinates with no responsibility
for decisions, but a good sense of business was still important. (Answer 6 on a
seven-point index)
Competence and professional knowledge were important, too, but political loyalty
was much more important than today. (Answer 6 on a seven-point index)
Primarily professional knowledge was required. (Answer 7 on a seven-point
index)

Importantly, respondents from both groups – the ones that thought that the change
of the regime did not bring any changes to the skills required to perform the job of a
manager and the ones that thought otherwise – identified loyalty to the party or the
greater importance of politics in the job of a manager as a characteristic of the previous
era, but apparently had a different perception of just how much it weighed on the
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manager. Obviously, the managers that believed that there was a great change in the skills
gave it a lot of weight, whereas the others understood it as something secondary that just
was there. The two groups of managers were quite heterogeneous with no special features
that would set them apart from each other.
In the answers cited above four respondents talked about professionalism, but two
stressed that professionalism as a skill was only secondary and that party membership
was the primary criterion for success, whereas the other two indicated professionalism as
the only thing that was required or needed to do the job of a manager. Interestingly
enough, this was a homogeneous group - three of these respondents were between the
ages of 45 and 55 that established their own company after 1989 (the other respondent
was between the ages of 35 and 45 working for a state-owned company that is about to be
privatized). In other words, there is no dramatic difference in the respondents’
background. The difference in the answers could probably be attributed to the difference
in what element each respondent chose to stress.
Three main themes emerge from the answers about the influence of the regime
change on the relationship between government and businesses, two of which are
contradictory. The first one is that the government has less influence on the economy
now than it used to - seven respondents noticed this trend: “It [the government] doesn’t
weight itself that much on the economy, as in the socialist era;” “Earlier the politics had a
significant effect on the economy, now the economy has effect on politics. The work and
activity of the government is determined by economic processes;” “In the long run it
depends on the governmental decision. The economy is forming itself yet, but it still
needs directions. One thing is sure the government is not the determining factor
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considering the changes;” “After the change of the regime, the connection between the
government and the economy became two-directional - the economy is no longer
controlled from above in terms of when and what should be done. The government has to
take the efficiency of the economy in consideration, because it (the government) depends
on it. So laws and regulations are enacted to help the economy and companies.
Sometimes this mechanism works, but sometimes it doesn't;” “After the change of the
regime ...political and economic empires separated.... We are moving towards such state
of affairs, in which only economic and market laws rule. I, personally avoid fields where
policy takes part. Of course, I do this as far as I can;” “The government can distract,
delay, and affect the economy with its wrong decisions, but basically the firms and
companies make the decisions - their own market policy is the principal one [the firms
are in control; the government is not really important], they ‘handle the reins.’ The words
of the big, multinational companies have a great importance in Hungary.”
The second theme is that the government and economy are more interconnected
now and that the politics are more involved in the economy now than before – 3
respondents voiced this as a concern and one respondent’s answer was more neutral:
The politics and the economy came closer to each other. The government
provides information to companies and offers plans and tenders to them. The
political decisions have influence on the economy (for example, the protective
duty), but these decisions are not always helping private companies; often they
seek their own interests.
The inter-penetration of the government and the economy can completely
unequivocally determine the fate of the country. Those who work themselves to
death, can hardly survive, while those, who affect decisions and laws and are in
control, prosper.
The politics has too big of an influence on the economy. This can be felt with
every change of the government - they are always changing, but the people can’t
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feel its positive effects, because four years is not enough for a government
program to work out and for its positive effects to be seen.
Nowadays you have to be aware of the political economics more often (daily).
You always have to be aware of the possible tenders, competitions. You have to
follow the economic rules and regulations as well. These possibilities – to have
choices for tenders – are positive, but the government gives as burdens as well changing laws and the unlimited taxes have a bad effect on our economy.

The third theme that surfaced from the answers of the Hungarian respondents is
the concern that the last respondent voiced as well - ever-changing laws and numerous
taxes:
Before the change of the regime we had central control and plans for 5 years.
Economy was easier to calculate, but it was an absent economy. The products
could be sold better, because there were not many competitors. The laws were
more abiding than now. Nowadays they change laws every 2-3 months, which
deeply affects the economy, and there are always new taxes.

Politics is very negative. Politicians make ill use of their opportunities. In
Hungary [after the change of the regime] politicians produced plenty of laws
every year, and every other year they amended them. It was terribly difficult to
accommodate to them. We couldn’t plan for the future. [With the EU
membership] we had to take over the system of the Western market economy.
This was the harmonization of laws, which was a good solution for the company.
In my opinion, after we join the EU we will be in a better position. Although the
new rules are strict, they will last longer, than the Hungarian ones. Because of it,
planning will be more calculable...They [the government] introduce new taxes,
which increase our cost.
The financial withdrawals (social insurance, health and education taxes, energy
taxes, etc.) by the government has become too much, so we don’t have enough
money for development. All loads are weighted on companies. Firms with strong
capital (funds) can compensate these somehow, but the weak ones can’t. So the
strong ones can use this to their advantage squeezing their competitors off the
market by offering low prices. The small and weak companies can do nothing, but
“punish” their workers with restrictions to stay alive on the market. And this is a
very bad tendency.
We have talked about these. The government expenses are constantly growing;
the government tries to compensate by increasing taxes, and that hinders
industrial development.
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In summary, predominantly, the positive feelings regarding the regime change
were associated with the factors that were predicted to happen after the communist
regime collapsed – more open economy, more opportunities, and more freedom. The
negative feelings were mainly targeted at high taxes, constantly changing laws, and the
role and decisions of the government.

Putsch of 1991
To compare, let us now look at the influence that the putsch of 1991 had on the
Russian respondents’ business environment, their work, and the relationship between
government and businesses.
Seven of the eight respondents thought that the putsch of 1991 had quite a
significant effect on their business environment and the job of a manager – they marked
answers 5,6 or 7 on a seven-point index (Figure 2). Surprisingly, five of them did not
think that the putsch had any effect whatsoever on the skills required to perform the job
of a manager and on the relationship between the government and businesses (they gave
an answer of 1 on a seven-point index6) with the remaining three being not sure whether
the effect was significant or not (answers 4 on a seven-points index) (Figure 2).
Those respondents who said that the putsch of 1991 had had a significant
influence on their business environment, could only either point at the rise in the number
of private companies and, thus, in competition, as its consequence, or at the fact that they
themselves got a chance to establish a company or change to private ownership: “Our

6

One of these respondents said that the influence was very small, but marked 1 – no influence, for
the answer.
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1 – no influence 7 – to a great extent
Influence on local business
environment

Influence on the job of a manager

5

3

4
2

3
2

1
1
0
4

5

6

7

0
4

5

6

7

Influence on the relationship between
government and businesses
Influence on managerial skills

5

5
4

4

3

3

2

2

1

1

0
1

2

3

4

5

0
1

2

3

4

Figure 2. Influence of the Putsch of 1991 on Business Environment, Manager’s job,
Managerial Skills, and the Relationship between Government and Businesses.

company became private; it was difficult in the beginning - state orders and financing
stopped, so we had to take care of everything ourselves;” “A lot of private companies
appeared - they've become our competition;” “It got more difficult to work after the
putsch: more competitors - private companies came into existence;” “A lot of small
private companies appeared that became our competition (they are smaller, it's easier for
them);” “A lot of private companies rose that time, but it got more difficult for
government owned companies;” “Both changes [the putsch of 1991 and the default of
1998] have formed the existent business environment - black market entrepreneurs have
come out and established (most of today directors are former black market
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entrepreneurs).” Moreover, the responses to the question regarding the influence of the
putsch on the job of a manager were either limited to “we have to compete with out
competitors now” (2 answers) or “the same influence [as on the business environment]”
(3 answers) or “can’t tell,” “positively,” and “life has gotten easier.”
The responses are even scarcer in regards to the influence of the putsch on
managerial skills. Only one respondent, the one that gave an answer of 5 on a seven-point
index, noticed a difference: “You had to participate in "social events" - exhibits, shows,
etc. Those who showed that they were better than the others were better financed by the
government.” The rest believed that the same qualities that are needed to manage today
were needed before as well.7
In regards to the influence of the putsch on the relationship between government
and businesses, one of those respondents that marked an answer of 4 could not explain
why, and the other two had noticed the following differences – “Private entrepreneurs
became independent, which gave people a chance to develop and live according to the
principle of natural selection” and “State financing ended”, but, apparently, did not think
that they were very significant. Here is how one of the “no change what’s so ever”
respondents explained his answer:
These things are always interconnected (the two are almost the same thing) - on
one hand everything has always been under government's control and nothing has
changed; on the other hand most of government officials now are involved in
businesses, which means the same people run the government and businesses.

7

The respondent that gave an answer of 4 was not completely sure if the qualities have changed or
not “Don't know, probably the same [qualities].”
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Furthermore, one of the respondents that talked about Perestroika8 as a significant
event gave very similar answers: the main influence on their business environment and
the manager’s work was that they were privatized – “before, we were owned by the state
- we didn’t worry what the next day was going to bring; it's different now, but we are
used to it by now;” the influence on the managerial skills was not clear - the respondent
gave an answer of 4 and commented that now you need experience, whereas before you
needed to be diplomatic; and no change was observed in the relationship between
government and businesses: ”No influence - the relationship hasn't gotten worse or better;
it just changed - the government stopped financing and ordering, but that's it.”
In other words, what we see in all these responses is that the changes did happen
at the institutional level (e.g. more private companies were established, state financing
stopped), but not much influence was felt on the substance of business life or manager’s
job or managerial skills or the relationship between government and businesses.

Crisis of 1998 (a.k.a. the Default)
According to the respondents’ evaluation on a seven-point index, the crisis of
1998 had from a moderate to significant effect on their business environment (26% gave
answers 6 or 7 on a seven-point index; 30% gave an answer of 5; and 35% gave an
answer of 4), a strong effect on the job of a manager (39% of the respondents gave
answers 6 or 7; 22% gave an answer of 5, and the same 35% again gave an answer of 4),
no or very little influence on the skills required to perform the job of a manager (52%

8

The other respondent mentioned the default of 1998 along with Perestroika and focused only on
the effects of the default on their business environment, the job of a manager, and the relationship between
the government and businesses.
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gave answers 1 to 3 and 39% gave an answer of 4), and more or less no influence on the
relationship between government and businesses (the majority of the respondents – 65% gave answers 1 or 2) (Figure 3).
1 – no influence 7 – to a great extent
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Figure 3. Influence of the Crisis of 1998 on Business Environment, Manager’s job,
Managerial Skills, and the Relationship between Government and Businesses as
Reported by the Russian Managers.

Some (9 or 39%) of the twenty three respondents that thought that the crisis of
1998 was an important factor did not think that it had any influence on their company per
se: “I can mention the crisis of 1998, although it didn't have any influence on us.” Seven
of these nine respondents gave answers 4 or 5 to the influence of the crisis on their
business environment and the job of a manager, but they could not explain why – they
thought that it must have had some influence on some businesses, but did not know what
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kind since it did not influence them. The other two respondents gave an answer of 6. One
of them explained that the overall situation in the country was difficult and he was
assuming that a lot of directors got fired as a result of it. The other one said that
instability is always bad on production and you simply do not know what to expect from
tomorrow.
Seven other respondents reported that the default had good influence on them.
Two explained it by the fact that the poorer the people get, the more of their product they
buy, because what they produce becomes the daily staple. The others said that as the
price of the dollar goes up, the local product becomes cheaper and, thus, more
competitive and, as a result, sells better:
The default overall had a good influence. The company produces mainly from
local materials; imported materials constitute only a small percentage of the
production, so we did not feel the negative consequences of the default. Overall
we benefited price-wise.
The default helped manufacturing; even if we personally suffered, the supply of
products on other markets rose. Because the dollar went up, the volume of
imported parts brought into the country went down and these were replaced with
their Russian counterparts.
For a local producer, the higher the value of the dollar, the more competitive
he/she is. Right now lots of producers are suffering because of the imported
products. For me the default was good. If the value of the dollar goes up twice
now - it will be even better.

Only three respondents indicated more of a negative effect of the crisis, although
one of them still said that their company had been on the rise ever since: ”Sales have
gone down; lots of companies folded (because of the default); instability; new laws; new
prices;” “After the default the competition rose in all branches of business. One of our
companies was formed in 1999 during the time when a lot of companies were being
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formed. So, we’ve been on the rise since 1999. Also, I can mention that in the last few
years competition has gotten stronger.”
Of the rest, some respondents could not specify the influence and some focused
on the effects of other events that they had mentioned along with the default.
The answers regarding the influence of the default on the job of the respondents
are very sporadic; it is hard to distinguish any trends.9 The main theme that dominated the
available answers was that it is always in the hands of the manager whether his/her
company does well or not, and so if some companies suffered it was their managers’
fault: “All those companies that folded after the default - their directors were not
professional;” “I believe that changes like these should not affect directors that are
‘standing strong on their feet;’” “90% of business success is management;” “Everything
depends on the director. There was no direct influence of the default on my job, but since
it influenced our production it must have indirectly influenced my job as well.... although,
everything depends on the director.”
Of the respondents who gave an answer of 4 to the question regarding the
influence of the crisis on the skills required to perform the job of a manager, three could
not explain the change, four said that the same qualities were needed as now, and only
two pointed at certain differences: ”Now you have to understand the situation on the
market and respond to it quicker, it used to be less hectic” and “You didn't have to have
any skills before.” One of the respondents that gave an answer of 5 indicated that before
the crisis the manager had to be “diplomatic - saying the right things at the right time,”

9

Overall a larger number of the respondents understood question 23.1 - the influence of the
changes on the job of a manager – as the question about other managers and companies and question 22.1 –
the influence of the changes on their business environment, as about their company; thus, there are a large

Karapetyan, Zinaida, 2005, UMSL, p 251

while the other manager pointed that the manager had to be resourceful and constantly in
search – “... search for yourself, for new markets to sell, just search in general;” both did
not think that these qualities are needed now. Interestingly enough, one of the managers
(who gave an answer of 1) voiced an opinion that the qualities that are needed to perform
the job of a manager are the same at all times.
Finally, there seems to have been a very minimal influence of the crisis of 1998
on the relationship between government and businesses. There was no prior expectation
on my part as to whether the default would have had such an influence or not, because I
assumed that it could have gone either way depending on other numerous factors of the
time. According to some of the respondents (who actually explained their 1 and 2
answers) it did not have an influence on the relationship between government and
businesses, because “everything is under government’s control as it used to be” (2
respondents) or “these things (government and business) are always interconnected” (2
respondents). The answers 4 on a seven-point index as usual were the ones that could not
explain what kind of an influence the event had. Two of the respondents that gave an
answer of 7 both mentioned the same effect – the loss of trust in the government: “We
(businesspeople) don't trust the government now - we can only rely on ourselves. “
Overall, the majority of the Russian managers mentioned the default in their
answers just as something that must have had some influence on other companies and
managers, but not as an event that had affected their company per se or them personally.

number of answers to question 23. 1 similar to “Can’t tell how it affected other managers. For the influence
on us see my answer to 22.1”
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Privatization and Establishment of Private Ownership
As one would assume the establishment of private ownership and privatization
would have been viewed if not the major but certainly as one of the major events in the
transition process of the former command economies and, thus, should have been
identified as such by the respondents. In fact, some of the respondents did mention
privatization, but not as many as one would expect - 5 or 9% of the Hungarian companies
and 4 or 8% of the Russian companies (Table 5).
As was mentioned earlier, whereas the privatization process was a major element
of restructuring for a large percentage of the Russian respondents (32 or 63% of them
have been privatized), the majority of the Hungarian respondent companies were either
established anew or bought out from cooperative ownership (44 or 81%). This explains,
then, why two other Hungarian companies identified the establishment of private
companies as one of the major events, and not privatization, and why quite a few of other
Hungarian respondents saw establishment of private companies in general or
establishment of their company in particular as one of the main results of the regime
change: “The change of the regime made it possible to establish private companies;”
“The changing regime changed economics as well. I did the same job, led a governmental
plant. After the change I had to start my own business to survive. That changed my life
100%.”10 In the analysis of the influence of the putsch of 1991, the few Russian
respondents that identified the rise in the number of private companies as its result saw it

10

Note how this respondent says that he had to start his own business to survive. There were a
number of other Hungarian respondents that expressed their situation in the same words: “Till 2000 I had
worked for a state company. It moved and I was forced to start my business;” “My workplace closed in the
1990s and I had to establish my own company.” These respondents are a perfect example of the freemarket mentality in working – instead of complaining and hoping that the government would do
something, they took charge of their situation.
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in terms of increase in the competition. In other words, the Hungarian respondents
perceived the loosening up of the ownership regulations as a good development – a
chance for people to manage their own business, whereas the Russian respondents
thought of it as more of a threat to them in terms of rising competition.
All nine respondents thought that privatization had a significant influence on their
business environment and on the job of a manager – with the exception of one Russian
company that gave an answer of 4, all of them gave an answer of 5 or higher to the
influence of the privatization on their company’s business environment and their jobs
(Figure 4). Only one Russian respondent (the one that marked 4 on a seven-point index)
gave a straight ‘bad influence’ answer: “Negatively - before, factories were leading
companies in Russia, now, no one cares about them.” The rest of the Russian respondents
just pointed out that companies had to start working in a different, market-oriented,
environment seeking orders on their own without the assistance of the government: “It
made the director work;” “During any changes the director gets some extreme experience
that changes his/her qualifications/skills, changes his motivation and his outlook on
things.”
Negative notes were present in the responses of four of the five Hungarian
managers, but their complaints were not really directed against the privatization per se,
but rather against the policies and choices of the government since then:
There was a pillage and privatization in 1989 (write it down safely). The profit of
the company has been decreasing year by year since its establishment. If the
situation remains, it’ll get to a near-breakdown state, thanks to the policy. It
completely destroys the domestic entrepreneur.
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Figure 4. Influence of Privatization on Business Environment, Manager’s job,
Managerial Skills, and the Relationship between Government and Businesses.
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The conditions became stricter, taxes increased, the competition strengthened. A
total planlessness rules; it can be seen at the taxation of the tobacco (the
regulations change almost every week). At the same time, products of the blackmarket flow in the market. In one word, the government slows down the
development of this branch of business. The frequent changes of the regulations
should be decreased in order to increase the efficiency of the manager’s decisions
(and these decreases are already promised). Besides this the inflation is also
present, and the union standards have become a referential basis. I personally
think that certain people don’t do their job properly. For example: the income-tax
of the tobacco goods is 5% in western countries, while it is 25% here, in Hungary,
since the government wants to get as much income as they can from this industry.
These circumstances can all hinder the manager’s activities (not to mention the
changes in regulations every four years with the change of the cabinet).
The changes in the requirements in managerial skills that these Hungarian
managers identified are very similar to what has been shown earlier: one respondent said
that the same skills were needed as now; one stressed the importance of party
membership and family connections before in addition to the same skills that are required
now; one said that organizing and leading abilities and professional knowledge were
enough then, but not now; finally, one manager said that he has all the skills that were
needed before, but they are not enough today – “[now] I should be a sorcerer or a
wizard.”
One of the Russian respondents did not perceive any changes in the skills
requirements. The other three, in constrast, identified very clear differences between the
two periods: before one simply had to be able to control the production process, be
diligent (do well what he/she is told to do), and have good memory and good
communications skills, but today, you need to be educated, work hard in general, and
work hard to attract orders and keep regular clients in particular, be responsible, and goaloriented. In other words, the change in the skills and qualities that these three respondents
identified corresponded to the change in the ownership and economic relations – in a
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planned economy under state ownership the manager’s job was limited to executing state
orders and supervising the production process; in a market economy under private
ownership the manager is on his/her own and has to seek his/her own customers and
work hard to achieve his/her company’s goals.
Finally, in identifying the changes in the relationship between the government and
businesses, two of the Hungarian respondents sounded very disappointed with the results:
Big multinational companies came, free of taxes, supported by the government...
And our taxes and all other kinds of payments are high. (Answer 7 on a sevenpoint index.)
I don’t think that the government cares about these questions. If it were aware of
the affects of these, it wouldn’t do what it does. I’ll give you an example. An
environmental charge (tax) was introduced. To fulfill this, a man from a company
in Debrecen worked for 6 days to figure out how much his company would have
to pay and he counted 11 Ft11 of the tax! Now, where is the proportion between 11
Ft of tax and someone’s six day of work? So, this is the economic policy in
Hungary. (This is the respondent that could not give an answer on a seven-point
index.)
One respondent said, similar to some answers discussed before, that politics used to be an
important factor in controlling the economy, but it is no longer the case, and that
companies have more possibilities now, but their life is more difficult, because they have
to work in the market environment.
The answers of the Russian respondents regarding the relationship between
government and businesses are similar to the answers discussed in the analysis of the
influence of the putsch of 1991: two of the respondents said that there had not been any
changes (answers 1), one respondent indicated that “it's gotten more obvious that the
majority of the economy and businesses are controlled by government officials” (answer

11

$1 is approximately 200 Forints.
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6), and the last one just said that the property got redistributed from the government to
businesses (answer 7).

Change of Cabinet, Elections, Current National Government.
Another interesting result of the survey is the respondents’ perception of the
influence of the government and its regular changes on their company’s life. Both
countries have democratic political systems in which the government gets reelected every
4 years. The few respondents from the two countries that indicated the influence of that
process on their business environment used different expressions to describe it. The three
Russian companies indicated the influence of elections on their business environment,
whereas for the Hungarian managers it is the “change of cabinet” or the “change of
government” that affects them (Table 5).
These responses reflect the differences in the political processes in the two
countries. In Hungary every election since 1989 has brought a different prime-minister
and a different cabinet in and, thus, different policies. The Russian respondents, in
contrast, have not seen much of a policy change after each election, because in their
political system the president is the main actor and the two presidents that they have had
since the Soviet Union collapsed – Boris Yelcin and Vladimir Putin – have shared
political views. This becomes clear from the analysis of the answers as well. The Russian
companies that talked about the influence of elections complained that they slow down
their professional life because “everyone gets involved” in them. In the Hungarian case
every election or the change of government slows down business life because people do
not know what to expect. According to the Hungarian respondents every new government
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brings new regulations, which makes the business environment very unstable and puts
companies in the situation of dependency on the government:
First, there is uncertainty when the new government comes in; then the laws and
rules become more or less constant and we know where to move; 3 years go by
and another government comes in with new changes and new ideas and brings
uncertainty again. This is an everlasting circle.
Everything depends on the government. If one cabinet starts something, the next
one will represent its direct opposite. There is no consistency and it affects the
economy very heavily. We are independent from the government, but our
customers have to take loans, because they lack sufficient funds; and that depends
on the banks and, of course, on the government. So, the government has an effect
on business/economic relations, and, thus, by implication, on us (and, thus, we
also depend on the cabinet in an indirect way).
Laws and orders issued by the leaders of the government in power generally have
a harmful influence on the work of the company (every new government has new
orders). There is a remarkable extent of corruption in Hungary.
One respondent even termed every change of government a change of the regime:
The change of regime was not only in 1989, but in 1994, 1998, and 2002. In 1989
we met a change of the regime, which brought many inventions, things I hadn’t
known. Then at the next change of the regime (1994) the mistakes of the previous
one tuned out, or at least we thought that those were faults. Later we realized that
many things were good.

Even more illustrative of this difference between the two countries is the case of
the influence of the policies of the then current national government - a relatively larger
number of Hungarian respondents (9 or 17%) attributed certain changes in their business
life to the policies of Medgyessy’s government, whereas only 2 Russian respondents
noticed some changes after Vladimir Putin came to power. One of the two Russian
respondents did not elaborate much on how much influence Putin’s policies had had on
his company’s life, but the other was quite positive about it:
It got more stable after Putin became president; before - don't know how to
express it - it's not clear-cut …..before, for example, not everyone could get a
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license to do our kind of business – there was less order when it came to it; now,
there is more order, but a number of licenses have been cancelled by Mr. Greff so, we have more competitors; although, I have to say, it is much more stable
now.....It's safer to work now - our partners from other regions, for example, feel
safe to transfer money to us now.12

The majority of the Hungarian managers were dissatisfied with the work of
Medgyessy’s government:
In the last two years: in the period of the new government people are more
pessimistic. In the era of the previous government one believed that improvement
was in turn, but the present one cannot make people feel it.
Nowadays in Hungary economic life is going downhill. It affects everyone’s life.
Tax burdens and utility prices are mounting, these affect our average customer. It
started about a year ago.
Globalization, bad economic policies, bad monetary policies - in the last two
years, 2002-2004.
I don’t like our current socialist government. They help unfairly multinational
companies; and the Forint is up-valued.

These feelings probably echoed the common mood in the country at the time, because in
the Fall of 2004 Peter Medgyessy resigned from his post of Prime Minister.

Hungary and European Union
Membership in the European Union overall received mostly unwelcome remarks
from the Hungarian respondents:
Not concerned about the requirements of the Union membership, nobody can
fulfill them; don’t even want to continue the business after the country becomes a
Union member; the company will not survive after the country joins.

12

This is an interesting statement, because the work stories of my family members and friends
suggest otherwise.
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It would take a lot of time to specify these changes: joining means a very strong
competition with foreign companies, who have a much better opportunity to
survive, and who lure the customers to their side; they have bigger assets, more
workers, better quality, and so on. The Hungarians try to improve and give better
prices, but it might not be enough.... Everyone, or at least the majority of the
nation has been waiting to join the EU, and has been hoping for a better living
after it. But they didn’t consider the downside effects of this, and what we must
give up for this. There won’t be a Paradise or something like that here, in
Hungary, just because we are members of the EU. A few, or maybe a moderate
amount of people and companies (close to certain government and state members)
will really do prosper from it, but the rest of us will just face the negative sides.
A concern was voiced that the liberalization of trade, which is to come with the
membership in the European Union, would only benefit the West European countries
allowing them to use Hungary and other East European countries for their markets:
Everybody curses the government, democracy, the EU, multinational companies.
Everyone has the opinion that they destroy domestic companies. The European
Union needs us only for the market. I’m reading in the newspaper: they can
hardly wait for May 1st. Germany, the Netherlands. I have recently read in the
Observer [a weekly newspaper] that 46 thousand enterprises went bankrupt in
Germany, and they hope there’ll be fewer this year because of the opening of the
East-European market.
One respondent pointed that the country was poorly prepared for the day when the
membership was to take effect:
I cannot talk about advantages. In Hungary the economic life is discursive. I feel
uncertainty in both economic and money market; the performance of our
politicians is outrageous. If you have to exist as a company in this economic and
political situation, it is at least warning us to behave carefully. I cannot see a clear
line of bearing in connection with our Union membership, if it would be good or
bad. For example I buy machinery and tools from Germany. I called the board of
customs to ask about my situation after May the 1st and they had no idea. And we
have only one month left....Nothing is ready and we are far from it. I met the
Union ambassador personally and he said that signs of improvement can only be
seen at the level of manufacturers. Those who try to coordinate them failed
totally. This is a terrible criticism.
Positive aspects of joining the European Union were seen in the establishment of
a duty-free trade zone with Western Europe, in the hope that Hungary would eventually
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catch up with the West European countries technologically, and that the Hungarian
government would be compelled to become more efficient:
In the beginning, the first 1-5 years, I think, it will be difficult for us, because
their technology is more advanced and we will have to re-learn a lot of things, but
then, I hope, it will get better... Also, in the beginning, I think the government will
try to slow down the process of changing the rules and regulations to match the
European Union’s ones, because they will not want to give up their power. In
other words, the economic development will probably be slowed down in the
beginning. And, again, I hope that after a while the government will have to give
up their power and the situation will improve.

No Change
A fairly large number of the Russian respondents could not think of any political
or economic changes that had had an effect on their business environment or their work –
11 companies or 22% of all Russian respondents. Four of these companies simply could
not point at any changes. Two other companies believed that they were too small to feel
any changes: “It's a small company; big changes do not affect them, just the local ones taxes, etc. Now the taxes are lower and they are afraid they are going to start going up.
But other than that, nothing touches upon them. [interviewer]” Two respondents said that
political and economic changes do not matter and that everything depends on the
company:
Politics and economy do not influence us - everything depends on us. There
seems to have been a sudden rise this year and I think it has to do with the fact
that our people have more money and have become more selective.
Can't think of anything; everything depends on the company. We constantly live
in a condition of change, we just can't pay attention to all of them; there is just no
reason to do that.

Furthermore, one other respondent said that he has never been interested in these
questions and he only cares about his own business; “everything depends on the manager
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and profitability of the company.” Two respondents explained that their companies have
always been stable, so they can not think of any changes that have influenced them:”Can't
think of anything. I've always worked for this company and our company has always
been stable (except for when we switched our production to a different product, but this
was a change of the overall orientation of the company).”
In other words, none of the 11 Russian respondents even remotely mentioned
perestroika, putsch, default, or any other changes that their country has gone through just
in the last 15-20 years, as if none of them ever happened.
In contrast, some (2) of the Hungarian respondents that did not think there had
been any change discussed the change of the regime in their answers:
There weren’t such periods. After the change of the regime everything remained
in its place, as before. In those 50 years passed since the Second World War, we
had at least 5 different periods, but always everything remained in its old form,
only the leaders in power changed. Nowadays these periods make their changes
every 4 years (elections). The power structure doesn’t change; it does not matter if
the money is in the power seat or the politics is.
The only changes that these two attributed to the regime change were an increase in
corruption and bringing the politics and economy closer together:
Corruption became much stronger; it has appeared everywhere, in the
administration too. It has become more open and direct. The ethics became
negative. The leaders can do anything....Previously politics and the economy
weren’t in such strong symbiosis. Nowadays anybody can get to a leading
position, while earlier usually competent people were in such positions. Politics
have a great influence on the operation of the economy and the ruling power. For
example, literacy is not among the conditions of electing someone to a mayor.
The competition sphere has roughened, too. The economic efficiency decreased a
lot....
The government and the economy are a bit more interwoven; the government tries
to control the economy, but it was that way in the previous era too. Every
government is after their own interests.

Karapetyan, Zinaida, 2005, UMSL, p 263

Both of these companies are in 100% private domestic ownership and have never been
privatized. One was established in 1989 and the other – in 1997. One has 12 employees
and the other has 23 employees and they belong to different industries. One of the
respondents is a male between the ages of 45 to 55 with some management training and
the other is a female between the ages of 35 and 45 with no management training
whatsoever. In other words, we have two respondents coming from different backgrounds
but voicing similar concerns.
The other Hungarian respondents simply said that politics is not important for
them:
Politics is unimportant; we usually remain at the same level irregardless of the
views of the governing party. For example: the Health Office, with which we
have a contract, once lowered its support from 85% to 50%, so the cost of our
product went up. The customers didn't really like it. They were so dissatisfied that
after 2 months everything went back to normal, including the rate of support.
Economically - the Chinese are bad for business in Budapest, but here they are
not a threat.
There was no change for me at all. May be the 1989 license released by the new
government. I have never had orders from the government. [After 1989 many
people got license from the government, as a result of which more companies
were established and the number of state orders decreased] There is nothing much
to say. Politics is not my field and I am not really concerned.
I don’t care about politics, and I don’t follow its changes, just to the extent I need
to do my business.
Political and economic changes do not have any effect on the business
environment of a company like his. The only thing that affects us is the law that
allows us to ask for the governmental donation – regulation 8/1983. This is our
most important working factor. We have to live according to that....This law is
constantly changing. If it is changed it happens at the beginning of the year. The
last change happened in 2002. The company was founded in 1996, we have been
doing what we do since January 2000. We are not affected by changing
governments.
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From the answers it can be seen that two of the above cited companies do some kind of
work that is subsidized by the government, and, apparently, the belief that what they
produce should be subsidized has been consistent throughout all the government changes.

Conclusion
The most surprising finding of this chapter is the minimum influence that political
events seem to have had on the life of the Russian business people. Not only the majority
of the Russian respondents could not point at any external obstacles to their work, none
of them perceived the events of the late 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s as the
change of the regime. Most of them did not even recall perestroika when asked about
political events that influenced their business life. Chapter 8 attempts to understand and
explain these and other findings of the survey.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION: PAST AND PRESENT

In this chapter I conclude the analysis with an attempt to demonstrate a
connection between the past and present of the two countries and understand the findings
of the survey through the prism of the countries’ unique historical developments.
This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section summarizes the
findings of the survey in terms of the two hypotheses presented in chapter 1. The next
two sections analyze the survey results in light of the discussions presented in chapters
2,3, and 4. The final section presents some concluding remarks.

Two Hypotheses
The first hypothesis, that Hungarian companies are more market oriented than
Russian companies, can be accepted for the following reasons.
The majority of the Hungarian companies not only pay attention to their
competitors, compare their own product to that of their competitors, and measure their
customers’ satisfaction – the direct measures of market orientation, but a larger number
of them think strategically and perceive some kind of a mission for their organization.
The Russian companies for the most part split almost evenly on most of those questions
with the less market-oriented group – companies that do not do any of those things,
normally somewhat dominating (with the exception of the mission statements part, where
these companies were in obvious majority). In sum, the organizational behavior of the
majority of the Russian companies does not incorporate elements of an organization
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operating in a market environment; and the organizational behavior of the majority of the
Hungarian companies does. There was only one aspect where the difference between the
two countries was less pronounced – organizational performance; the majority of the
companies in both countries perform some kind of measurement of their organization’s
performance.
One of the main initial concerns was that the over-representation of the food,
beverages, and tobacco industry in the Russian sample would skew the results if the
majority of the companies from that industry group displayed similar trends in behavior.
As was shown in Chapter 6, quite a large number of companies from that industry group
often did appear to be less market oriented: 1) the majority of them does not have a
mission statement, does not develop a plan or strategy, does not evaluate their
competitors, and does not measure their customers’ satisfaction; 2) the majority of them,
although only by a small margin, does not set strategic goals and does not compare the
quality of their product to that of their competitors’; 3) all 8 Russian companies that do
not measure their organization’s performance are from that industry group. At the same
time they did not always represent an overwhelming majority of the less-market oriented
companies. In other words, even if the over-representation of the food, beverages, and
tobacco industry group did influence the results, the degree of influence could not have
been significant enough to change the main conclusion of the analysis that Russian
companies are less market-oriented than Hungarian companies.
The second hypothesis, that regardless of the political and economic
developments in the two countries in the last two decades, the businesspeople in both
countries will perceive no or little change in their business environment and their work as
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a result of those events, only holds true for Russia but not for Hungary. It appears that
economic and political events have had little or no influence on the life of the Russian
companies and businesspeople, but have played an important part in the life of the
Hungarian companies.

Business Practices: An Overview of Major Trends
A major feature of the Hungarian economy that is often overlooked by analysts is
the presence of a wide variety and a large number of private undertakings during
communist times. I myself did not give it much weight in preparing the questionnaire
and, as a result, cannot draw definitive conclusions on some issues. One thing that the
scattered evidence does demonstrate is that the private and semi-private sector did exist
and must have been quite pervasive. Five of the forty four private companies that have
never been privatized and one of the two companies that did not answer the question on
privatization were established before 1985, which means they existed in some kind of
private or semi-private form before the regime change. I am aware of at least two other
respondent companies that had been in cooperative ownership before they were
established in 1991. These eight companies already make up fifteen percent of the
responses, which, if projected onto the population on the whole, means that at least
fifteen percent of manufacturing in the region had been in private or semi-private
ownership. This, in turn, may have attributed to the fact that a larger number of
Hungarian respondents exhibited market-oriented behavior than of Russian respondents.
Even though the proportion of Russian enterprises that display market-oriented
behaviors is smaller than the proportion of Hungarian enterprises, the methods that the
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former use in their work match those that Hungarian enterprises use or sometimes even
appear more advanced. For example, consider the use of profit and profitability: a larger
number of Russian respondents referred directly to profit or profitability as their
measures of organizational performance. As was discussed in chapter 6, profit was not
absent from the lexicon of the Soviet manager; it was superceded by the volume of
production, but it nevertheless had to be fulfilled as well. Profitability was likewise one
of the main plan targets, which received addition attention in the reform of 1965 and
thereafter.
Such an old communist habit as setting company’s goals and measuring its
performance in terms of production and volume figures appears in the responses of the
Russian and Hungarian respondents in equal proportions. Most noticeably, of the six
Hungarian enterprises that set their goals in terms of the volume of production, three used
to be and one is still in state ownership. Of the fourteen Hungarian companies that use
some kind of volume measure to evaluate their organization’s performance, eleven have
never been in state ownership and one is unknown, but three of these eleven and the
unknown one were established before 1985, which means they had been transformed into
private ownership from cooperative or other kind of ownership. Of the six Hungarian
companies that use the volume of sales to measure their organization’s performance, five
have never been in state ownership, and only one of these five was established before
1990.
Of the four Russian companies that set their strategic goals in terms of production,
two companies have never been in state ownership and the other two have. Of the twelve
Russian companies that use some kind of volume measure to evaluate their organization’s
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performance, nine used to be in state ownership. Of the eight Russian companies that use
the volume of sales to evaluate their organization’s performance, six used to be in state
ownership. In other words, the data suggest quite a strong correlation between former
state ownership and the old style measures for Russia, which was expected. It may be
suggesting a correlation between whether a company had existed before communism
collapsed and the use of these measures for Hungary, but not very definite. This, in turn,
could be a reflection of the country’s diverse economy and the presence of diverse
business behaviors before the collapse, some examples of which were given in chapter 4.
Of the Hungarian respondents seventy percent either have more than four
competitors or their market share is less than twenty percent. This compared to only
thirty seven percent of the Russian respondents that have more than four competitors or
whose market share is less than twenty percent. Competition was not a concern for
sixteen percent of the Russian respondents. Another eighteen percent either do not
measure their competition or do not have any in their region. This more or less
monopolistic nature of the market in the Saratov region probably speaks of high barriers
to market entry. In addition, the vastness of the Russian geography and its poorly
developed infrastructure bounds local level businesses to their own regions, which means
there is little threat of competition from outside of the region. Only large conglomerates
formed on the basis of former state enterprises have resources to operate throughout the
country.
The manager and company specific characteristics did not show any significant
influence on the survey answers. The characteristics of the Russian respondents and
enterprises demonstrated some patterns for certain answers more so than the
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characteristics of the Hungarian respondents and enterprises, but still very insignificant.
One exception was the Food, Beverages, and Tobacco industry group that persistently
appeared less market oriented than the rest.
This industry group has a very unique position – it produces the necessities of life.
As a result it prospers the most at times of crisis or when the majority of the population is
poor. “The main reason for the increase in bread production [after 1998] is the declining
buying capacity of the population, which makes bread one of the main affordable
staples.”1 In the responses these were producers of bread and related products (8
companies), milk (7 companies), meat (4 companies), alcohol (3 companies), and
cooking oil and related products (2 companies).2 As a few of our respondents put it –
these companies have enough work as it is, so there is no need to worry about
competition, strategies, and other things.

Business Life, Politics, and Institutions
When I was planning this study, my starting point was my own life experience
with change, or rather the lack thereof, in Russia. I could clearly see that all the theories
about market, transition, and economic transformations were as far removed from what
was happening in my part of the country, as the old communist regime was from
capitalism. I remember trying to explain to an American friend of mine how all these
theories of supply and demand that they had started to teach in Russia did not apply to
real life. It was difficult for my friend, an economist by training, to even comprehend that
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these ‘laws’ of nature could not work. So, I embarked on my study to demonstrate just
what I meant by showing that the communist past was not a simple mistake of fate, that
each communist regime developed according to its country’s culture and historical
development, and that the transition from it has not been such an overwhelming change
as the Western media and scholarship portrayed it. I was trying, in other words, to
demonstrate how ethnocentric and narrow approaches to understanding the process of
transition had been in the West.
Little did I know that my ideas of ‘no change’ were just as ethnocentric and
narrow. I had made the same mistake as the others – I based my understanding of the
political and economic processes in other communist countries on my observations of
what was happening in Russia. Putting forth an argument that each communist country
had followed its unique path of development, I, nevertheless, failed to consider that the
process of development and change for each country was as unique and different as the
development itself. Seeing no substantive change in the life of Russia I assumed that
Hungarians must not have seen any substantive change as well and have simply had more
luck with the reforms, because of their previous historical development and culture.
The survey results demonstrated my narrow approach quite clearly. Not only have
Hungarian businesspeople experienced a change of regime (or at least perceive to have
experienced one), they see changes with every new government and all major policy
initiatives. These have little or no effect on Russian businesses. The formal institutional
environment of Hungarian business life is very much functional, as can be seen through
its significant influence on the enterprises, whereas the influence of the Russian formal
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institutional environment on businesses is practically absent, which had led me to believe
in the first place that no change had happened at the institutional level. Let me elaborate
on each point in greater detail.
What we have seen as a result of the survey is that Hungarian society reacted to
the transition processes and political developments afterwards as was expected by its
designers, and much more so than Russian society. The regime change in Hungary is
associated with the creation of a more open economy, more freedom, more business
opportunities, and a significant change in the enterprise business environment, the job of
a manager, and the relationship between businesses and government. The governments of
József Antall, Gyula Horn, Viktor Orbán, and Péter Medgyessy had brought in their own
agendas and the people could feel the difference in the approaches of their different
parties. These differences in party platforms constitute the core of a pluralist society, in
which various political groups should represent diverse opinions and approaches.
Membership in the European Union raises concerns about an increase in competition,
stricter rules and regulations, but also brings hope that Hungary would catch up with the
Western World in technology and the efficiency of the government.
In Russia, out of everything the country has gone through, only the crisis of 1998
seems to have left an imprint on the majority of the managers. Even in this case, though,
most managers simply remembered the event and could not identify what kind of
influence it may have had on their business environment and work. The majority of the
respondents remembered neither Perestroika, nor the Putsch of August of 1991, when the
old time communists tried to oust Michael Gorbachev and stop the processes that were
leading towards the break up of the Soviet Union. The managers that did think that those
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events were important perceived their influence only in the emergence of a greater
number of small companies and, thus, their competition. No qualitative changes in their
work, business environment, or relationship between government and businesses were
recognized.
One explanation for these different perceptions of the political and economic
events in the two countries does stand out from the historical analysis presented in
previous chapters. The difference in the role of law and legitimacy between the two
countries and the duality of the Russian mentality and life from the times of the tsar all
throughout communism may provide a good insight as to why the Russian
businesspeople did not perceive much change in their business lives as a result of major
political events and the Hungarian businesspeople did.
The presence and the supremacy of the rule of law in Hungary have meant that
laws and regulations have legitimacy and, thus, their intentions are carried out into real
life. As a result we see real policy changes with every new government and new policy
initiatives. Hence, the complaints of the Hungarian businesspeople about uncertainties
that arise with every change of cabinet, changing laws as a result of it, and dissatisfaction
with the policies of then current government.
The low legitimacy of the law in Russia leads to its inability to translate
government’s goals into real actions. In Russia, official rules have never had very much
presence in real life and the development of the society has always been determined by
the development of informal, unofficial rules. Marina Kurkchiyan presents a model of the
Soviet society based on the interrelation of these two realms – official and unofficial, in
which the official realm was simply a formality that was easy to satisfy with very
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minimum effort.3 The duality of life was universal for every citizen regardless of
position. “It was not a matter of ‘officials’ applying the laws and procedures while
ordinary people fought against them; everyone was involved, including officials.”4 To
illustrate how insignificant the position of the formal realm was Kurkchiyan refers to a
Bulgarian aphorism – “It is like a door in the middle of an open field. Only a fool would
use the door.”5
Kurkchiyan determines that this duality of life has not changed since the
communist regime collapsed. A response that the author received from one of her
interviewees in Ukraine to the question ‘why does not the law work?’ is what the Russian
respondents in the survey presented in this work were indirectly saying through their
inability to identify any official changes that had influenced their work – “’Who says
that it does not work? It might work, but who cares about it enough to try it?’” 6 The result
– the official realm, which the questions in the current study were concerned with, have
had as much effect on the business life as that door in the field would have if one tried to
use it to keep people from crossing the field.
An example of a court case provided by Kurkchiyan illustrates this logic in action.
Some time in the 1990s, Armenian Airlines was taken to court by a private news agency.7
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The agency had a contract with the airline that was breached by the airline when the new
management came and decided that they no longer wanted the services of the agency.
The contract presumed a provision of certain services by the agency in exchange for a
monthly payment from the airline. The agency took the airline to court after it had
accumulated a substantial debt and the court ordered the airline to pay the agency its
debts, thus, abide by the terms of the contract.
To an outside observer not familiar with the politics behind the case, the case is
very simple – the court acted in a professional manner and in accordance with the law.
The two sides involved, though, did not think that the decision of the court had anything
to do with the law. The representative of the news agency was convinced that the agency
had won the case only because the government was planning to privatize the airline and,
thus, was deliberately weakening the airline so that it could be cheaply sold to a member
of the ruling elite. Otherwise, the state would have intervened and helped the airline win.
The lawyer for the airline believed that they had lost the case, because the judge was
afraid that an alternative decision would have caused an outbreak of criticism in the
media and a conflict with the media overall.
This case could just as well have happened in Russia. It provides a good metaphor
for the working of Russian society – everything, even a court decision, has a dual
meaning. Even in times when the law is obviously being observed, as in the previous
case, people do not accept it at its face value and look for hidden reasons. This, in turn,
pre-disposes people to act in such a way that official rules and regulations lose their
meaning – they are not believed to make a difference and, thus, are disregarded.

Karapetyan, Zinaida, 2005, UMSL, p. 276

The changing perception of social time in the life of Russian managers may have
contributed to the low perception of the importance of major political events as well.
Social time refers to a group’s perception of when social events occur and it identifies a
social phenomenon in its relation to a different social phenomenon that is used as a
starting point.8 Using the change of the regime as a starting point for the creation of a free
economy in the country would be an example of what social time means, because the
stress is not simply on the date when the regime changed, but on the qualitative change
that the change of the regime entailed for the society. The Soviet government, for
example, identified the origin of all the positive developments in the country with the
October Revolution and all the negative developments with the old bourgeois regime,
thus, using the social time for reference. Likewise, today, in Russia the ‘winners’ in the
transition game identify all the bad features of the society with communism and
communists and all the good ones with the ‘new’ era. The social time is, thus, socially
constructed and is not a continuous phenomenon.
According to Anna Federova, one of the characteristics of the social environment
in Russia today is its period of ‘timelessness.’ 9 “In such a situation social and subjective
time no longer correlate with each other and the time structure of ‘past-present-future’ is
destroyed. The past loses its meaning, including at the level of social and personal
memory; the present is shaky and unclear; the future is conditional and unpredictable and
does not originate from the present.” 10 This may explain why the respondents of the
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survey did not make any correlation between the past events in the country and their
current state of being.
A study of Russian business elite conducted in collaboration with the Russian
Academy of Sciences has demonstrated this phenomenon in relations to the future – the
respondents of that study were reluctant to discuss models of the country’s development
in the next 10-15 years: “If you start developing hard plans and forecasts, you, in
advance, increase the chances of failure. If you just feel your way through, you can
intuitively feel the situation and do not burden yourself with obligations that are beyond
your ability to fulfill;” 11 “I live in a situation of risky uncertainty....I know that I
personally will survive....But how long will I exist doing what I am doing, that I don’t
know. And neither do hundreds of other businesspeople...’”

12

Instability and legal

‘chaos’ make the business environment unpredictable and the need to look beyond a few
years ahead may not pay off, because the future is too uncertain.
Apparently the present does not have much of an influence on Russian
businesspeople either. While the majority of the Hungarian respondents experience some
kind of obstacles from their external institutional environment, including high taxes, bad
policies, and burdening economic regulations, the Russian respondents perceive very
minimal impact of institutions on their work. This either means that the institutions
indeed do not pose any constraints, or they do, but the respondents do not see them or do
not want to disclose them.
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The first scenario is highly unlikely. One only needs to look at any discussion of
the business environment in Russia to see that its institutions are anything but business
friendly.
The second scenario may incorporate a number of features. First, it is possible
that the respondents are aware of all the externally imposed difficulties, but do not see
them as such, because they have become a normal part of their business life. Second, the
respondents do not want to talk about them, because they do not want to ‘look bad’ and
want to appear in ‘control’ as was a common ‘strategy’ of communists. Third, any
external constraints can get taken care of through informal ‘transactions’- corruption or
criminal activities, and, thus, either cannot be talked about or do not represent much of a
problem.
Considering the pervasiveness of corruption and criminalization of the Russian
economy overall, the third alternative probably dominated the answers, even though the
first two may have had an influence as well.
As in Soviet times, when corruption and criminal activities were an inseparable
part of the official economy, Russian economic life today is no exception. Every problem
can be solved by paying someone – either a corrupt bureaucrat or a criminal group. A
Russian businessman, who owns a small-scale production business, once told me that no
tax inspector has ever seen his books, because the inspector gets ‘taken care of’ before
he/she reaches them. If it is easy to pay someone off, then constraints stop being a
problem.
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An example provided by Kurkchiyan supports the above point very well.13 All
respondents in her study of Armenian, Russian, and Ukrainian legal cultures indicated
that the majority of businesses fall in the ‘gray’ area of legality in those countries. To
explain what that meant an Armenian businessman gave an example of how he uses two
different lists for recording employees’ salaries. One list goes to the tax inspector and
records lower salaries than what employees really get paid to reduce the company’s
social security payments. The other list is only meant for internal use and it contains the
actual amounts paid to each employee. The tax inspector is aware of the practice; and
neither side (neither the manager, nor the tax inspector) makes it a secret. Despite being
clearly illegal, the practice nevertheless is accepted as normal by everyone involved and
does not represent a problem to either party.
Since the current study did not question the respondents about these issues, it is
impossible to make any definite conclusions in this regard. Considering the overall trend
in the country, however, it is highly possible to attribute the lack of influence of formal
institutions in the study to widespread corruption and criminalization of the economy.
In chapters 1 and 4, a mention was made of the concentration of businesses in the
hands of a few oligarchs in Russia. This theme surfaced during the discussion of the
Russian respondents with interviewers as well. No specific notes were made, but the
main interviewer that was working with me on the research would often describe a
company in relation to another company as owned by the same people or having some
kind of a connection. In the survey this probably manifested itself in the fact that most of
the Russian respondents were hired directors and not the owners themselves.
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The legacy of one-man management in the Soviet Union can be seen in the goal
and strategy setting practice among the Russian respondents – the owner, though not
being involved in the day-to-day management of the business, sets the goals for the
business overall and the director and/or the marketing department implements those
goals. The study of Russian business elite mentioned above observes the tendency as
well. The respondents of that study provided the following justifications for being
unwilling to transfer full management rights to the top management of their companies:
the immature state of market relations in the country makes it difficult to manage a
business and make it profitable – “the owner can hire management, other people, but he
himself has to run his business;” there is a weak guarantee of protection of ownership
rights; there is a lack of trust in other people, which leads to the conviction that the
manager would eventually steal the property; there is a belief that the strategy can only be
decided by one person – the owner. 14 Despite the seeming diversity of the answer, they
all have one common link – they assume one-person ownership of business, even though
the respondents were all owners of large-size business organizations.
Hungary made the first steps towards a corporate type of management already in
the first half of the 1980s with the transfer of management and some property rights to
employee councils or general meetings placing the manager under the authority of these
bodies as well. During interviews the majority of the Hungarian respondents while
describing their goal and strategy setting procedure either used ‘we’ in their answers such
as “we always consider the needs of our partners...,” “we do market research...,” “our
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aim...,” or put a stress on following a certain plan. The exception were enterprises
employing only a few people, in which the owner makes most decisions himself/herself,
The elitist nature of the Russian economy is directly derived from the elitist
nature of the Soviet economy. When the ideological change finally gave room to private
initiative and state property was beginning to be transferred to private hands, there were
only three groups that had access to these state resources – the black market
entrepreneurs, directors of state enterprises, and the party and komsomol leaders.
According to a Moscow sociologist, two-thirds of the new Russian businesspeople come
from the Soviet nomenklatura [former party apparatus], and the most successful and the
richest ones started out with having support from within the state; “’They were never
small and they were never poor.’”
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constitute another large group of owners, who had acquired their businesses through
privatization; “most of today’s directors are former black market entrepreneurs.”
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The

old political and economic elite, then, simply changed names and places, but remained in
power.
This process has led to the inter-penetration of the business world and the
government: “most of the government officials now are involved in business, which
means the same people run the government and business.” 17 In contrast, when the
Hungarian businesspeople complained about involvement of the government in the
economy, they stressed the imposition of economic regulators such as high taxes or
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giving preferential credits to people with connections, rather than the ‘joint ownership’ of
the two.
The elitist nature of the Russian economy also contrasts with the ‘second class’
nature of the Hungarian economy. Not only were the majority of the Hungarian
respondents the owners themselves that participated in the day-to-day operation of the
business, a number of them had established their businesses anew, because they had lost
their old jobs and had to figure something out to survive.
If the Russian respondents were more or less uniform in their ‘reluctance’ to
pinpoint what political events had influenced their business world, the Hungarian
respondents were as much divided on just what kind of an effect the main political events
had had. While giving the change of the regime a high rating of influence on a sevenpoint index, opinions still ranged from “political and economic empires separated” to
“the politics and the economy came closer to each other.”
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One explanation that the

historical analysis may offer to this contradictory trend is the diversity of economic
behaviors that were present in Hungary during the communist regime. The discussion in
chapter 4 provided examples of more market-oriented subsidiaries of large state
enterprises, or of the entrepreneurial nature of semi-private enterprises, or of the
widespread private activity of ordinary citizens. These various backgrounds could be
manifesting themselves in the answers of the respondents as well. Someone who worked
for a subsidiary of a state enterprise or for a semi-private enterprise in the communist
times may have felt less of an effect of politics on hi/her work than now, as opposed to
someone who worked for a state enterprise that was directly subordinated to the ministry.
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Concluding Remarks
This research has provided a general overview of the differences in the Hungarian
and Russian economic developments; illustrated how these differences played out at the
end of the communist era; and connected some of them to the present-day situation.
Because of the complexity of issues involved in development, the study only touched
upon general social, economic, and political tendencies, and omitted many details.
The study quite clearly demonstrated the persistence of main characteristics of a
society through time and the continuity in its development. Recognition of those
characteristics and the limitations that they may impose on the process of change can
make the process much more efficient. For example, accepting the fact that Russia
always lacked the rule of law would have required an absolutely different transition
strategy – one that would rely less on changing laws and regulations, but would rely
more, may be, on strong leadership. May be the ‘right’ strategy would have required a
very slow and gradual process of transition, one that would have acknowledged the
country’s limitations and proceeded accordingly.
It is not my intention here to suggest the route that Russia should have taken. This
is a far more complex and multi-dimensional question, with which this study cannot and
does not want to cope. My intention is to point out that history and culture manifest
themselves in more than just little trinkets like nesting dolls or tee shirts with McLenin on
the front. History and culture are present in every aspect of society.
When Vladimir Putin announced that governors of Russian regions would, from
then on, be appointed by the President and not elected by the people, the Western
observers ‘issued’ an alert of de-democratization in Russia. The Russian people sighed
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with relief – ‘hopefully order will be restored.’ People put more trust in the President,
than in elections, not necessarily because they do not trust themselves, but more likely
because they do not trust the system. They could never trust the system, and the only way
order has ever been restored in the country is by having a strong ruler taking charge of it.
Even I remember people recollecting, with nostalgia, their memories of Stalin’s times as
the safest and the most orderly.
Hungary’s uniqueness may seem to have generated less attention in this research
than Russia’s specific features. This is not out of disregard for the country. In the subjects
that have been covered by this work Hungary represents the ‘model’ and Russia
represents the deviation from the ‘model.’ The general strategy of the transition process
of the 1990s found a good match in the Hungarian system – the country had had a long
history of private initiative, the market mechanism had already been introduced into the
system, its legal system had operated well, and the rule of law had prevailed, just to name
a few. All these elements were necessary for the transition to be successful. Russia, on
the other hand, did not have any of those elements. It has not developed them in the
1990s either, not because its process of transition was poorly designed, but because its
logic of operation was absolutely different. Hence, it was not ready for major changes
and was not receptive to them.
The countries find themselves at different crossroads today as well. Hungary is a
member of the European Union and all its hopes lie in the West. Its economic and
political system with time will resemble that of a Western European nation even more. Its
business practices, as well, will approximate those of a mature market economy quite
soon.
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Russia’s situation is much more ambiguous. It finally has a President that seems
to have power and ability to bring the country out of crisis, but who readily utilizes his
power to breach the law or to increase his authority when he considers it necessary.
Despite quite successful market transformations in the capital, the country’s periphery
still significantly lacks behind. I, like the managers in one of the above-mentioned
studies, am very reluctant to provide any predictions of the country’s development in the
future - it is just too uncertain.
Where can the research idea advanced by this study go next and what lessons does
it provide? In application to the two countries under consideration the analysis can be
expanded by narrowing its focus to a particular issue or a set of interrelated issues, such
as the development of the rule of law and the government legitimacy, depending on what
aspect of these two countries’ developments one is wishing to study. In application to
analyzing the transition process in other former communist countries, the study suggests
that possibly these and other elements, such as history of the development of private
initiative during communism and before, can explain certain successes and failures of the
process in those countries as well.
The main lesson of the study, though, is in demonstrating the importance of
country-specific characteristics for development by building an illustrative case of how
the developments of the two countries have proceeded according to their own history and
tradition. It implies, then, that understanding history and culture of any country would
significantly improve understanding of that country’s current and future economic and
political processes.
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APPENDIX 1
SELECTION OF REGIONS
Originally, the survey was to be administered in Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok county in
Hungary and the Saratov region in Russia. The Saratov region was chosen because it is
my home region. Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok county was chosen because its rank among the
other Hungarian counties on the volume of industrial output (63rd, 3rd quartile) was
comparable to the rank of the Saratov region (67th, 3rd quartile) among other Russian
regions (Tables 2.1 and 2.2). Considering that the Saratov region is industrial-agrarian
(about 20% of its economically active population is employed in industry and another
20% in agriculture)1, Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok county was preferred over KomáromEsztergom county, which ranked 68th on the industrial output and also fell into the 3rd
quartile, because the proportion of its economically active population employed in
agriculture is higher than that in Komárom-Esztergom county.2
During the survey preparation stage, in 2002-2003, in compliance with Act XXI
of 1996 on Regional Development and Regional Planning, a system of planningstatistical regions was set up in Hungary. As a result, Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok county was
incorporated into the Northern Great Plain planning-statistical region along with HajdúBihar and Szbolcs-Szatmá-Bereg counties.

1

Calculated on the basis of the data provided on the web-site of the regional government at
http://www.saratov.gov.ru/region/population/index.html?lang=en (in English)
2

According to the 2001 Census data, available at http://www.nepszamlalas.hu/eng/, the
proportions of economically active population employed in agriculture and industry in Jász-NagykunSzolnok county are 9% and 28% respectively and in Komárom-Esztergom county are 4% and 33%
respectively.
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The new system was set up to bring the country’s territorial division in line with
the requirements of the European Union’s territorial classification system, NUTS
(Nomenclature des Units Territoriales Statistiques – The Nomenclature of Territorial
Units for Statistics). There are three levels of NUTS territorial units, which are arranged
hierarchically. NUTS level 1 units incorporate major socio-economic regions of each
member state; in some cases a level 1 unit is represented by a whole country. NUTS level
2 units are the basic regions, within the framework of which regional policies are
normally developed. The Northern Great Plain region constitutes a level 2 unit.
Individual counties are level 3 units.
Since the new planning-statistical regions are to become the basic units of
regional development, I decided to incorporate the whole region into the survey, rather
than just one county. Even though Hajdú-Bihar and Szbolcs-Szatmá-Bereg counties have
a lower level of industrial output than Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok county, overall the region
is still a good fit for comparison with the Saratov region. Its volume of industrial output
among other planning-statistical regions falls right in the middle (Table 2.3), and the
regions that have a higher level of industrial output have a very narrow agricultural
sector, which makes them bad fits for comparison with the industrial-agrarian Saratov
region. The Northern Great Plain region with a total population of 1,547,748 people is
also a better unit of comparison to the Saratov region (population of 2,680,000) size-wise
than Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok county on its own with a population of only 417,008 people.
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Table 1.1. Industrial Output by Region, Russia, 1999
Region
Chechnya
Evenkiyskiy autonomous okrug
Aginskiy Buryatskiy autonomous okrug
Taymyrskiy autonomous okrug
Ust'-Ordynskiy autonomousokrug
Altay
Komi-Permyatskiy autonomous okrug
Ingushetiya
Tyva
Yevreyskaya autonomous oblast
Kalmykiya
Chukotskiy autonomous okrug
Karachayevo-Cherkesiya
Koryakskiy autonomous okrug
Adygeya
Severnaya Osetiya
Kabardino-Balkariya
Dagestan
Nenetskiy autonomous okrug
Pskovskaya oblast
Amurskaya oblast
Mariy-El
Chitinskaya oblast
Magadanskaya oblast
Buryatiya
Kamchatskaya oblast
Tambovskaya oblast
Kostromskaya oblast
Bryanskaya oblast
Orlovskaya oblast
Ivanovskaya oblast
Kaliningradskaya oblast
Mordoviya
Tyumenskaya oblast
Astrakhanskaya oblast
Khakasiya
Kurganskaya oblast
Kaluzhskaya oblast
Penzenskaya oblast
Chuvashiya
Novgorodskaya oblast
Sakhalinskaya oblast
Ryazanskaya oblast
Tomskaya oblast
Omskaya oblast
Kareliya
Smolenskaya oblast
Tverskaya oblast
Kurskaya oblast
Stavropol'skiykray

Industrial Output (million Rub.)

Percent Rank

0
13
61
67
120
230
250
410
610
870
910
1,800
1,900
1,900
2,000
3,100
3,700
3,800
3,900
5,100
6,800
6,800
7,100
7,400
8,300
8,800
9,100
9,300
9,900
9,900
10,000
10,000
10,000
10,000
11,000
11,000
11,000
12,000
13,000
14,000
14,000
14,000
16,000
16,000
17,000
18,000
19,000
19,000
20,000
20,000

0.00
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
0.09
0.10
0.11
0.13
0.13
0.15
0.16
0.17
0.18
0.20
0.21
0.22
0.22
0.24
0.25
0.26
0.28
0.29
0.30
0.31
0.31
0.33
0.33
0.33
0.33
0.38
0.38
0.38
0.41
0.43
0.44
0.44
0.44
0.47
0.47
0.49
0.51
0.52
0.52
0.54
0.54
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Table 1.1. Industrial Output by Region, Russia, 1999 (Continued)
Region
Altayskiy kray
Ul'yanovskaya oblast
Kirovskaya oblast
Novosibirskaya oblast
Vladimirskaya oblast
Voronezhskaya oblast
Arkhangel'skaya oblast
Khabarovskiy kray
Tul'skaya oblast
Belgorodskaya oblast
Saratovskaya oblast (Saratov Region)
Udmurtiya
Leningradskaya oblast
Yaroslavskaya oblast
Murmanskaya oblast
Primorskiy kray
Komi
Rostovskaya oblast
Lipetskaya oblast
Krasnodarskiy kray
Orenburgskaya oblast
Volgogradskaya oblast
Yamalo-Nenetskiy autonomous okrug
Sakha
Vologodskaya oblast
Kemerovskaya oblast
Irkutskaya oblast
Nizhegorodskaya oblast
Permskaya oblast
Moskovskaya oblast
Bashkortostan
Chelyabinskaya oblast
Sankt-Peterburg (Saint Petersburg)
Tatarstan
Samarskaya oblast
Sverdlovskaya oblast
Krasnoyarskiy kray
Khanty-Mansiyskiy autonomous okrug
Moskva (Moscow)
Min value
1st quartile
Median
3rd quartile
Max value

Industrial Output (million Rub.)
21,000
21,000
23,000
24,000
24,000
24,000
25,000
25,000
28,000
30,000
30,000
33,000
34,000
34,000
35,000
35,000
36,000
38,000
39,000
41,000
41,000
41,000
42,000
51,000
54,000
64,000
72,000
73,000
77,000
82,000
90,000
91,000
100,000
100,000
110,000
110,000
120,000
180,000
180,000

Percent Rank
0.56
0.56
0.59
0.60
0.60
0.60
0.63
0.63
0.66
0.67
0.67
0.69
0.70
0.70
0.72
0.72
0.75
0.76
0.77
0.78
0.78
0.78
0.82
0.83
0.84
0.85
0.86
0.87
0.89
0.90
0.91
0.92
0.93
0.93
0.95
0.95
0.98
0.99
0.99

13
7,325
17,500
36,500
180,000

Source: Practical Science Database (in Russian), March 2002, available at http://www.sci.aha.ru/cgi-bin/regbase.pl . (based on the data
published by the Russian Statistical Office in statistical bulletin “Regions of Russia, 2000”)
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Table 1.2. Industrial Output by County, Hungary, 1999
County
Nógrád county
Somogy county
Tolna county
Békés county
Baranya county
Heves county
Csongrád county
Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg county
Veszprém county
Bács-Kiskun county
Hajdú-Bihar county
Zala county
Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok county
Komárom-Esztergom county
Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén county
Vas county
Pest county
Gyõr-Moson-Sopron county
Fejér county
Budapest

Industrial Output
(million HUF)
100,000
170,000
173,000
180,000
200,000
206,000
230,000
242,000
257,000
270,000
270,000
293,000
300,000
367,000
494,000
511,000
693,000
1,148,000
1,340,000
1,412,000

Min value

100,000

1st quartile

204,500

Median

270,000

3rd quartile

498,250

Max value

1,412,000

Source: Central Statistical Office, Hungary.

Percent Rank
0.00
0.05
0.11
0.16
0.21
0.26
0.32
0.37
0.42
0.47
0.47
0.58
0.63
0.68
0.74
0.79
0.84
0.89
0.95
1.00

Karapetyan, Zinaida, 2005, UMSL, p 291

Table 1.3. Industrial Output by Region, Hungary, 1999.

Regions

Counties

Industrial Output
(million HUF)
543,000

South Transdanubia
Baranya

200,000

Somogy

170,000

Tolna

173,000

0.00
680,000

Southern Great Plain
Bács-Kiskun

270,000

Békés

180,000

Csongrád

230,000

0.17
800,000

N. Hungary
Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén

494,000

Heves

206,000

Nógrád

100,000

Northern Great Plain

0.33
812,000

Hajdú-Bihar

270,000

Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok

300,000

Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg

242,000

0.50
1,952,000

West Transdanubia
Gyõr-Moson.-Sopron

1,148,000

Vas

511,000

Zala

293,000

0.67
1,964,000

Central Transdanubia
Fejér

1,340,000

Komáron-Esztergom

367,000

Veszprém

257,000

0.83
2,105,000

Central Hungary
Budapest

1,412,000

Pest

693,000

Source: Central Statistical Office, Hungary.

Percent Rank

1.00
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APPENDIX 2
SAMPLING
The sample of Russian companies for the survey was drawn from the list of
manufacturing enterprises1 obtained from the Statistical Office of the Saratov Region.
The list contained 386 medium and large enterprises (100 and more employees) and 243
small enterprises (less than 100 employees). 2 The medium and large enterprises on the
list represented the population of all medium and large size enterprises in the region. The
small enterprises were a 20% random sample of all small-size enterprises in the region.3
The sample used for the survey was drawn by randomly sampling 100 enterprises
from each of the two size groups using Microsoft Excel’s random sampling tool. The
final sample consisted of 171 enterprises - 79 small-size enterprises and 92 medium- and
large-size enterprises, because a number of enterprises were randomly selected 2 or 3
times.
The Company-Code-Register (CÉG-KÓD-TÁR) disc produced by the Hungarian
National Statistical Office was used to obtain the population list for the Northern Great

1

Enterprises classified in Section D “Manufacturing Industry” of the Russian Classification
System of Economic Activity (Obscherossiiskii Klassifikator Vidov Ekonomicheskoy Deyatelnosti
(OKVED), http://www.gks.ru/scripts/free/1c.exe?XXXX66R.1 (in Russian)) or of the Hungarian NACE
classification system available at http://www.fifoost.org/database/nace/index_en.php. The two countries
have recently adopted the same classification system based on the European Union’s standard.
2

The Statistical Services classify enterprises only in two categories – small-size enterprises and
medium- and large-size enterprises. Any division of enterprises into other size categories could only be
accomplished if the employment data were available for each enterprise. These data become available only
at the end of July – beginning of August of every year. I was time-constrained and had to undertake the
survey before the data became available. I, however, tried to obtain the employment and income data for
the previous year, 2002, but that was the last year when the old classification system of economic activities
was used and, thus, the enterprises that would fall under Section D of the new classification system were
classified in different sections of the old system. Since the Statistical Services kept the data for every year
separately, it was impossible to link the enterprises from Section D of the new classification system with
the data for those enterprises for previous years.
3

The population list of small enterprises is not available for public.
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Plain Region of Hungary. NACE codes 1511 -3720 for manufacturing4 were used to
identify companies for the study. It yielded a total number of 4,271 companies. The
database contained a revenue category and a staff category. All companies that did not
have revenue and/or staff data were eliminated – 187 companies. Out of the 4,084
remaining, 2,494 companies were in the category of 4 or less employees. These
companies were also excluded, because the predominant number of those entries were
more likely to be private individuals engaged in a production of meat or some other
product without establishing a formal organization to carry out their activity. The object
of the research was to study business practices of organizations. The final population of
companies from which the Hungarian sample for the study was drawn consisted of 1,590
companies with 5 or more employees.
All companies in the Hungarian population were divided into 3 revenue
categories: R1 - less than $250,000, R2 - $250,000-$1,500,000, and R3 - more than
$1,500,000;5 the percentage of each category in the total population was calculated; on
the basis of these percentages the number of responses required from each category to
yield 50 responses in total were calculated (Table 1). Table 1 also shows the number of
companies that had to be drawn from each category to obtain a sample of 200 companies.
these numbers were multiplied
4 Distribution
(see Tableof1).Companies by Revenue
Tableby
2.1.
Revenue Category
R1 - Less than $250,000
R2 - $250,000 - $1,500,000
R3 – More than $1,500,000
Total

4

See footnote 1.

Number of Companies /
Percent total
600 / 38%
626 / 39%
364 / 23%
1,590 / 100%

Number of responses / number
drawn
19 / 76
20 / 80
11 / 44
50 / 200
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The final Hungarian sample was 188 companies, because 5 companies were
drawn twice from R1 category, 4 companies were drawn twice from R2 category, and 3
companies were drawn twice from R3 category.

5

These amounts are approximate, because they were calculated by conversion of the original
revenue categories that were given in Forints (the National Hungarian Currency) into dollars using the rate
of $1 = 200 Forints.
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APPENDIX 3
BUSINESS PRACTICES AND PERSONAL OPINION
QUESTIONNAIRE
I. Organization’s Description and Respondent’s Information
1. What is your organization’s field of business? ________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________

2. Approximately, when was the organization established? _______________________
3. Is your organization:
r privately owned
Privatized? r Yes r No
r state owned
r mixed private and state ownership
Approximately _________% private Approximately ___________% state
3.1. What is your organization's legal structure?_________________________________
4. Approximately, what percent of the ownership of the organization is each of the
following? (These should sum to l00%.)
__________% domestic (within the country)

___________% foreign (outside the country)

5. Approximately, how many full-time employees does your organization have? ______
6. What is your position in the organization?____________________________________
7. What are your responsibilities?_____________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________

8. Have you ever had any management training (courses, seminars, diploma, etc.)?
r Yes (please specify)
r No
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________

Karapetyan, Zinaida, 2005, UMSL, p 296

9. Please select your age-group: r less than 25 r 25-35 r 35-45 r 45-55 r 55 or above
10. Gender of the respondent

r Male r Female

II. Business Practices
11. Does your organization have a mission statement?

r Yes

r No

r Don’t know

(Is there a specific sentence that your organization uses to describe its purpose?)
11.1 What is your organization’s mission statement? _____________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________

12. Does your organization set strategic goals?

r Yes

r No

r Don’t know

12.1 Could you list current goals of your organization? ___________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________

13. Does your organization make a plan or a strategy to achieve the goals?
r Yes

r No

r Don’t know

13.1 How far ahead do you plan or strategize?__________________________________
13.2 What is the process by which your organization determines the goals and its plan or
strategy? ________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________

14. Do you measure your organization’s performance? r Yes

r No

r Don’t know
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14.1 Approximately, how often do you measure your organization’s performance?
r Weekly
r Monthly
r Quarterly
r Every six month
r Yearly
r Other _______________________________________________________________
14.2 What measures do you use to measure your organization’s performance? ________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________

15.1. Are there any external (outside of your organization) factors that facilitate the
achievement of your organization’s goals and the execution of its plan or strategy, or
that positively effect your organization’s performance? r Yes (specify) r No r
Don’t know
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________

15.2. Are there any external (outside of your organization) constraints or obstacles that
make it difficult for your organization to achieve its goals, execute its plan or strategy,
or that negatively effect your organization’s performance?
r Yes (specify) r No r Don’t know
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
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15.3. Are there any internal (within your organization) factors that facilitate the
achievement of your organization’s goals and the execution of its plan or strategy, or
that positively effect your organization’s performance?
r Yes (specify)

r No

r Don’t know

______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________

15.4. Are there any internal (within your organization) constraints or obstacles that make
it difficult for your organization to achieve its goals, execute its plan or strategy, or
that negatively effect your organization’s performance?
r Yes (specify)

r No

r Don’t know

______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________

16. Does your organization have competitors on the market? r Yes r No r Don’t know
16.1 What is your market share? __________________________________________
(if don’t know, how many competitors do you have?)
17. Is it necessary for an organization in your business environment to have regular
evaluation of its competitors’ performance/strengths/weaknesses/strategies?
not at all
1

to a great extent
2

3

4

5

6

7

17.1 Approximately, how often does your organization evaluate its competitors’
performance/strengths/weaknesses/strategies?
r Weekly
r Monthly
r Quarterly
r Every six month
r Yearly
r Other _______________________________________________________________
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17.2 How do you evaluate your competitors’ performance / strengths / weaknesses /
strategies?
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________

18. Is it necessary for an organization in your business environment to regularly evaluate
its products’ quality vis-a-vis its competitors’ products’ quality?
not at all
1

to a great extent
2

3

4

5

6

7

18.1 Approximately, how often does your organization evaluate its products’ quality visa-vis your competitors’ products’ quality?
r Weekly
r Monthly
r Quarterly
r Every six month
r Yearly
r Other _______________________________________________________________
18.2 How do you evaluate your products’ quality vis-a-vis your competitors’ products’
quality?
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________

19. Is it necessary for an organization in your business environment to regularly evaluate
its customers’ satisfaction?
not at all
1

to a great extent
2

3

4

5

6

7
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19.1 Approximately, how often does your organization evaluate its customers’
satisfaction?
r Weekly
r Monthly
r Quarterly
r Every six month
r Yearly
r Other _______________________________________________________________
19.2 How do you evaluate your customers’ satisfaction?
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________

III. Personal Opinion
20. In your lifetime what kind of political and economic changes have happened in your
country that have had an altering effect on your business environment? __________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________

21. What time period or years do you associate with each change? __________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________

22. To what extent do you think these changes have effected your local business
environment?
not at all
1

to a great extent
2

3

4

5

6

7
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22.1 Please specify the effects of each change on your local business environment.
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________

23. To what extent do you think these changes have affected the job of a manager like
you?
not at all
1

to a great extent
2

3

4

5

6

7

23.1 Please specify the effects of each change on the job of a manager like you.
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________

24. To what extent do you think these changes have affected the qualities or skills that are
required to perform the job of a manager like you?
not at all
1

to a great extent
2

3

4

5

6

7

24.1. What kind of qualities or skills are required to perform the job of a manager like
you in the current business environment? __________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
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24.2. What kind of qualities or skills do you think were required to perform the job of a
manager like you before each change? __________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________

25. To what extent do you think these changes have affected the relationship between the
government and businesses?
not at all
1

to a great extent
2

3

4

5

6

7

25.1. Please specify the effects. _____________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________________
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APPENDIX 4
MAPS OF RUSSIA AND HUNGARY

Saratov Region

Figure 4.1 Administrative Divisions, Russia

Figure 4.2 Counties and Planning–Statistical Regions, Hungary
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APPENDIX 5
GDP PER CAPITA AND ECONOMIC HEALTH INDICATOR BY
COUNTY AND REGION, HUNGARY.
Regions
Counties

GDP per capita (average = 100)
1975
1996
Change

Central Hungary
Budapest
139
Pest
61
C. Transdanubia
Fejér
106
Komáron-E.
131
Veszprém
116
W. Transdanubia
Gyõr-M.-S.
111
Vas
82
Zala
88
S. Transdanubia
Baranya
108
Somogy
71
Tolna
77
N. Hungary
Borsod-A.-Z.
111
Heves
100
Nógrád
77
N. Great Plain
Hajdú-B.
83
Jász-N.-Sz.
93
Szabolcs-Sz.-B.
59
S. Great Plain
Bács-K.
79
Békés
89
Csongrád
109
Hungary
100
Source: József Nemes-Nagy 2001, 46.

Economic Health (factor values)*
1990
1996
Change

186
74

47
13

3.22
0.72

2.80
0.48

-0.42
-0.23

102
89
80

-4
-42
-36

0.24
0.53
0.23

0.40
0.11
0.39

0.15
-0.42
0.16

110
109
93

-1
27
5

0.92
0.46
0.09

1.01
0.89
0.73

0.09
0.43
0.63

77
75
90

-31
4
13

0.27
-0.37
-0.24

0.01
-0.22
-0.43

-0.26
0.15
-0.20

70
73
57

-41
-27
-20

-1.01
-0.82
-0.95

-1.29
-0.50
-1.01

-0.29
0.33
-0.06

78
76
59

-5
-17
0

-0.44
-0.69
-1.65

-0.87
-0.80
-1.56

-0.42
-0.12
0.08

76
76
93
100

-3
-13
-16

0.00
-0.65
0.13
0.00

-0.15
-0.77
0.78
0.00

-0.15
-0.12
0.66

*High positive figures mean relatively high income levels, low unemployment rates, a large number of
business ventures, and a large volume of foreign capital investment. Figures close to zero represent the
average.
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APPENDIX 6
DISTRIBUTION OF COMPANIES ON THE POPULATION LIST BY
COMPANY SIZE AND THE SIZE OF THE TOWN WHERE THE
COMPANY IS LOCATED, RUSSIA

Town Size1

Small Enterprises

Medium and Large
Enterprises

Total

Number of people

Percent of Small Size
Companies in the Region

Less than 3,000

7

(3%)

18 (4%)

25 (4%)

3,000 – 9,999

16 (6%)

31 (8%)

47 (8%)

10,000 – 19,999

3

(1%)

27 (7%)

30 (5%)

20,000 – 49,999

9

(4%)

50 (13%)

59 (9%)

50,000 – 99,999

9

(4%)

31 (8%)

40 (6%)

100,000 – 249,999

48 (20%)

72 (19%)

120 (19%)

250,000 and more

151 (62%)

157 (41%)

308 (49%)

Total

243 (100%)

386 (100%)

629 (100%)

1

Percent of Medium and Large
Enterprises in the Region

Percent of Total in the
Region

The city population data were downloaded from http://www.perepis2002.ru/ct/html/TOM_01_04_4.htm (2002 Census; in
Russian).
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APPENDIX 7
DETAILED DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES TO BUSINESS
PRACTICE QUESTIONS
Table 7.1 Distribution of Responses by Whether the Company Has a Mission Statement or Not and by
Whether the Company Has Ever Been in State Ownership or Not, the Size of the Company, Industry, the
Size of the Town Where the Company is Located, Whether the Respondent Has Ever Had Any
Management Training or Not, the Age and Gender of the Respondent
Whether the company has ever been in state ownership or not1
Does your organization
have a mission statement?
Yes
No
Total

Hungary
No
30
14
44

Yes
3
5
8

Russia
No
5
13
18

Yes
8
24
32

Number of Employees
Does your organization
have a mission
statement?
Yes
No
Total

Town Size

less than 20

Hungary
20-49 50 or more

18
9
27

6
6
12

Hungary

11
4
15

Hungary

less than 20

Russia
20-49

50 or more

0
7
7

3
18
21

10
13
23

Russia

Russia

Number of people

Yes, we have a
mission statement

No mission statement

Yes, we have a
mission statement

No mission statement

Less than 3,000

1

5

0

2

3,000 – 9,999

3

5

1

3

10,000 – 19,999

4

1

0

4

20,000 – 49,999

7

3

0

7

50,000 – 99,999

2

1

2

1

100,000 – 249,999

18

4

1

5

250,000 and more

0

0

9

16

Total

35

19

13

38

1

To code this variable, three cases were dropped (the two private Hungarian companies that did
not identify if they were privatized or not and the Russian state owned company), the state-owned
Hungarian company that indicated that it is to be privatized within a year was coded as privatized, and the
Hungarian company in which the state has only intangible assets was coded as privatized. As a result, the
total for this variable is 102 responses.
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Manufacturing Categories

Hungary

Hungary

Yes, we have a
No mission
mission statement statement

1. (DA) Manufacturing of food products, beverages
and tobacco
2. (DB) Manufacturing of textiles and textile
products
3. (DC) Manufacturing of leather and leather
products
4. (DD) Manufacturing of wood and wood products
5. (DE) Manufacturing of pulp, paper and paper
products; publishing and printing
6. (DF) Manufacturing of coke, refined petroleum
products and nuclear fuel
7. (DG) Manufacturing of chemicals, chemical
products and man-made fibers
8. (DH) Manufacturing of rubber and plastic
products
9. (DI) Manufacturing of other non-metallic mineral
products
10. (DJ) Manufacturing of basic metals and
fabricated metal products
11. (DK) Manufacturing of machinery and
equipment n.e.c.
12. (DL) Manufacturing of electrical and optical
equipment
13. (DM) Manufacturing of transport equipment
14. (DN) Manufacturing n.e.c
Other
Total

Russia

Russia

Yes, we have a
No mission
mission statement statement

6

3

4

20

6

1

0

1

1

1

0

1

2
5

2
1

0
0

0
5

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

2

1

0

0

1

1

2

2

4

4

3

1

2

1

2

2

1

1

0

1

1
1
2
35

0
3
0
19

0
1
1
13

1
3
1
38

Age of the Respondent
Does your organization
have a mission statement?
Yes
No
Total

25-35
5
1
6

35-45
7
9
16

Yes
No
Total

25-35
3
2
5

35-45
8
25
33

Hungary
45-55
17
6
23
Russia
45-55
2
11
13

55 and above
6
3
9
55 and above
0
0
0

Gender of the Respondent
Does your organization
have a mission statement?
Yes
No
Total

Female
6
2
8

Hungary
Male
29
17
46

Female
2
6
8

Russia
Male
11
32
43
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Table 7.2 Distribution of Responses by Whether the Company Sets Strategic Goals or Not and by Whether
the Company Has Ever Been in State Ownership or Not, the Size of the Company, Industry, the Size of the
Town Where the Company Is Located, Whether the Respondent Has Ever Had Any Management Training
or Not, the Age and Gender of the Respondent
Whether the company has ever been in state ownership or not
Does your organization
set strategic goals?
Yes
No
Total

Yes
6
2
8

Hungary
No
36
8
44

Yes
16
16
32

Russia
No
7
11
18

Number of Employees
Does your organization
set strategic goals?
Yes
No
Total

less than 20
18
9
27

Hungary
20-49
12
0
12

Manufacturing Categories
1. (DA) Manufacturing of food products, beverages
and tobacco
2. (DB) Manufacturing of textiles and textile products
3. (DC) Manufacturing of leather and leather products
4. (DD) Manufacturing of wood and wood products
5. (DE) Manufacturing of pulp, paper and paper
products; publishing and printing
6. (DF) Manufacturing of coke, refined petroleum
products and nuclear fuel
7. (DG) Manufacturing of chemicals, chemical
products and man-made fibers
8. (DH) Manufacturing of rubber and plastic products
9. (DI) Manufacturing of other non-metallic mineral
products
10. (DJ) Manufacturing of basic metals and fabricated
metal products
11. (DK) Manufacturing of machinery and equipment
n.e.c.
12. (DL) Manufacturing of electrical and optical
equipment
13. (DM) Manufacturing of transport equipment
14. (DN) Manufacturing n.e.c
Other
Total

50 or more
14
1
15

Hungary

Yes, we have
strategic goals

less than 20
2
5
7

Hungary

No strategic
goals

Russia
20-49
6
15
21

Russia

50 or more
16
7
23

Yes, we have
strategic goals

Russia

No strategic
goals

7

2

11

13

5
1
3
4

2
1
1
2

0
1
0
1

1
0
0
4

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

3
1

0
1

0
1

0
3

7

1

4

0

3

0

2

2

2

0

1

0

1
4
2
44

0
0
0
10

1
1
1
24

0
3
1
27
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Town Size

Hungary

Hungary

Russia

Russia

Number of people

Yes, we have strategic
goals

No strategic goals

Yes, we have strategic
goals

No strategic goals

Less than 3,000

5

1

0

2

3,000 – 9,999

7

1

1

3

10,000 – 19,999

4

1

1

3

20,000 – 49,999

9

1

2

5

50,000 – 99,999

2

1

2

1

100,000 – 249,999

17

5

1

5

250,000 and more

0

0

17

8

Total

44

10

24

27

Management Training
Does your organization
set strategic goals?
Yes
No
Total

Some
22
5
27

Hungary
None
22
5
27

Some
8
2
10

Russia
None
16
25
41

Age of the Respondent
Does your organization
set strategic goals?
Yes
No
Total

25-35
5
1
6

35-45
12
4
16

Hungary
45-55
21
2
23

55 and above
6
3
9

Russia
45-55
4
9
13

55 and above
0
0
0

Age of the Respondent
Does your organization
set strategic goals?
Yes
No
Total

25-35
4
1
5

35-45
16
17
33

Gender of the Respondent
Does your organization
set strategic goals?
Yes
No
Total

Female
7
1
8

Hungary
Male
37
9
46

Female
3
5
8

Russia
Male
21
22
43
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Table 7.3 Distribution of Responses by Whether the Company Develops a Plan or Not and by Whether the
Company Has Ever Been In State Ownership or Not, the Size of the Company, Industry, the Size of the
Town Where the Company Is Located, Whether the Respondent Has Ever Had Any Management Training
or Not, the Age and Gender of the Respondent
Whether the company has ever been in state ownership or not
Does your organization
develop a plan?
Yes
No
Total

Hungary
No
25
19
44

Yes
7
1
8

Russia
No
8
10
18

Yes
13
19
32

Number of Employees
Does your
organization develop
a plan?
Yes
No
Total

less than 20

Hungary
20-49
50 or more

12
15
27

10
2
12

11
4
15

Manufacturing Categories
1. (DA) Manufacturing of food products, beverages
and tobacco
2. (DB) Manufacturing of textiles and textile products
3. (DC) Manufacturing of leather and leather products
4. (DD) Manufacturing of wood and wood products
5. (DE) Manufacturing of pulp, paper and paper
products; publishing and printing
6. (DF) Manufacturing of coke, refined petroleum
products and nuclear fuel
7. (DG) Manufacturing of chemicals, chemical
products and man-made fibers
8. (DH) Manufacturing of rubber and plastic products
9. (DI) Manufacturing of other non-metallic mineral
products
10. (DJ) Manufacturing of basic metals and fabricated
metal products
11. (DK) Manufacturing of machinery and equipment
n.e.c.
12. (DL) Manufacturing of electrical and optical
equipment
13. (DM) Manufacturing of transport equipment
14. (DN) Manufacturing n.e.c
Other
Total

less than 20

Russia
20-49

1
6
7

Hungary

Yes, we have a
plan

5
16
21

Hungary

No plan

Russia

Yes, we have a
plan

50 or more
16
7
23

Russia

No plan

5

4

7

17

3
1
1
4

4
1
3
2

0
1
0
1

1
0
0
4

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

2
1

1
1

0
2

0
2

6

2

4

0

2

1

3

1

2

0

1

0

1
3
1
33

0
1
1
21

1
1
1
22

0
3
1
29
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Town Size

Hungary

Hungary

Russia

Russia

Less than 3,000

2

4

0

2

3,000 – 9,999

6

2

1

3

10,000 – 19,999

3

2

0

4

20,000 – 49,999

4

6

0

7

50,000 – 99,999

3

0

1

2

100,000 – 249,999

15

7

1

5

250,000 and more

0

0

18

6

Total

33

21

22

29

Number of people

Yes, we have a plan

No plan

Yes, we have a plan

No plan

Management Training
Does your organization
develop a plan?
Yes
No
Total

Some
21
6
27

Hungary
None
12
15
27

Some
9
1
10

Russia
None
13
28
41

Age of the Respondent
Does your organization
develop a plan?
Yes
No
Total

25-35
3
3
6

35-45
9
7
16

Hungary
45-55
18
5
23

55 and above
3
6
9

Age of the Respondent
Does your organization
develop a plan?
Yes
No
Total

25-35
5
0
5

35-45
14
19
33

Russia
45-55
3
10
13

55 and above
0
0

Gender of the Respondent
Does your organization
develop a plan?
Yes
No
Total

Female
6
2
8

Hungary
Male
27
19
46

Female
3
5
8

Russia
Male
19
24
43
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Table 7.4 Distribution of Responses by Whether the Company Evaluates its Performance or Not and by
Whether the Company Has Ever Been In State Ownership or Not, the Size of the Company, Industry, the
Size of the Town Where the Company Is Located, Whether the Respondent Has Ever Had Any
Management Training or Not, the Age and Gender of the Respondent
Whether the company has ever been in state ownership or not
Does your organization
evaluate its performance?
Yes
No
Total

Yes
8
0
8

Hungary
No
43
1
44

Russia
No
17
1
18

Yes
25
7
32

Number of Employees
Does your organization
evaluate its
performance?
Yes
No
Total

less than 20
26
1
27

Hungary
20-49 50 or more
12
0
12

Manufacturing Categories
1. (DA) Manufacturing of food products, beverages
and tobacco
2. (DB) Manufacturing of textiles and textile
products
3. (DC) Manufacturing of leather and leather
products
4. (DD) Manufacturing of wood and wood products
5. (DE) Manufacturing of pulp, paper and paper
products; publishing and printing
6. (DF) Manufacturing of coke, refined petroleum
products and nuclear fuel
7. (DG) Manufacturing of chemicals, chemical
products and man-made fibers
8. (DH) Manufacturing of rubber and plastic
products
9. (DI) Manufacturing of other non-metallic mineral
products
10. (DJ) Manufacturing of basic metals and
fabricated metal products
11. (DK) Manufacturing of machinery and
equipment n.e.c.
12. (DL) Manufacturing of electrical and optical
equipment
13. (DM) Manufacturing of transport equipment
14. (DN) Manufacturing n.e.c
Other
Total

15
0
15

Hungary

Yes, we evaluate
our performance

less than 20

Russia
20-49

50 or more

5
2
7

16
5
21

22
1
23

Hungary

No, we
don’t

Russia

Yes, we evaluate
our performance

Russia

No, we
don’t

9

0

16

8

7

0

1

0

2

0

1

0

4
6

0
0

0
5

0
0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

3

0

0

0

1

1

4

0

8

0

4

0

3

0

4

0

2

0

1

0

1
4
2
53

0
0
0
1

1
4
2
43

0
0
0
8
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Town Size

Hungary

Hungary

Russia

Russia

Number of people

Yes, we evaluate our
performance

No, we don’t evaluate
our performance

Yes, we evaluate our
performance

No, we don’t evaluate
our performance

Less than 3,000

6

0

1

1

3,000 – 9,999

8

0

2

2

10,000 – 19,999

5

0

3

1

20,000 – 49,999

10

0

4

3

50,000 – 99,999

3

0

3

0

100,000 – 249,999

21

1

6

0

250,000 and more

0

0

24

1

Total

53

1

43

8

Management Training
Does your organization
evaluate its performance?
Yes
No
Total

Some
26
1
27

Hungary
None
27
0
27

Some
10
0
10

Russia
None
33
8
41

Age of the Respondent
Does your organization
evaluate its performance?
Yes
No
Total

25-35
6
0
6

35-45
15
1
16

Hungary
45-55
23
0
23

55 and above
9
0
9

Russia
45-55
9
4
13

55 and above
0
0
0

Age of the Respondent
Does your organization
evaluate its performance?
Yes
No
Total

25-35
5
0
5

35-45
29
4
33

Gender of the Respondent
Does your organization
evaluate its performance?
Yes
No
Total

Female
8
0
8

Hungary
Male
45
1
46

Female
6
2
8

Russia
Male
37
6
43
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Table 7.5 Distribution of Companies That Use Profit as a Measure of Their Performance by Whether the
Company Has Ever Been In State Ownership or Not, the Size of the Company, Industry, the Size of the
Town Where the Company Is Located, Whether the Respondent Has Ever Had Any Management Training
or Not, the Age and Gender of the Respondent (the number in parentheses is the total number of survey
responses in that group)
Whether the company has ever been in state ownership or not

Companies that use profit
as a measure of their
performance

Yes
2 (8)

Hungary
No
17 (44)

Russia
No
9 (18)

Yes
16 (32)

Number of Employees

Companies that use profit
as a measure of their
performance

less than 20
8 (27)

Hungary
20-49 50 or more
3 (12) 9 (15)

Manufacturing Categories
1. (DA) Manufacturing of food products, beverages
and tobacco
2. (DB) Manufacturing of textiles and textile products
3. (DC) Manufacturing of leather and leather products
4. (DD) Manufacturing of wood and wood products
5. (DE) Manufacturing of pulp, paper and paper
products; publishing and printing
6. (DF) Manufacturing of coke, refined petroleum
products and nuclear fuel
7. (DG) Manufacturing of chemicals, chemical
products and man-made fibers
8. (DH) Manufacturing of rubber and plastic products
9. (DI) Manufacturing of other non-metallic mineral
products
10. (DJ) Manufacturing of basic metals and fabricated
metal products
11. (DK) Manufacturing of machinery and equipment
n.e.c.
12. (DL) Manufacturing of electrical and optical
equipment
13. (DM) Manufacturing of transport equipment
14. (DN) Manufacturing n.e.c
Other
Total

less than 20
2 (7)

Hungary

Companies that use profit as a
measure of their performance

Russia
20-49
10
(21)

50 or more
15 (23)

Russia

Companies that use profit as a
measure of their performance

5 (9)

9 (24)

3 (7)
0 (2)
2 (4)
1 (6)

0 (1)
1 (1)
0 (0)
4 (5)

0 (0)

0 (0)

1 (1)

0 (0 )

0 (3)
1 (2)

0 (0)
3 (4)

3 (8)

2 (4)

0 (3)

2 (4)

2 (2)

1 (1)

0 (1)
0 (4)
2 (2)
20

1 (1)
2 (4)
1 (2)
26
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Town Size

Hungary

Russia

Number of people

Companies that use profit as a measure of
their performance

Less than 3,000

2 (6)

1 (2)

3,000 – 9,999

1 (8)

2 (4)

10,000 – 19,999

1 (5)

1 (4)

20,000 – 49,999

5 (10)

2 (7)

50,000 – 99,999

3 (3)

2 (3)

100,000 – 249,999

8 (22)

5 (6)

250,000 and more

0

13 (25)

Total

20 (54)

26 (51)

Companies that use profit as a measure of
their performance

Management Training

Companies that use profit
as a measure of their
performance

Some
6 (27)

Hungary
None
14 (27)

Some
7 (10)

Russia
None
19 (41)

Age of the Respondent

Companies that use profit
as a measure of their
performance

25-35
3 (6)

35-45
6 (16)

Hungary
45-55
9 (23)

55 and above
2 (9)

Russia
45-55
5 (13)

55 and above
0 (0)

Age of the Respondent

Companies that use profit
as a measure of their
performance

25-35
5 (5)

35-45
16 (33)

Gender of the Respondent

Companies that use profit
as a measure of their
performance

Female
3 (8)

Hungary
Male
17 (46)

Female
3 (8)

Russia
Male
23 (43)
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Table 7.6 Distribution of Responses to the Four Point Index Variable 17 by Whether the Company Has
Ever Been In State Ownership or Not, the Number of Employees, the Food, Beverages, and Tobacco
Industry (for Russian Companies Only), Whether the Manager Has Ever Had Any Management Training or
Not, the Age and Gender of the Manager
Whether the company has ever been in state ownership or not
4 point index
1
2
3
4
Total

Yes
0
2
2
4
8

Hungary
No
11
4
11
18
44

Yes
14
2
7
9
32

Russia
No
8
4
1
5
18

Number of Employees
4 point index
1
2
3
4
Total

less than 20
10
4
4
9
27

Hungary
20-49
1
1
4
6
12

50 or more
1
1
6
7
15

less than 20
4
2
1
0
7

Russia
20-49
13
2
4
2
21

50 or more
5
2
4
12
23

Companies from the Food, Beverages, and Tobacco Industry
4 point index
1
2
3
4
Total

Russia
14
0
6
4
24
Management Training

4 point index
1
2
3
4
Total

Some
3
5
7
12
27

Hungary
None
9
1
7
10
27

Some
2
1
2
5
10

Russia
None
20
5
7
9
41

Age of the Respondent
4 point index
1
2
3
4
Total

25-35
2
1
3
0
6

35-45
2
1
3
10
16

Hungary
45-55
3
1
8
11
23

55 and above
5
3
0
1
9
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Age of the Respondent
4 point index
1
2
3
4
Total

25-35
0
1
2
2
5

35-45
12
5
6
10
33

Russia
45-55
10
0
1
2
13

55 and above
0
0
0
0

Gender of the Respondent
4 point index
1
2
3
4
Total

Female
2
1
2
3
8

Hungary
Male
10
5
12
19
46

Female
3
1
1
3
8

Russia
Male
19
5
8
11
43
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Table 7.7 Distribution of Companies by Whether They Evaluate Their Competitors’
Performance/Strengths/Weaknesses/Strategies or Not and by Whether the Company Has Ever Been In
State Ownership or Not, the Number of Employees, the Food, Beverages, and Tobacco Industry (for
Russian companies only), Whether the Manager Has Ever Had Any Management Training or Not, the Age
and Gender of the Manager
Whether the company has ever been in state ownership or not

Evaluate
Do not evaluate
Total

Yes
8
0
8

Hungary
No
35
9
44

Yes
14
18
32

Russia
No
8
10
18

less than 20
1
6
7

Russia
20-49
6
15
21

Number of Employees

Evaluate
Do not evaluate
Total

less than 20
19
8
27

Hungary
20-49
11
1
12

50 or more
14
1
15

50 or more
16
7
23

Companies from the Food, Beverages, and Tobacco Industry
Evaluate
Do not evaluate
Total

Russia
8
16
24
Management Training

Evaluate
Do not evaluate
Total

Some
24
3
27

Hungary
None
20
7
27

Some
8
2
10

Russia
None
15
26
41

Age of the Respondent

Evaluate
Do not evaluate
Total

25-35
5
1
6

35-45
15
1
16

Hungary
45-55
20
3
23

55 and above
4
5
9
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Age of the Respondent

Evaluate
Do not evaluate
Total

25-35
5
0
5

35-45
16
17
33

Russia
45-55
2
11
13

55 and above
0
0
0

Gender of the Respondent

Evaluate
Do not evaluate
Total

Female
6
2
8

Hungary
Male
38
8
46

Female
5
3
8

Russia
Male
18
25
43
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Table 7.8 Distribution of Responses to Question 18 by Whether the Company Has Ever Been In State
Ownership or Not, the Number of Employees, the Food, Beverages, and Tobacco Industry (for the Russian
Companies Only), Whether the Manager Has Ever Had Any Management Training or Not, the Age and
Gender of the Manager
Whether the company has ever been in state ownership or not
7 point index
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Total

Yes
0
0
0
1
0
1
6
8

Hungary
No
6
0
1
0
3
6
28
44

Yes
11
2
2
1
6
1
9
32

Russia
No
7
0
1
0
2
3
5
18

Number of Employees
7 point index
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Total

less than
20
6
0
0
1
1
3
16
27

Hungary
20-49
50 or more
0
0
1
0
1
3
7
12

0
0
1
0
1
1
12
15

less than
20
4
0
0
1
1
1
0
7

Russia
20-49

50 or more

9
2
2
0
3
2
3
21

5
0
2
0
4
1
11
23

Companies from the Food, Beverages, and Tobacco Industry
7 point index
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Total

Russia
10
2
1
1
5
2
3
24
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Management Training
7 point index
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Total

Some
2
0
1
1
2
2
19
27

Hungary
None
4
0
1
0
1
5
16
27

Some
1
0
2
0
2
2
3
10

Russia
None
17
2
2
1
6
2
11
41

Age of the Respondent
7 point index
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Total

25-35
1
0
0
0
2
1
2
6

35-45
2
0
1
0
1
0
12
16

Hungary
45-55
1
0
1
0
0
4
17
23

55 and above
2
0
0
1
0
2
4
9

Russia
45-55
9
0
0
0
3
1
0
13

55 and above
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Age of the Respondent
7 point index
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Total

25-35
1
0
1
0
1
0
2
5

35-45
8
2
2
1
4
3
12
33

Gender of the Respondent
7 point index
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Total

Female
0
0
1
0
1
0
6
8

Hungary
Male
6
0
1
1
2
7
29
46

Female
2
2
1
0
0
1
2
8

Russia
Male
16
0
3
1
8
3
12
43
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Table 7.9 Distributions of Companies by Whether They Compare Their Products’ Quality with the
Competitors’ Products’ Quality or Not and By Whether the Company Has
Ever Been In State Ownership or Not, the Number of Employees, the Food, Beverages, and Tobacco
Industry (for Russian Companies Only), Whether the Manager Has Ever Had Any Management Training or
Not, the Age and Gender of the Manager
Whether the company has ever been in state ownership or not

Compare
Do not compare
Total

Yes
8
0
8

Hungary
No
39
5
44

Yes
18
14
32

Russia
No
9
9
18

less than 20
2
5
7

Russia
20-49
8
13
21

Number of Employees

Compare
Do not compare
Total

less than 20
23
4
27

Hungary
20-49
11
1
12

50 or more
15
0
15

40 or more
17
6
23

Companies from the Food, Beverages, and Tobacco Industry
Compare
Do not compare
Total

Russia
11
13
24
Management Training

Compare
Do not compare
Total

Some
26
1
27

Hungary
None
23
4
27

Some
6
4
10

Russia
None
21
20
41

Age of the Respondent

Compare
Do not compare
Total

25-35
4
2
6

35-45
14
2
16

Hungary
45-55
22
1
23

55 and above
9
0
9
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Age of the Respondent

Compare
Do not compare
Total

25-35
3
2
5

35-45
21
12
33

Russia
45-55
3
10
13

55 and above
0
0
0

Gender of the Respondent

Compare
Do not compare
Total

Female
8
0
8

Hungary
Male
41
5
46

Female
5
3
8

Russia
Male
22
21
43
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Table 7.10 Distribution of Responses to Question 19 by Whether the Company Has Ever Been In State
Ownership or Not, the Number of Employees, the Food, Beverages, and Tobacco Industry (for Russian
Companies Only), Whether the Manager Has Ever Had Any Management Training or Not, the Age and
Gender of the Manager
Whether the company has ever been in state ownership or not
7 point index
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Total

Yes
0
0
0
0
1
0
7
8

Hungary
No
3
0
1
2
2
4
32
44

Yes
17
0
3
3
1
2
6
32

Russia
No
3
2
3
2
2
2
4
18

less than 20
4
0
2
0
0
0
1
7

Russia
20-49
9
0
3
3
1
1
4
21

Number of Employees
7 point index
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Total

less than 20
2
0
1
1
2
3
18
27

Hungary
20-49
1
0
0
1
0
1
9
12

50 or more
0
0
0
0
2
0
13
15

Companies from the Food, Beverages, and Tobacco Industry
7 point index
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Total

Russia
14
1
1
4
2
2
0
24

50 or more
7
2
1
2
2
3
6
23
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Management Training
7 point index
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Total

Some
1
0
0
1
1
1
23
27

Hungary
None
2
0
1
1
3
3
17
27

Some
0
0
0
2
1
2
5
10

Russia
None
20
2
6
3
2
2
6
41

Age of the Respondent
7 point index
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Total

25-35
1
0
0
0
1
1
3
6

35-45
1
0
1
1
1
1
11
16

Hungary
45-55
0
0
0
1
2
2
18
23

55 and above
1
0
0
0
0
0
8
9

Russia
45-55
8
0
1
1
0
1
2
13

55 and above
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Age of the Respondent
7 point index
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Total

25-35
1
0
0
0
0
2
2
5

35-45
11
2
5
4
3
1
7
33

Gender of the Respondent
7 point index
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Total

Female
0
0
0
1
1
0
6
8

Hungary
Male
3
0
1
1
3
4
34
46

Female
2
1
2
1
0
1
1
8

Russia
Male
18
1
4
4
3
3
10
43
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Table 7.11 Distribution of Companies by Whether They Measure Their Customers’ Satisfaction or Not and
by Whether the Company Has Ever Been In State Ownership or Not, the Number of Employees, the Food,
Beverages, and Tobacco Industry (for Russian Companies Only), Whether the Manager Has Ever Had Any
Management Training or Not, the Age and Gender of the Manager
Whether the company has ever been in state ownership or not

Measure
Do not measure
Total

Yes
8
0
8

Hungary
No
42
2
44

Yes
14
18
32

Russia
No
9
9
18

less than 20
1
6
7

Russia
20-49
9
12
21

Number of Employees

Measure
Do not measure
Total

less than 20
25
2
27

Hungary
20-49
12
0
12

50 or more
15
0
15

50 or more
14
9
23

Companies from the Food, Beverages, and Tobacco Industry
Measure
Do not measure
Total

Russia
8
16
24
Management Training

Measure
Do not measure
Total

Some
26
1
27

Hungary
None
26
1
27

Some
9
1
10

Russia
None
15
26
41

Age of the Respondent

Measure
Do not measure
Total

25-35
5
1
6

35-45
16
0
16

Hungary
45-55
23
0
23

55 and above
8
1
9
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Age of the Respondent

Measure
Do not measure
Total

25-35
4
1
5

35-45
14
19
33

Russia
45-55
6
7
13

55 and above
0
0
0

Gender of the Respondent

Measure
Do not measure
Total

Female
8
0
8

Hungary
Male
44
2
46

Female
3
5
8

Russia
Male
21
22
43
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APPENDIX 8
DETAILED DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS 15.1
AND 15.2
Table 8.1 Distribution of Companies by Whether There Are Any Outside Factors That Positively Influence
Them or Not and by Whether the Company Has Ever Been In State Ownership or Not, the Size of the
Company, Industry, the Size of the Town Where the Company Is Located, Whether the Manager Has Ever
Had Any Management Training or Not, the Age and Gender of the Manager
Whether the company has ever been in state ownership or not
Positive factors
Yes
No
Total

Yes
4
4
8

Hungary
No
31
13
44

Russia
No
3
15
18

Yes
10
22
32

Number of Employees
Positive factors
Yes
No
Total

less than 20
16
11
27

Hungary
20-49
9
3
12

50 or more
5
5
15

Russia
20-49
4
17
21

less than 20
1
6
7

Manufacturing Categories

Hungary

50 or more
9
14
23

Hungary

There are positive No positive
factors
factors

1. (DA) Manufacturing of food products, beverages and tobacco
2. (DB) Manufacturing of textiles and textile products
3. (DC) Manufacturing of leather and leather products
4. (DD) Manufacturing of wood and wood products
5. (DE) Manufacturing of pulp, paper and paper products; publishing and
printing
6. (DF) Manufacturing of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel
7. (DG) Manufacturing of chemicals, chemical products and man-made fibers
8. (DH) Manufacturing of rubber and plastic products
9. (DI) Manufacturing of other non-metallic mineral products

4
3
1
3
3

5
4
1
1
3

0
1
3
1

0
0
0
1

10. (DJ) Manufacturing of basic metals and fabricated metal products
11. (DK) Manufacturing of machinery and equipment n.e.c.
12. (DL) Manufacturing of electrical and optical equipment
13. (DM) Manufacturing of transport equipment
14. (DN) Manufacturing n.e.c
Other
Total

6
3
1
1
3
2
35

2
0
1
0
1
0
19
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Manufacturing Categories

Russia

Russia

There are positive No positive
factors
factors

1. (DA) Manufacturing of food products, beverages and tobacco
2. (DB) Manufacturing of textiles and textile products
3. (DC) Manufacturing of leather and leather products
4. (DD) Manufacturing of wood and wood products
5. (DE) Manufacturing of pulp, paper and paper products; publishing and
printing
6. (DF) Manufacturing of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel
7. (DG) Manufacturing of chemicals, chemical products and man-made fibers
8. (DH) Manufacturing of rubber and plastic products
9. (DI) Manufacturing of other non-metallic mineral products

5
0
0
0
2

19
1
1
0
3

0
0
0
3

0
0
0
1

10. (DJ) Manufacturing of basic metals and fabricated metal products
11. (DK) Manufacturing of machinery and equipment n.e.c.
12. (DL) Manufacturing of electrical and optical equipment
13. (DM) Manufacturing of transport equipment
14. (DN) Manufacturing n.e.c
Other
Total

2
1
0
0
0
1
14

2
3
1
1
4
1
37

Town Size

Hungary

Number of people

There are outside
factors

Hungary

Less than 3,000

5

1

0

2

3,000 – 9,999

5

3

2

2

10,000 – 19,999

2

3

0

4

20,000 – 49,999

5

5

1

6

50,000 – 99,999

2

1

2

1

100,000 – 249,999

16

6

0

6

250,000 and more

0

0

9

16

Total

35

19

14

37

There are no
outside factors

Russia

There are outside
factors

Russia

There are no
outside factors

Management Training
Positive factors
Yes
No
Total

Some
18
9
27

Hungary
None
17
10
27

Some
5
5
10

Russia
None
9
32
41
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Age of the Respondent
Positive factors
Yes
No
Total

25-35
4
2
6

35-45
9
7
16

Hungary
45-55
19
4
23

55 and above
3
6
9

Russia
45-55
2
11
13

55 and above
0
0
0

Age of the Respondent
Positive factors
Yes
No
Total

25-35
3
2
5

35-45
9
24
33

Gender of the Respondent
Positive factors
Yes
No
Total

Female
5
3
8

Hungary
Male
30
16
46

Female
4
4
8

Russia
Male
10
33
43
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Table 8.2 Distribution of Companies by Whether There Are Any Outside Constraints That Negatively
Influence Them or Not and by Whether the Company Has Ever Been In State Ownership or Not, the Size
of the Company, Industry, the Size of the Town Where the Company Is Located, Whether the Manager Has
Ever Had Any Management Training or Not, the Age and Gender of the Manager
Whether the company has ever been in state ownership or not
Outside
constraints
Yes
No
Total

Yes
6
2
8

Hungary
No
42
2
44

Russia
No
12
6
18

Yes
13
19
32

Number of Employees
Outside
constraints
Yes
No
Total

less than 20
26
1
27

Hungary
20-49
12
0
12

50 or more
11
4
15

less than 20
3
4
7

Manufacturing Categories

Russia
20-49
8
13
21

Hungary
There are
constraints

50 or more
15
8
23

Hungary

No constraints

1. (DA) Manufacturing of food products, beverages and tobacco
2. (DB) Manufacturing of textiles and textile products
3. (DC) Manufacturing of leather and leather products
4. (DD) Manufacturing of wood and wood products
5. (DE) Manufacturing of pulp, paper and paper products; publishing and
printing
6. (DF) Manufacturing of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear
fuel
7. (DG) Manufacturing of chemicals, chemical products and man-made
fibers
8. (DH) Manufacturing of rubber and plastic products
9. (DI) Manufacturing of other non-metallic mineral products

9
7
2
3
5

0
0
0
1
1

0

0

1

0

3
2

0
0

10. (DJ) Manufacturing of basic metals and fabricated metal products
11. (DK) Manufacturing of machinery and equipment n.e.c.
12. (DL) Manufacturing of electrical and optical equipment
13. (DM) Manufacturing of transport equipment
14. (DN) Manufacturing n.e.c
Other
Total

7
3
1
1
4
1
49

1
0
1
0
0
1
5
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Manufacturing Categories

Russia

Russia

No constraints

There are
constraints

1. (DA) Manufacturing of food products, beverages and tobacco
2. (DB) Manufacturing of textiles and textile products
3. (DC) Manufacturing of leather and leather products
4. (DD) Manufacturing of wood and wood products
5. (DE) Manufacturing of pulp, paper and paper products; publishing and
printing
6. (DF) Manufacturing of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear
fuel
7. (DG) Manufacturing of chemicals, chemical products and man-made
fibers
8. (DH) Manufacturing of rubber and plastic products
9. (DI) Manufacturing of other non-metallic mineral products

9
1
0
0
2

15
0
1
0
3

0

0

0

0

0
3

0
1

10. (DJ) Manufacturing of basic metals and fabricated metal products
11. (DK) Manufacturing of machinery and equipment n.e.c.
12. (DL) Manufacturing of electrical and optical equipment
13. (DM) Manufacturing of transport equipment
14. (DN) Manufacturing n.e.c
Other
Total

3
2
1
1
2
2
26

1
2
0
0
2
0
25

Town Size

Hungary

Less than 3,000

6

0

2

0

3,000 – 9,999

7

1

0

4

10,000 – 19,999

4

1

0

4

20,000 – 49,999

9

1

4

3

50,000 – 99,999

3

0

1

2

100,000 – 249,999

20

2

1

5

250,000 and more

0

0

18

7

Total

49

5

26

25

Number of people

There are constraints

Hungary

There are no
constraints

Russia

There are constraints

Russia

There are no
constraints

Management Training
Outside
constraints
Yes
No
Total

Some
23
4
27

Hungary
None
26
1
27

Some
8
2
10

Russia
None
18
23
41
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Age of the Respondent
Outside
constraints
Yes
No
Total

25-35
4
2
6

35-45
15
1
16

Hungary
45-55
22
1
23

55 and above
8
1
9

Russia
45-55
8
5
13

55 and above
0
0
0

Age of the Respondent
Outside
constraints
Yes
No
Total

25-35
5
0
5

35-45
13
20
33

Gender of the Respondent
Outside
constraints
Yes
No
Total

Female
6
2
8

Hungary
Male
43
3
46

Female
2
6
8

Russia
Male
24
19
43
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